

DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-PHILOSOPHY

SEMESTER-I

INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

CORE-102

BLOCK-1

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

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First Published in 2019



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FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavors.



INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

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BLOCK-1 INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

In this block you will study the introduction of epistemology, basis of pramanas, pratyaksha, anumana and khyati.

Unit-1 deals with Philosophical Questions and Pramanas

Unit-2 deals with valid (prama) and invalid (aprama); validity (pramanya); its nature, conditions and definitions; valid cognition (prama): classification; instruments of cognition (indriya) and their nature.

Unit-3 deals in the debate about the nature, origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (jnapti) of validity; svatahpramanyavada; paratahpramanyavad

Unit-4 deals with pratyaksha pramana as understood by various schools

Unit-5 deals with anumana as accepted by various schools

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Unit-7 talks about Atmakhyati , anirvacaniyakhyati, akhyati,

UNIT 1 - PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS AND PRAMANAS

STRUCTURE

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Sceptical Questions
- 1.3 The Empirical and the Non-empirical
- 1.4 The Pramana Doctrine: General Characteristics
- 1.5 Two World-views
- 1.6 Ontological Issues
- 1.7 Let Us Sum Up
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- 1.9 Questions for review
- 1.10 Suggested Readings
- 1.11 Answers to Check your Progress

1.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn about the basic features of knowing
- know the philosophical understanding of epistemology

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Every one of us, in his pre-philosophical mood, is bound to believe that there exists a physical, material world-a world which is there independently of our awareness of it. But the truth or falsity of this simple and commonplace belief, as philosophers over the ages and all over the world have made us well aware, is one of the hardest things on earth to prove. The familiar fact that I am writing now on a paper with pen and ink and that all these three things, pen, ink, and paper, constitute

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parts of what we call the material world, seems to be something that can never be doubted, and yet philosophers have been able to cast doubt upon such pre-philosophical, pre-reflective, pre-critical certainties. The problem is that not only do we believe, as we must, in the mind-dependent existence of the physical world, we also seem to share a common feeling that this belief can be vindicated and proven to be true through rational means and evidence available to us. We feel that this goal, though difficult, is not impossible to achieve. However, the sceptics have argued that this goal is ever-elusive, for the best that philosophers of all ages could do is to formulate different, often conflicting, theories about the way the world is or seems to be. Granted that the theories are poor substitutes for truth, they are our only resort in our puzzlement. If the clothes do not fit we may either decide to remain naked or buy new ones that may fit better. The sceptics may prefer the pristine purity of nakedness (cf. 'emptiness', 'the elimination of metaphysics'), but others choose the latter.

Evaluation of our evidence for knowledge is tied to the question of the sources of knowledge, how knowledge is derived. An important and pervasive view, which is sometimes recognized as a characteristic of the philosophic position called empiricism, is that sense-experience or immediate experience is the primary source of knowledge. The strong form of this doctrine accords observational basis to all our theoretical and objective knowledge. In a weak form it may claim that all our knowledge must begin with sensory experience and that the ultimate court of appeal must be some observational data or other. The group of classical philosophers of India, whom I will classify as the pramana theorists, seems to have upheld this weaker doctrine of the empiricists for they use this as an implicit premise from which the theory of pramana is derived. The theory states that for each piece of knowledge there is some accredited means. It is further held by all the pramana theorists that sense-perception is the principal among all the evidential bases or means, for all the bases must in the long run be authenticated by some (sensory) perceptual base or other. As Uddyotakara has commented, we emphasize perception, for all pramanas are (in some way or other) preceded by (sensory) perception.

The strong claim of some philosophers of classical India was that conception without perception is 'empty'. The counter-claim was that perception without conception is 'blind'. But it seems to me that the counter-claim may also be compatible with empiricism. For it says that non-conceptual or pre-conceptual perception is merely blind or unrevealing, not empty or non-existent. Even so, such perceptual experience is possible: witness the experience of babies and the mute. This does not offend the spirit of the pramana doctrine as long as it could be claimed further that such 'blind' perceptual occurrences constitute the starting-point of concept-formation. While remaining ontologically neutral regarding the status of concepts, we may say that whatever concepts are there, they do not enter our mind without being first presented or suggested by the senses. This does not apparently go against the medieval scholastic formulation of the empirical doctrine: Nothing is in the mind (intellect) without its first being in the senses.

The cornerstone of such a philosophic position is what is usually called 'experience'. If all our factual knowledge and knowledge of existence are to be based upon, or should be vindicated by reference to, experience, we must all be clear about what is meant by 'experience'. But it is by no means certain what most philosophers in the Western tradition meant by this term. The situation in Sanskrit does not seem to be any way better in this regard. The analogous term in Sanskrit is pratiti or pratyaya (sometimes the word anubhava is also used); but neither are the Sanskrit terms always translatable as 'experience' in English, nor is it easy to find any other word suitable for the purpose. Experience is usually appealed to, in the Western tradition, when our search for certainty (in Cartesian epistemology) is supposed to come to an end and hence a knowledge-claim can be established. Pratiti or anubhava becomes also the ultimate court of appeal for many Sanskrit philosophers whom we will refer to here. There is an obvious problem if this argument is seriously and critically scrutinized. If the most immediate, non-conceptual experience is barren without being impregnated by a background theory, then it becomes a very inadequate guide to decisions in controversial, but vitally important matters, as we shall see in the next section.

Scepticism concerning the possibility of our knowledge about the objective, external world has driven the philosophers of East and West to

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think of 'experience' as purely how the world appears to the subject without implying what it actually is or may be. A basic distinction has to be postulated between an experience and its interpretation, between the crude data passively received and construction of them into a structure. This, however, raises many important philosophic issues which we will go into later. But let us note one issue at the outset, viz. the paradoxicality of the situation. Empiricists try to make experience the 'building blocks' of our knowledge, but if those building blocks are given in terms of appearances only, then the edifice of knowledge will show only the appearance and not the reality. The sceptics, who first compelled the empiricists to search for the indubitable ground for knowledge to guarantee certainty, may now feel elated because our 'experience' of the external, material world still remains unestablished. We can have a 'causal theory' of appearances or of experience, but it will still allow us only to speculate about how the material world actually is or to wonder whether there is a material world at all, for it becomes like the unperceived Lockean substance. We can at best talk about our knowledge of the appearances. The Western epistemologists and the pramana theorists are alike unwittingly led to look to our 'subjective' experience for the support of our 'objective' knowledge. This is what A. J. Ayer has called the existence of an unbridgeable gap which the sceptic seeks to demonstrate, between the conclusion, we desire to reach and the premises from which we set out. The problem is that somehow the epistemologists of both traditions feel quite unsure about how to bridge the gap, and there hardly seems to be any agreed principle on the basis of which they could proceed.

A comment on my use of the word 'empiricism' in this connection may be in order. The word is much entrenched in the West today in the sense of being a counter-theory to what is called rationalism, and hence my use of it in the present context may be misleading. Empiricism is supposed to oppose the doctrine according to which the mind is not a tabula rasa, but there are innate ideas in mind. Locke's empiricism was thus directed against such a theory of innate ideas. Roughly speaking, those who believe in innate ideas claim that abstract ideas, concepts, or universals can exist prior to sensory experience and provide a kind of knowledge more precise than that obtained from sensory experience. Empiricism,

which rejects this claim, is therefore generally seen as mainly a thesis about the origin of ideas, universals, or concepts. But when characterized the pramana doctrine as being committed to some form of empiricism, one must not wish to give the impression that all pramana theorists agreed about this thesis concerning the origin of ideas or universals.

In fact the term 'empiricism' has been used by philosophers with extreme looseness and hence there may be several philosophic schools, practices, and attitudes which could be called empiricist. We could call the pramana theorists empiricists in order to focus upon the fact that these philosophers, the Naiyayikas and the Buddhists (as well as their counterparts in the Mimamsa, Samkhya, and Jaina traditions), were in fact engaged in attempts to refute the overpowering scepticism of such Indian dialecticians as Nagarjuna and Jayarasi regarding the possibility of knowledge. All parties propounding the doctrine of pramanas maintain that no knowledge is possible independently of some perceptual basis or other. Even scriptural knowledge (i.e. knowledge derived from scriptures) is regarded by some pramana theorists as ultimately based upon the direct (presumably mystical) experience of such persons as the Buddha or the Jina. For Nyaya, the Vedas were spoken by God, and hence their validity is on a par with the validity of statements made by reliable and trustworthy persons who have seen the dharma or the truth. Mimamsa is an exception to this rule, and Vedanta or the 'later' (Uttara) Mimamsa part company with the other pramana theorists in this regard.

In much of contemporary analytical philosophy in the West a form of empiricism is presupposed. (The old dispute between empiricism and rationalism has recently been reviewed by Noam Chomsky and a few others. One would take the following line to resolve the terminological problem. As long as the observational basis of our knowledge or most of it is conceded, it is believed that an important part of the empiricists' intuition is accepted. This remains so even if it is agreed within the general context that some universals, though they are not innate ideas in the mind, are mind-independent realities of the world. Bhartrhari held the view that our innate readiness to articulate concepts in speech is an 'innate' disposition, but this disposition is acquired (in

some metaphysical sense), for it is derived from the residual (memory) traces of countless experiences in countless previous incarnations of the person (purvahita-samskra). One may well be reminded here of Plato's celebrated Theory of Recollection, the theory that says that so-called learning is really the recollecting of knowledge acquired before birth. The Buddhists on the other hand regard universals only as convenient myths, helpful like a 'vehicle' but dispensable after the journey. Nyaya argues that some natural universals are objectively real and even perceptible, provided the objects instantiating them are also perceived. One may use the term 'empiricism' with a small 'e' and say that in the Indian context there are at least four optional philosophic positions under the general principle embodying the observation-based character of all empirical knowledge:

Nyaya realism, Buddhist phenomenalism/idealism, mystical scepticism (of Nagarjuna and Srihara), and Bhartrhari's holism.

1.2 SCEPTICAL QUESTIONS

Philosophical problems are characteristically initiated by a sceptical challenge to some accepted doctrine. The various pramana theories of classical Indian philosophy were thus answers to the sceptical challenge that knowledge is impossible. The accepted doctrine (articulated probably in the early Nyaya tradition) was that it is possible for us to know what is there and that our means of knowing (pramana) clearly establishes what is there to be known (or the 'objects' of knowledge = prameya). Before the rise of the philosophical systems in India, during the heyday of debates between the sramanas and the brahmins (roughly the period between 600 and 100 BC), there were sceptics like Sanjaya and others, whose accounts are to be found in the canonical literature of Buddhism and Jainism as well as in the Hindu epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. Scepticism at that time was either iconoclastic or directed against the knowledge-claims regarding moral, religious, and eschatological matters. Sanjaya, for example, was sceptical about the possibility of any knowledge about such matters. Some specimens of

questions, the answers to which were thought 'unexplained' or 'unexplainable' (cf. *avyakrta*) in the Pali canons are as follows:

Does anything survive death? Is the world finite?

Is there a soul different from body?

Does he who acts also 'enjoy', i.e. get reward and punishment?

What is right and what is wrong?'

Scepticism about metaphysical truth-claims and moral principles gradually leads to scepticism about the possibility of any knowledge. It is thus not at all surprising when we find in Nagarjuna, a great exponent of Madhyamika Buddhism (c.AD 150), a full-fledged and systematic sceptical challenge to a theory of knowledge that tries to articulate a notion of 'knowledge' and 'knowable' by referring to various accredited ways or means of knowing (*pramana*). Nagarjuna was followed in this regard by Jayarasi in the eighth century AD and Srihara in the eleventh century. Apart from Jayarasi, who was avowedly a sceptic, there were also the monistic metaphysicians who were always critical of the *pramana* method. In fact recognized two distinct streams in the philosophic tradition of India are : one is illustrated by the *pramana-prameya* doctrine and the other by a total scepticism about the adequacy or validity of such a philosophic method. The usual distinction between empiricism and rationalism—a distinction that was prevalent among Western philosophers primarily of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—does not seem to be very relevant in a context where a very frank fundamental critique of knowledge is put forward. Both the empiricist and the rationalist try to combat scepticism on different grounds. Both believe that there should be an indubitable ground upon which knowledge is to be founded: primary experiential data for the empiricist, and certain primary a priori axioms for the rationalist. The sceptical dialecticians of India followed a 'radical' method to expose the hollowness of the very concept of knowledge and knowables so that alternative ways of arriving at certainty—reason or sense-experience—were simply not adequate. The sceptics of India argued that the very concept of knowledge and its foundation is either paradoxical or circular.

Further, to be fairly consistent, the sceptical dialecticians, such as Nagarjuna, Sanjaya, Jayarasi, and Srihara seldom, if at all, offered construction of any metaphysical system (Sanjaya and Jayarasi did not,

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Nagarjuna and Srihara apparently did); it was accepted a priori and without rational explanation, for it was handed down by the scriptures. It is still arguable whether Nagarjuna and Srihara believed in any metaphysics except that they regarded philosophy conducted through sceptical method as complementary to their soteriological goal—a ladder to climb up or a raft to cross over, and then to be discarded. They sought to demonstrate that the so-called exercise of pure reason was bound to be futile for it would lose itself in the quicksand of contradictions as soon as it is rigorously pursued and led beyond the limits of possible experience. A famous and oft-quoted couplet puts it as follows: “The own-nature” of things cannot be ascertained by the analytical exercise of intellect (buddhi). Therefore, they (the things) are shown to be ineffable and without “own-nature” From the point of view these Indian sceptics, the seventeenth-century rationalists of Europe mistaken in supposing that the nature of things could be discovered merely through the exercise of reason.

Philosophical empiricism is ingrained in some form of scepticism. Doubt and uncertainty regarding the possibility of knowledge lead one to ground knowledge on the most direct sort of evidence (experience). I have said that the pramana theorists (by which I mean the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, the Samkhya and Mimamsakas, and the later Buddhists and Jains) believed in a weaker form of empiricism, namely that senses initially provide us with knowledge. The sceptics, on the other hand, denied this thesis, and argued that there is an inherent conflict between the data of experience and reason, and such a conflict leads to scepticism rather than to any theory about the way the world is.

The point that Nagarjuna tried to put across is briefly this. The standards that we use to measure others are themselves in need of being measured. If this is conceded, then we end up with an infinite regress that is damaging to the fundamental assumptions of the pramana theorists. If, however, this is not conceded, then, argues Nagarjuna, our choice of standard becomes unreasonably arbitrary—a situation that is also intolerable to reason.. If a follower of Descartes argued that whatever standard we may choose it must be indubitable in the sense of our having a feeling of absolute certainty with regard to it, then Nagarjuna would say that such a criterion would invest the standard with a subjectivity that

would be repulsive to philosophers who are looking for some objective characteristic of the standard.

The pramana theorists create a common front against this onslaught of radical scepticism. It may be objected that what has been presented is a very disparate bunch of philosophers as a united group, calling them the pramana theorists. It is true that they adhered to different rival positions in ontology and other areas, but this should not blind us to the fact that a great deal of agreement on fundamental principles and method of philosophy exists among them.

All pramana theorists agree, first and foremost but with varying degrees of emphasis, that what exists, or is really there, can be known (and is known). The domain of the knowables seems to converge, or coincide, with only a few exceptions, with the domain of 'existents'. Some (e.g. Nyaya-Vaisesika) would even go further to say that what is knowable is also 'effable', i.e. expressible or nameable in language, for whatever satisfies the conditions for being known satisfies also the conditions for being expressed or named. Other pramana theorists, however, part company with the Nyaya-Vaisesika and are reluctant to make knowability a sufficient condition for 'effability'. There are others, for example Bhartrhari and possibly also the proponents of Kashmir Saivism, who would lend an indirect support to the Nyaya-Vaisesika position by propounding a theory of an intimate connection between language and 'structured' knowledge.

Bhartrhari argued that ordinary human consciousness is an ever-vibrating agency, revealing the objects (knowables) through the medium of words. Without such words or language-mediated revelation of objects (or knowables), the revelatory character of human awareness would be destroyed. Awareness or perception without the intermingling of words and concepts would be, in other words, barren. A cognitive act is, in this view, only a word-mediated act of consciousness. The Nyaya claim, however, does not necessarily assume such a view about human awareness. For Nyaya allows that there could be word-less, and, what amounts to the same thing, concept-less awareness of the knowables. But it would be possible to express in language what would be known, or what we would be aware of, in this way. Others, dissenting from the Nyaya, argue that there may be-in fact, there are-objects or knowables,

which could only be known, i.e. revealed to human awareness, but which may not be effable in language.

This 'ineffability' thesis can take several forms. One view says that what is 'sensed' or directly grasped by our perceptual experience cannot be captured by our use of word or language, for language is a social affair, and we can transmit through it only what is inter subjectively accessible. Pure sensory (and even subjective) experiences, to which upholders of this view would assign the name 'perception' as well as 'knowledge', are unique to each subject. Therefore, what is revealed in such an experience must have an important component that is incommunicable. This view, with possible modifications, is ascribable to the Dinnaga-Dharmakirti school of Buddhism and it leans towards what is called phenomenism in present-day terminology. It also subscribes to a sort of logical atomism. Indeed this Buddhist point of view seems to coincide with the Russellian intuition about logically proper names. Russell argued that in an ideal language there must be logically proper names although there are no examples of them in actual language, for 'to get a true proper name, we should have to get to a single particular'. Dinnaga might have had the same idea when he declared that the pure particular or the pure sense-datum is, in principle, ineffable (anirdesa).

The other view is holistic. It regards reality as a unitary, undifferentiated, and indivisible whole. But language necessarily slices this whole into pieces, and thereby becomes responsible for the proliferation of concepts. Almost all our concepts, e.g. cause, effect, and motion, issue according to this view, into some contradiction or other. To the extent that language operates with concepts, it fails to represent reality.

1.3 THE EMPIRICAL AND THE NON-EMPIRICAL

To one who is generally conversant with the recent history of Western epistemology, it may seem surprising that the Indian pramanas theorists do not discuss the rather well-entrenched epistemological distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. Obviously this distinction has something to do with knowledge. Whatever might have been the origin

of the terms among the scholastics, they are understood nowadays (since Kant) as roughly equivalent to what is derived from experience and what is not. It is surely a lacuna in the Indian pramiti Jnana theory that it has very little to say about the nature of a priori knowledge. We can catch only occasional glimpses of some background notions, that of purportedly necessary truths and a priori arguments. In other words, we can arguably talk about the pramana theorists' view of the necessary and omnitemporal truths and arguments based upon such truths.

To suit our purpose we can talk in terms of a distinction between empirical and non-empirical knowledge. For the pramana theorists discussed in another context what may be called non-empirical knowledge. They did so when they debated among themselves about the nature of 'scriptural' knowledge and what they called the knowledge of dharma. Some philosophers have claimed that our knowledge of dharma cannot be derived simply through empirical means such as perception and inference. The notion of dharma (a very pervasive and significant term enriched by its ambiguous use) encompasses religious as well as social and ethical duties. It also includes some moral principles. Philosophers argued that the scriptures purportedly talk about such matters. They also deal with a number of factual beliefs on the basis of which the religious and moral duties are prescribed. We may recall that the early sceptics (such as Sanjaya) argued that we cannot obtain knowledge about such matters and therefore correct answers to such questions as 'What happens to us when we die?' and 'Why and how can the deeds we do here be effective for us hereafter?' are unavailable. The factual beliefs that we derive from the scriptures cannot therefore obtain the status of empirical knowledge, for the well-known empirical means are not available. The scriptures, it is argued, impart no empirical or trans-empirical knowledge. For as far as the pramana theory is concerned, it has to be knowledge, not just a belief or faith, in order to persuade intelligent and rational beings to act the way they do. The tradition defines the scriptures as follows: The means (in fact, "knowledge-how") that can be known by neither perception nor inference is what they come to know through Scriptures. And this constitutes the scripture-hood of the Scriptures.

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Vaidika philosophers such as Bhartrhari and Samkara have debated that our empirical ways of knowing, perception, inference or language, can sometimes be fallible but the scriptural way of knowing is by definition infallible! This is a sort of fundamentalism. Our knowledge derived in this way is bound to be true because no empirical means could possibly falsify it. Referring to the fallibility of empirical knowledge Bhartrhari says: 'The sky looks like a solid surface, and the fire-fly like (a spark of) fire, (but we know that it is all wrong for) there is no solid surface in the sky, and no fire in the fire-fly. The scriptures reveal truths that are by no means revealed in the ordinary way. Samkara has said: 'The truth (knowledge-hood) of the Vedic statements is self-established independently of anything else. It is like the sun which reveals itself while revealing colours. In other words, the scriptures are self-validating. Most philosophers belonging to the Purva and Uttara-Mimamsa upheld not only the self-validation theory of the scriptures but also the self-validation theory of knowledge in general (whether empirical or non-empirical). Their general thesis is that when knowledge arises it validates itself.

A very simple argument is given to show that there is no possibility of error in scriptural statements. They cannot be wrong for they have no author, no speaker. They are eternally given and 'trans-human' in origin (a-pauruseya). When a statement is false, the reason for this falsity can invariably be traced back to the shortcomings of its author, its speaker. Hence no speaker, no falsification! Obviously this amounts to a dogma. However, certain other considerations are submitted to avoid the charge of dogmatism.

It has been claimed in the Mahabharata, the Manusamhita and many other places, that the essence or truth (tattva) of dharma lies hidden from human experience, and comprehension of dharma would therefore be impossible. But there are, fortunately for humans, some other ways of obtaining this knowledge: (i) the scriptures, (ii) the verdict of the saints and seers, and (iii) your own good conscience or moral intuition.

On the notion of intuition or pratibha, Bhartrhari has a lot to say. For him, intuition is different from perception and inference and is a means by which we understand the undifferentiated meaning of a sentence as a whole. We understand it in a flash. It is a separate awareness (anyaiva),

not one which is generated by piecing together the fragments of meaning of different words and other constituents of the sentence. The scope of this intuition in Bhartrhari's conception is however much wider. It is regarded as a flash of understanding which arises spontaneously in all sentient beings. It is natural and comparable to the power of intoxication that naturally develops in some liquids when they become mature. This notion in Bhartrhari's description is comprehensive enough to include matters ranging from the instincts of birds and animals, the spontaneous capacities of newly born babies, and the infant's capacity to learn a language, to the intelligence of higher order. Bhartrhari claims that this intuitive knowledge is far more reliable than any other kind of knowledge because it comes from within. It can arise in all sentient beings, for its root cause is the Word- principle which is an integral part of sentience and hence present (potentially) in all such beings. It is because of this principle that newly born babies are able to make the first movement of their vocal chords to utter words and to breathe. This is also how they learn a language.

From Bhartrhari's description, it is not absolutely clear whether we regard intuition as empirical or non-empirical. I am inclined to hold that it is the latter. The Naiyayikas will find it difficult to accommodate such a piece of intuitive knowledge in their scheme of classification of ordinary empirical knowledge. The scriptures in Bhartrhari are nothing more than the record of the higher intuitive knowledge of the seers and saints. It is the transcendental insight of the seers into such matters or facts as lie beyond the scope and limit of (ordinary) human knowledge.

The Naiyayikas on the other hand argued that the knowledge-claim of the scriptures must have some sort of empirical foundation. It is, they held, ridiculous to assume that they have no author, no speaker. Just as the veracity of any statement is derived from the trustworthiness of its speaker, so the veracity of the scriptural statements is dependent upon the infallibility of its author. Its author is a person with perfect knowledge, God. Hence the truth-claim of the scriptures is of a piece with the truth-claim of any other statement. The speaker must be an apta, a trustworthy person. Vatsyayana defines an apta as 'a person who has directly experienced the dharma and is motivated by a desire to transmit what he has seen. The definition extends to God who is supposed to have direct

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knowledge of the dharma and the scriptures being authored by such a person can be informative about the dharma. In fact the model of a trustworthy person can be relieved of its sectarian colour as well as its theistic overtone. Even the Buddha or the Jina can be called apta if it is allowed that the truth of dharma has been revealed to their intuitive insight. In this way however the distinction between the empirical and the non-empirical may be said to disappear. Scriptural knowledge and the knowledge of dharma, the factual beliefs upon which the religious and moral prescriptions are based, would receive an empirical foundation of a different order. They are validated by a different sort of experience, intuitive insight of a Buddha, a Jina, or a saint.

The next section is the discussion of (ordinary) empirical knowledge, which was the cornerstone of the pramana epistemology. The Indian way of looking at the scriptural, religious, and moral beliefs does not require a sharp dichotomy of facts and values, and it is incompatible with what is known as non-cognitivism in today's moral philosophy. Even a moral proposition becomes morally binding, that is, a dharma becomes a 'true' (satya) dharma, for it receives the required cognitive value from the intuition and the 'unimpaired' insight of the apta, such as the sages, the seers, god, the Buddha, or the Jina. This might tentatively answer the obvious, often-asked question today about classical Indian philosophy: Why do these Indian philosophers with their basically religious, soteriological, and practical concerns (e.g. concern for the final freedom or nirvana) waste so much energy and effort on the investigation of some apparently theoretical and secular problems, such as the nature of perception, truth and falsity of awareness, logic and meanings of words and sentences? To wit: They do not waste time and energy for they find them particularly relevant to their concerns although such relevance may have to be established in a rather seemingly tortuous way. Understanding precedes praxis and there cannot be any understanding that is of any value if it is not philosophically based and argued for.

1.4 THE PRAMANA DOCTRINE: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Briefly speaking, the pramana-prameya doctrine states: (i) there are accredited means of knowledge (pramana) such as perception and inference, on the basis of which we make assertions about what exists, and what is true, and (ii) there are knowables (prameya) i.e. cognizable entities, which constitute the world. Each knowable entity can be revealed or grasped by our knowledge-episodes. The means of knowing provide the required, adequate evidence for the objects or entities that we know. All pramana theorists agree about the episodic character of knowledge. Knowledge or a knowing episode is brought about much like a sensation of pain by a set of causal factors. It is a happening, an event that takes place, a cognitive episode; but not all cognitive episodes amount to knowledge or knowing episodes. Only such cognitive or mental episodes would amount to knowledge as would yield a truth. Knowledge is but a true cognition revealing the nature or reality as it is.

While talking about pramana, one has to emphasize its dual character: evidential and causal. A pramana provides evidence or justification for regarding a cognitive episode as a piece of knowledge. It is also regarded as the 'most effective' causal factor that gives rise to a particular cognitive episode. The theory of pramanas in this way becomes (secondarily) a theory of justification as well. In Sanskrit technical terminology, a pramana is said to be an 'instrumental' cause (karana), or the 'most effective' causal factor (sadhakatama) of the knowledge-episode.

There is also a systematic ambiguity in the use of the term pramana. It means both a means for (or a way of) knowledge and an authoritative source for making a knowledge-claim. It also means a 'proof', a way of proving that something exists or something is the case. If there is a table before me, a table which I see, then any means of seeing it (presumably the faultless faculty of sight) is a pramana for what I see to be there. The same means is also called a pramana in the second sense; it is an authority, pramana, for me to know what I see, it forms the basis or basic evidence for my assertion about what I see. It is also apramana in the

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sense of being a proof, being a way of proving what I see. What I see, whatever it may be, is a prameya, a 'knowable', an 'object' of knowledge, provided my seeing also amounts to a piece of knowledge, a prama, a truth-hitting episode, a knowing episode. Ordinarily, it is the first sense that dominates the philosophic discussion of pramana jnana , although other senses are also acknowledged and discussed.

The verbal root mii from which both words pramana and prameya are derived with the prefix pra, means also to measure (apart from meaning 'to cognize'). The analogy based upon this ambiguity of ma works very well here. What is to be measured is the prameya, and that by which it is to be measured, the measuring stick as it were, is the pramiti Jnana. Nagarjuna asks the following question:

If you think the means of knowledge, pramana establishes the variety of objects, the knowables (prameya), just as by means of a measure one establishes what is to be measured, then how are the various, in fact, the four, means of knowledge (accepted by the Nyaya School) such as perception (inference, comparison and testimony), to be established?

The pramanas are supposed to lead to just those types of cognitive episode by which the nature of reality is correctly and unerringly understood. It is then legitimate to ask, as Nagarjuna asks here, how we are to ascertain and identify those items that are called pramanas. If the set of certain objects is to be set aside as standards for measuring others, what standard are we to use to measure those standards themselves? Using the analogy, Nyayasutra 2.1.16 elucidates the sceptical argument: Using the standard of measurement (tula = a weighing machine) we determine the correct measure of other things, but that standard itself is also a prameya, something to be measured. This leads to circularity.

The pramana theorists have to answer this charge of circularity and infinite regress. One easy way out would be to reach certain basic standards which would presumably be self-validating or self-measuring. Or to use the 'light' analogy (referred to by both Nagarjuna and Nyayasutra), at least some pramanas, if not all, should be self-illuminating, just as light illuminates itself as well as others. We shall return to this issue in the next chapter.

We have noted the uneasiness and ambivalence that an empiricist as well as a pramana theorist feels when he is confronted with the sceptic's

challenge to spell out what sort of entities he really believes to be there, or what are the 'furniture' of the world that he experiences. First, he has a pre-philosophical, perhaps instinctive, belief in the existence of a material world around, and he believes that his belief can somehow be rationally justified. The sceptic drives him to search for the most certain and indubitable data as the foundation of his knowledge-claim. If he feels most certain about what is grasped in his most immediate experience, then the sceptic points out that he would be guilty of using his subjective data—the data of his subjective experience which would be by the same token inaccessible to all others—to construct and account for his objective knowledge. In fact, he has two broad alternatives open to him. Either he should assert that the things are exactly as they seem to us in our pre-analytic, pre-reflective mood—the world is constituted, among other things, of middle-sized, measurable material objects—or he should try to construct, and thereby give a philosophical account of, such objects out of the data of what he feels to be his immediate experience. This is the age-old controversy between phenomenalism and realism, or immaterialism and materialism (naive realism).

1.5 TWO WORLD-VIEWS

A modern empiricist generally tries to shun ontological commitments. When he does talk about ontology, he oscillates between (common-sense) realism and phenomenalism, representationalism and anti-realism. A pramana Jnana theorist is, broadly speaking, either a phenomenal-ist or a realist, and if he is a realist he is either a direct realist or a representationalist. This comment, however, is hardly illuminating unless we are able to underline the specific nature of the ontological position of each group of the pramana theorists.

Let our starting-point be a physical object such as a table. The metaphysician asks the question: How are we to get an idea of the table as it really is in itself? This is also part of an ontological inquiry: what type of object is the table really? The question already presupposes a duality, a distinction to be deployed between how things really are and how they appear to us. This distinction is implicit in most

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philosophical/ontological inquiries. This is the minimal achievement of the sceptic by his use of what is popularly dubbed 'the argument from illusion'. The pramana theorists underline the distinction by calling one the pratibhasa, things as they appear to us, and the other alambana, the support or foundation of such appearances'. The exact connection that needs to be established between alambana and pratibhasa has been a vexed question among Indian philosophers, and different pramana theorists came up with different answers.

The assumed distinction between how things really are and how they appear has at least two ramifications, and the sceptic's argument seems to overlook them. The sceptic, we may recall, uses cases of perceptual illusion or mistake as evidence for forcing the distinction between the actual and the appearance. But mistakes are usually mistakes of some human observer or other, not of all observers at all times. A rope has a snake-like appearance to a particular observer on a given occasion. Hence the distinction between how things appear to one observer and how they actually are is not the same thing as that between how things appear generally to any human observer and how they are. The sceptic apparently uses the first as his premise to derive the second as his conclusion. This conclusion is reinforced by the prevalence of certain common cases of universal illusion. The stick looks bent to any observer when it is dipped in water, and the sky looks like a blue dome to all of us on a clear day. (Bhartrhari used such an example.) Modern science tells that what appears to be a solid table before me is actually neither solid nor a table. It is not a single object, but a swarm of particles.

Cases of universal illusion, if they occur at all, can be over-stretched. In consequence, each perception would then be a misperception, and each description of the object would be a mis-description. To avoid such a consequence some philosophers would cling to the most immediate in perception, and hold that the physical world is as it appears to us in perception. They deny the duality and argue that in the final analysis the purported distinction vanishes. In Western terminology, this view approximates phenomenalism. It holds that the so-called physical world is actually a construction out of the atomic data supplied by our perceptions. Hence the distinction between the real and the apparent is one of elements (atomic constituents) and the whole or wholes

constituted out of their combination. Hence each perception is not necessarily a misperception and each description not a misdescription as long as we understand them within the given context. Just as the characterization of a thing under observation is dependent upon the observer's situation and the circumstances of his observation, similarly the description of the world or the world as it appears to us generally must be dependent upon the common condition of all human observers. It is relative to our own observational capacities. But this relativity does not necessarily transform it into a false appearance or a false description. If there is a demand for an absolute description, or a picture of the world that is independent of all such conditioning and limitations, it should be said that such a demand cannot ordinarily be fulfilled. One may concede to the Buddhist that the ultimate reality in this sense is ineffable or indescribable, but this is so only because there is no observer of the kind we are looking for, an observer who observes and is at the same time free from all observational conditionings and limitations. Reference to a god or a Buddha or a Jaina may save the argument, but that solution need not detain us here.

Science, it may be said, purports to give a description of the world in absolute terms—a correct description that is not encumbered by observational conditionings. The attractiveness of science lies precisely in the fact that it attempts a correct description of how things actually are. But this point can be easily dismissed. Let us see how. Let us say that the demand by the sceptic for an absolutely absolute view of the world, or absolutely absolute description of it, is in fact a red herring, for the sceptic has conceived the demand in such a way as to make it necessarily unfulfilable—an ideal that has been deliberately set up so as to make it by definition unattainable. The sceptic's argument is a priori and hence trivial, even if it is regarded as valid. But then there is no absolute science that offers an absolute view of the world. Short of an absolutely absolute view of the world (in that case, it will no longer be a view), the relative strength and weakness of different views of the world should be decided on other grounds; and within each view it would be sufficient if a distinction between the apparent and the real is underlined clearly.

Some pramiti jnana theorists prefer a realist ontology, which is generally a substance-property oriented view of the world. They agree with the

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epistemological principle of so-called native realism that we see physical objects, things, directly, and not through a veil of sense- impressions. This principle in combination with the thesis that the world is exactly as we know it to be in our normal perception and inference, yields a world-view that is physicalist in the sense that the elements are physical items such as things and properties, parts and wholes. This is the approach of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas and Mimamsakas. The Buddhists may scoff at such a realist ontology of propertied objects, for, to the extent it has to make use of some non-empirical principles in order to argue in favour of such an ontology, it shuns empiricism. The realist, however, thinks that if there is a loss on this count, there is nevertheless a gain on another count: his world-view is brought closer to our pre-philosophical intuition about the world, it accommodates better our common-sense views. As long as we can make some sense of what is meant by normal conditions of perception, it holds that what the world really is coincides with what we perceive or infer under normal conditions.

The two types of world-view elucidated by the Buddhist on the one hand and by the Nyaya-Vaisesika on the other are in agreement that the basic elements of either system are claimed to be 'observable' or 'perceptible' individuals. But obviously they are of different types. The Buddhist prefers the phenomenal object and argues that nothing beyond the phenomenal need be countenanced for we can explain everything in terms of the phenomenal. The dharma doctrine of the Abhidharma can be seen as an attempt to carry on this programme of explanation. The Nyaya-Vaisesika chooses the observable physical elements, consisting of the things and properties, and hence their programme is to explain the phenomenal in terms of the physical. The choice of one rather than the other type of elements as basic reflects a difference in their philosophic motivation. The Buddhist does not accept the soul-substance, but explains it in terms of perceptions and other aggregates holding that nothing that cannot be explained in terms of the phenomenal is real, and hence words purporting to refer to non-phenomenal objects are vacuous. The Nyaya accepts the soul- substance as the substratum of various psychological qualities, and hence the 'physical-object' model of a table with its brown colour or rectangular shape suits his purpose very well.

Both the Nyaya and the Buddhist agree that an ontological system must be epistemologically grounded in the sense that what is epistemologically prior should be the starting-point of ontological enquiry. But the difference lies in what they consider to be epistemologically prior, how they define the perceptual knowledge. The Buddhist argues that the phenomenal (the appearance of particular colour, shape, taste, smell, touch, and so on) by its nature comprises the entire content of our immediate perceptual experience, and hence it is epistemologically prior, while physical objects or propertied things are far removed from 'raw' experience. The Nyaya claims, on the other hand, that physical things or propertied things are more directly accessible to our perceptual awareness than the evanescent dharmas or phenomena, for the dharmas are, if anything, the atomic data of awareness and the results of our analytic intellectual activity.

Check your Progress

1. Debates about the pramana prameya doctrine

1.6 ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES

The pre-philosophical, instinctive belief in material objects is not the only concern in the theory of knowledge. Materials for knowledge are not supplied simply by what is directly grasped by sense, the particulars, whether phenomenal or physical. Particulars can be characterized as self-contained, unrepeatable or unrepeated entities. An instance of a physical object-particular would be the particular chair I am sitting upon, and that of phenomenal-particular is the particular unrepeatable blue grasped by my present sense-perception. It is difficult to expound this crucial notion of repeatability. We may say a colour is repeated if it occurs in two places, even at the same time. But in that case it would not be a colour-particular. What would it be? This opens up the possibility of another set of entities being considered as part of the furniture of our world, part of

reality, and ontology must be concerned with this question. The repeatable entities are generally called universals.

Ontology asks 'What is there?' But this fundamental question is often broken down to a more familiar question: 'What kinds of things are there?' Ontology thus concerns itself with the basic principles of categorization. Philosophic tradition, both in East and West, generally identifies two broad sorts of categories: particulars and universals. If we say that the same colour occurs in two objects, then what we identify by the expression 'the same colour' is actually a universal. If, however, we refuse to adopt this mode of speech and say instead that the two objects (things) have a similar colour we talk presumably of two colour-particulars, and the expression 'similar' only indicates that there may be a universal under which these two colour-particulars might be collected. One of the most persistent questions in philosophy has been: What sort of entities are these universals? Do they exist? Are they real? Another use of the term 'realism' becomes pertinent here. Those who accept some universals to be real are called realists, those who do not accept any are called nominalists. If we have to apply this terminology to the pramana theorists, we have to put the Buddhist (of the Dinnaga-Dharmakirti school) on the side of the nominalist, and the Nyaya etc. on the side of the realist. This need not cause surprise, for in general philosophers with a phenomenalist stance in the West have favoured a nominalistic ontology, although there does not seem to be any obviously necessary connection between the two. It may be noted here that as the Buddhist phenomenism waxes idealistic, the external world beyond the phenomena and appearances becomes more and more elusive. A standard Buddhist view is thus nicknamed sakaravada, the theory which holds that each awareness has its own (intrinsic) form, the object-form that distinguishes it from other awarenesses. The 'blue-form' is said to be the distinctive feature of what we designate as the awareness of blue. It is the 'blue-form' that is most immediately given to us, and from this blue-form the Sautrantika Buddhist would like to infer the existence of blue-object, blue atoms, as distinct from, but causally related to, the 'blue-form' in awareness. But the sakaravadin who waxes idealistic says that it would be an impossible feat to draw such an inference from what is given. As Jayanta has put the point against the Sautrantika: 'If when there is the

object, the awareness has the object-form, and when there is no object present, the awareness lacks the form, then where would such a philosopher as maintains the constant inferability of the external object find the awareness that would support such an inference? In order to make such an inference possible, we have to be independently aware of the invariable connection between the said external object and the object-form. Not only do we not have such independent knowledge, but we can also cite counter-examples where the object-form is present (as in dreams and mis-perceptions) but the so-called object distinct from it is absent.

Since it is impossible to find awareness without the object-form, we may regard the object-form belonging to the awareness as its necessary feature. Some may say that we need to refer to external objects to account for the distinctness of each awareness, e.g. awareness of blue and awareness of yellow, for such distinct external objects would then be causally responsible for the said distinctness of each awareness. But the Sakaravadin argues that once we admit the 'object-forms' belonging to awareness and giving to each awareness its distinctive feature, there will be little need to imagine the existence of the object as such, which may possibly contribute this 'object-form' to the awareness. By such and other arguments, the Sakaravadin eliminates the so-called objective world in favour of the 'object-forms' of our awareness. The slogan 'there is no need to go beyond the phenomena' would thereby be transformed into 'there is no need to go beyond the object-forms in the awareness', and then to there is no need to go beyond the awareness whose essential nature is to have some object-form or other. Phenomenalism in this manner paves the way for idealism and immaterialism in Buddhism. These Buddhists were pramana theorists as well. Now an interesting question arises as follows: a pramana provides both an evidential base for a knowledge-claim and a causal base for the generation of such a knowledge-episode. Besides, a piece of knowledge, being knowledge of something, must refer beyond itself to something else (called object). Hence there is first the relation of cause and effect (and also that of the 'proof and the proven) between the pramana means of knowledge and prama 'knowledge'. Second, there is also the relation of the knowledge and the known. This obviously presupposes a realist ontology. But in the context of the sakaravada idealism, how can one make sense of the said

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distinction? It will not do to say simply that such distinctions are all false. For strong common-sense intuition favours such distinctions as are reflected in our common usage, and hence, they require some explanation.

The Dinnaga-Dharmakirti answer to this point may be stated here. In the common usage, 'I know X by the means of Y', X is the object known and Y is the instrument (pramana) for knowing X, and the result or effect (phala) is the knowledge of X. This analysis is modelled after such usage, 'I hold the pen by the hand', where the hand is the so-called instrument for holding the pen. The Buddhist would argue that in 'I see blue with my eyes' there is no need to have an act-object relationship between the knowledge and the known. The case of the relation between the so-called instrument and the knowledge to which it is deemed to be an instrument, may also be reinterpreted as a sort of essential dependence or invariable connection. The said distinctions can then be explained as referring to the three different aspects of the same knowledge-episode. The same episode of knowledge, in Dinnaga's analysis, has three different aspects; one is given by the object-form, the other by 'form' of the awareness itself, and the third by what is called self-awareness (sva-samvedana), i.e. the awareness revealing itself as an awareness of blue. This 'blue-form' or the object-form is to be regarded, according to Dinnaga and Dharmakirti, as providing both the evidential base for the object that is known and the causal base for the effect, i.e. the awareness revealing itself as the awareness of blue (cf. sva-samvedana).

In the medieval western discussion of the problem of universals there are usually three competing theories about their status: realism, conceptualism, and nominalism. In the Indian context, the contrast is usually between nominalism and realism. Conceptualism does not emerge here as a clear-cut doctrine. It shades off into some form of either nominalism or realism. In the modern context the problem arises primarily in the philosophy of language as well as in the philosophy of mathematics. But it is never dissociated from epistemological issues. Even W. V. Quine pointed out a connection between the medieval controversy about the nature of universals and the modern discussion of necessary truths in the philosophy of mathematics:

The three main medieval points of view regarding universals are designated by historians as realism, conceptualism and nominalism. Essentially the same three doctrines reappear in twentieth-century surveys of the philosophy of mathematics under the new names logicism, intuitionism and formalism.

In our discussion of Indian philosophers we will see that conceptualism is actually a version of nominalism, as the distinction between concepts and corresponding words is made to vanish under the scrutiny of such linguistic philosophers as Bhartrhari or Hehiraja. Sometimes the distinction between conceptualism and realism is made to vanish as the concepts are accorded some sort of reality. A sharp and well-defined formulation of conceptualism is not easily available even in the Western tradition, except in medieval scholasticism. Intuitionism in mathematics is however a viable alternative. Medieval conceptualism is the offshoot of medieval theology, which argued that logical and mathematical truths were known by God simply by knowing the powers of his own essence and not by virtue of anything outside his mind. Classical Indian philosophers, and even theologians among them, did not discuss the problem of God's knowledge of the a priori disciplines, and they did not develop conceptualism in the Western medieval sense. Intuitionism retains at least one segment of the conceptualist doctrine: truths of mathematics are truths about the human mind. However, the polarity of views regarding universals is still emphasized in terms of realism and nominalism or constructivism. Just as we have an instinctive, pre-philosophical belief about a material world constituted by particulars, we also seem to have some tacit, pre-critical assumption about certain universals and abstract entities in the organization of our empirical knowledge. Critical scrutiny and argumentation may strengthen or weaken the assumption of the reality of such entities. Such is the general method in philosophy. Our instinctive beliefs are often not compatible with one another, and the business of a philosopher is to try to introduce coherence and hierarchy among them. For although coherence is not sufficient to establish truth, lack of it is enough to ensure falsity. Philosophy, as Russell has said, 'should take care to show that ... our instinctive beliefs do not clash'. For, to continue with Russell: 'There can never be any reason for rejecting our instinctive belief except that it

clashes with others: thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance.

Check your Progress

1. Scriptural and Non Scriptural Knowledge
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1.7 LETS SUM UP

Our beliefs acquire the status of knowledge when they are proven to be true. Philosophy, therefore, as part of its activity, aims at establishing criteria for, and characteristics of, knowledge, criteria which may possibly set limits to what we can know, and characteristics that may mark off knowledge from mere beliefs which are not proven to be true. In the Western tradition, epistemology is the name given to that branch of philosophy which concerns itself with the theory of knowledge, that is to say, the attempted vindication of the reliability of our claims to knowledge. It investigates and evaluates evidence, our method of reasoning, criteria upon which our knowledge-claims are based. The function of what is called the *pramana-sastra* in Indian philosophic tradition coincides to a great extent with this activity. It is not surprising that both in India and in the West pursuit of knowledge has been intimately connected with the pursuit of truth or reality (or, sometimes called the divinity). What is surprising is that the philosophical worries concerning knowledge have led to some very interesting results in both traditions. A study of *pramana-sastra* substantiates this point. What is a *pramana* ? Roughly the answer is: A *pramana* is the means leading to a knowledge-episode (*prama*) as its end.

1.8 KEY WORDS

1. *Pramana*, means by which one obtains accurate and valid knowledge (*prama*, *pramiti*) about the world.

2. Prama, when reality reveals true knowledge it is called Prama or valid knowledge.
3. Ontology: the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being.

1.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain the sceptical challenge in epistemology

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1.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- Two distinct streams in the philosophic tradition of India
- one is illustrated by the pramana-prameya doctrine
- the other by a total scepticism about the adequacy or validity of such a philosophic method.

2. Answer to check your progress-1

- Bhartrhari and Samkara have debated that our empirical ways of knowing, perception, inference or language, can sometimes be fallible but the scriptural way of knowing is by definition infallible!
- The Naiyayikas on the other hand argued that the knowledge-claim of the scriptures must have some sort of empirical foundation.

UNIT 2 COGNITION: IT I DEFINITION AND NATURE; DIVISION OF COGNITIONS; VALID (PRAMA) AND INVALID (APRAMA); VALIDITY (PRAMANYA); ITS NATURE, CONDITIONS AND DEFINITIONS; VALID COGNITION (PRAMA): CLASSIFICATION; INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION (INDRIYA) AND THEIR NATURE.

STRUCTURE

2.0 Objectives

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Epistemology and Metaphysics

2.3 nature of knowledge

2.4 Epistemology and Logic

2.5 clasification of knowledge

2.6 the sources of valid knowl edge

2.7 Let Us Sum Up

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2.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn cognition
- know valid and invalid knowledge
- understand the instruments of Knowledge

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Epistemology is one of the main branches of Indian philosophy. The other two branches are Metaphysics or Ontology and Ethics. Epistemology means the theory of knowledge. With the help of epistemology one can acquire valid knowledge. The term epistemology is used in English, American and more rarely in French and in some trends of German bourgeois philosophy. The introduction of the term epistemology is attributed to the Scottish philosopher J.F. Ferrier (institute of Metaphysics), who divided philosophy into Ontology and Epistemology. The term epistemology is derived from “Episteme”, meaning knowledge and “Logos”, meaning science or theory.

Epistemology therefore is the theory or science of knowledge. It is a science which enquires into the nature, origin., range and condition of knowledge. It means the theory of valid knowledge, an important division of philosophical theory, the doctrine on man’s ability to cognise reality, on the sources, forms and methods of cognition, the truth and the ways of attaining it. To study and generalize the source and development of knowledge, the transition from non knowledge to knowledge is dealt in epistemology. Knowledge in general is analysable into ideas- ideas about things of the external world, about men and about one’s own self. It is to be observed that not all ideas are of the same value and validity. Some ideas are true and some are false. The awareness such a distinction between true and false knowledge, what is also referred to as valid and invalid, presupposes an inquiry into the origin and validity of all knowledge. Thus, epistemology is a systematic study about knowledge which is solely centered on knowledge itself.

In Western philosophy special importance is given to epistemology. Philosophers like Kant, Locke, Hume etc. are the main exponent of it. Kant divides the theory of knowledge into two broad divisions, viz. conceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge. There is one type knowledge which is prior to both conceptual and perceptual knowledge. That is the knowledge of T , i.e. self-awareness. All intuitive knowledge originates from this T consciousness. It does not require its source in conceptions of the mind or in sense-perception. Conceptual knowledge

develops according to the inherent structure of the mind and laws of thought. Its truth does not require empirical proof. Perceptual knowledge is empirical knowledge. It is tentative and its truth or falsity has to be referred to the external world for verification. Kant admits that without a prior critical examination of the elements, sources and limits of knowledge, one should not engage in metaphysical discussion. However, the American neo-realist have tried to oppose the general modern trend, initiated by Kant, that the theory of knowledge should precede the theory of reality. They are led to this position by a kind of reaction against the use of epistemology made by most modern idealists for establishing realistic theories of reality.

2.2 EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

Epistemology is closely connected with metaphysics or ontology. Epistemology means the 'Science of Knowledge'. It enquires into the origin, nature, validity and extent of knowledge. It is concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It cannot enquire into the validity of knowledge without enquiring into the nature of the reality comprehended by knowledge.

The nature of the reality is investigated by metaphysics. Epistemology is the theory of knowing, while Metaphysics is the theory of being or reality. Epistemology is the fundamental basis or groundwork of metaphysics. Ontology must be preceded by epistemology, since we cannot investigate the ultimate nature of the reality without prior criticism of the organ of knowledge. Thus, we can say there is an intimate relation between epistemology and metaphysics. One cannot stand without the other.

2.3 NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

The topics like nature of knowledge, means of acquiring knowledge and criteria to determine truth of knowledge etc. consist of the subject-matter of the epistemological queries that lead to the formulation of a theory of

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knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of all practical activities. The function of the knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself. Knowledge refers to an object that is known and it always belongs to a subject that knows. Knowledge can not be independent by itself without implying a knower and a thing known. Knowledge is a self-transcending property of the self.

Different philosophical systems of India have adopted divergent attitude towards the theory of knowledge. Carvakas attempt to analyse knowledge and its means in their own way and took the view that the problem of knowledge is not beyond solution. According to Jainas, knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. Advaita Vedantins hold that knowledge is very stuff of the self. There is no difference between self and knowledge. According to Samkhya-Yoga, knowledge is a mode of buddhi.

According to them Purusa or Self is unchangeable and conscious. Pain, pleasure etc. belong to buddhi which is an evolute of Prakrti. Knowledge is a mode of buddhi which transforms itself into the shape of the object that is cognising. Purusa becomes active due to the indiscrimination and intelligence of buddhi, and as a result the phenomenon of cognition arises. Vacaspati's view on knowledge is that the self is by nature inactive.

All activity belongs to Prakrti. Yet the self due to its proximity is reflected in buddhi and through non-discrimination identifies itself to be the knower. When an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, it produces certain modifications in the sense-organ. These modifications are analysed by the mind and are presented to buddhi which becomes modified or transformed

into the form of the object. Buddhi, being unconscious in nature, cannot by itself know the object. But as buddhi possesses an excess of saliva in it, it reflects the consciousness of the self and appears as if conscious. With the reflection of consciousness of the self in buddhi, the unconscious modification of buddhi into the form of the object becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception. This is called knowledge. Just as a mirror, due to reflection of

light in it, appears to have the light within it, in the same manner, buddhi due to a natural excess of sattva in it, reflects the consciousness of the self or Purusa and illuminates or cognizes the object.

According to Vijnanabhiksu, however, when an object comes into contact with the sense-organ the buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Due to the preponderance of sattva in buddhi, it reflects the self and appears to be conscious, as a mirror reflects the light and becomes

illuminating. Next, buddhi, which is modified into the form of the object is reflected back in the self, and the modification becomes manifested. Without this mutual reflection, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain in the self, which is pure consciousness and free from pleasure and pain, cannot be explained. Nyaya defines knowledge (jnana) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava). Nyaya, being realistic, believes that knowledge reveals both the subjects and the object which are quite distinct from itself. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects. Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it. Gautama refers to knowledge through the term buddhi and states that the term upalabdhi and jnana are its synonyms. It is pertinent to make an enquiry as to how knowledge itself is known.

According to the Jainas, the Buddhist, Vijnanavadins, the Prabhakara, Mimamsakas, the Advaita Vedantins and the Samkhya-Yoga thinkers, knowledge is known by itself. According to them knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination. Knowledge as the nature of light does not require anything to manifest it. Knowledge is, by nature self-revealing in the sense that it does not require anything to reveal it or to know it. According to this view, knowledge is never an object of knowledge, nor known by other knowledge. If knowledge is known as an object, then each individual knowledge may require another knowledge to know it, and so on.

Kumarila Bhatta accepts the independent existence of external object. Every act of knowledge gives a certain relationship between the knower and the known. It involves some activity on the part of the knower. Knowledge reveals the object but cannot reveal itself. According to Kumarila Bhatta, knowledge is not self-revealing because it is by nature non-perceptible and is known by means of an inference. But, Prabhakara

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holds that knowledge is self luminous. It manifests itself and needs nothing else for its manifestation.

According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, knowledge is known not by itself but by another knowledge known as *anuvyavasaya*. According to them knowledges like the eyes which illumine everything but itself remain in curtain. Bhatta Mimamsakas also accept this view regarding knowledge.

The Nyaya view of knowledge is an attribute of soul. It copies reality and seems to common sense too simple to need any justification; yet this apparently innocent view involves assumptions that have been uncritically accepted. In its hostility to Buddhist subjectivism the Nyaya insists that things are the ground of logical truth, that the external world exists apart from our knowledge of it and determines that knowledge that our ideas correspond to things. It divides the real into two compartments of subjects and objects, and thus transforms the ordinary assumptions of common sense into a metaphysical theory which is inadequate to the facts of consciousness as well as the demands of logic. The main assumptions which vitiate the epistemology of the Nyaya are: 1. that self and not-self are sharply separated from one another, 2. that consciousness is the result of the causal action of the not-self on the self, 3. that knowledge is a property of the self. In spite of these metaphysical prejudices, the Nyaya contains fruitful suggestions by which its defects may be overcome. Knowledge which is revelation of reality may do its function either in a true manner or in a manner which is false. When reality is revealed valid knowledge is called *prama* and when this revelation is faulty it is treated as *aprama*. Thus knowledge requires some factors or marks, the presence of which raises it to the status of *prama*. These factors or marks are variously interpreted by different schools of Indian philosophy as: practical value, novelty, certainty and definiteness. According to Samkhya-Yoga, marks of validity of knowledge are certainty, correspondence to object and novelty. The presence of these factors or marks may be technically called *pramanya*. Here, the question naturally arises as to how these factors or marks arise in a certain piece of knowledge. The first part refers to the conditions of their origin, while the second to that of their ascertainment. If they originate or are ascertained through totality of knowledge producing conditions themselves, *pramanya* or validity is technically called *svatah* (intrinsic)

and if they originate or are ascertained through some conditions additional to those giving rise to valid knowledge, the validity is said to be paratah (extrinsic) because in this case the validity is caused by some other factor than the conditions giving rise to knowledge. Similarly, the same question arises about the factors leading to invalid knowledge as to whether invalidity originates and is ascertained by the same factors generating knowledge or by others additional to them.

According to Kesava Misra cognition is that which manifests objects. He also mentions that cognition (buddhi), understanding (upalabdhi), knowledge (jnana) and apprehension (pratyaya) - these words are synonymous. The term apprehension is generally used in the sense of perception. According to the Samkhya philosophy, Buddhi or intellect, which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (Prakrti), is altogether different from knowledge, which consists in the reflection of external objects on the soul (Purusa). Commentators of TB say that to reject this Samkhya view the word pratyaya is mentioned here. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects.

According to Kesava Misra all cognitions are devoid of form. No object reflects its own form in the cognition, because the theory that cognition arises with the form of the object reflected in it has been rejected. For the same reason the inference of the object from its form reflected in the cognition is rejected as the existence of objects like ajar etc. is established by perception. All cognitions are frilly defined by the objects presented in them and without being related to the objects no cognition can be perceived by the mind; because the knowledge that arises from any such apprehension is of the form 'I have the cognition of the jar' and not merely of the form 'I have a cognition'. The definition of buddhi is more convenient in practice in many respects. Another definition of buddhi given by Annambhatta in the Tarkasangraha is that cognition is the cause of all communication or intercourse, and it is the knowledge.

2.4 EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC

Logic is the special enquiry into the estimation of evidence. Epistemology is a general enquiry into the conditions of valid

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knowledge. Epistemology is a more general study than logic. It is closely connected with metaphysics. Logic enquires into the various kinds of proof and the conditions of valid knowledge. It investigates the nature and validity of the various kinds of inference, deduction and induction. Logic avoids metaphysical discussion. But reasoning is not fully possible without some metaphysical discussion. Epistemology is more metaphyseal than logic. Epistemology thus becomes closely linked up with metaphysics and both then again with ethics. In Indian philosophy also Epistemology is regarded as an essential part of philosophy. According to late Dr. Ward, Epistemology is a 'systematic reflection concerning knowledge and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science'. In the course of the development of the Indian system interest in epistemology increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussions of almost every school. From the very beginning of the different systems of philosophy until recent times, discussions on the problems of knowledge (including those of doubt and error) have formed an essential part of philosophy. The reason can be found in the fact that all schools of Indian philosophy, without exception regarded ignorance as the root cause of human suffering, so that they were all bent upon discovering the means and process of true knowledge by means of which reality could be known and life could be so lived as to overcome misery or minimize suffering. Vatsyayana commenting upon the first sutra of Gautama, says that the study of the sources of knowledge (pramana) is necessary, because through it we can know the reality and thereby guide our actions to attain desirable ends and avoid sufferings.

Indian epistemology deals with four main factors, viz. the nature of pramana, the nature of prama, the nature of pramata and the nature of prameya. Thus, Indian epistemology comes to involve these four basic factors with the help of which different schools of Indian philosophy try to determine the methods of arriving at the conclusions. In Indian epistemology, two terms are used in the sense of knowledge. They are jnana and prama.

4. pramanam pramata prameyam pramitiriti caturvargenaiva vyavaharah parisamapyate. NVTT. under NS. 1.1.1.

The special source of prama is called pramana. The word pramana etymologically means the instrument of valid knowledge. So, pramana is the means or sources of valid knowledge. It is that which gives rise to valid knowledge of objects.

Knowledge has three factors viz. the knower (jnata), the known (jneya) and the process of knowing (jnanaprakriya). The knower and the process of knowing can not be separated. But the known is neither completely subjective nor purely mental. It is something outside of us. The known is object to the knower i.e. the subject. This dualism of the subject and the object is present in empirical knowledge. In fact, knowledge at the empirical level becomes possible as a valid and useful factor only if the dualism is recognised. From this, however, we cannot draw any conclusion about the nature of human knowledge as a whole.

Because of the dualism of the subject and object, we have the subjective element and the objective element in all empirical knowledge. Our knowledge of the external world is the knowledge of our sense-experience and the belief that what are presented to us, constitute the real world, i.e. the world as it is, cannot be proved either logically or empirically.

The relation between the knowledge and the object is that of the manifest and the manifested. In an act of cognition, there is an object which is revealed, a self to whom it is revealed and the fact of revelation itself. All these three factors are distinct from each other as they are clearly

distinguishable. The objects exist independently in the external world. In an act of cognition, an object is the accusative (karma) and the self is the nominative (karta). As for instance, in an act of cognition like “This is blue”, what is apprehended is “this” which appears to be “blue”. Cognition manifested an external object “this” directly to the self. This theory of valid knowledge or pramana is known as epistemology.

Check your Progress

1. What is Epistemology, its relation with metaphysics and logic.

2.5 CLASIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Indian epistemology deals with two particular terms viz, jnana and prama. All kinds of knowledge is known as jnana. When reality reveals true or valid knowledge, it is called prama and when it reveals false knowledge, it is called aprama. The word prama is used only in the sense of valid knowledge or yathartha-jhana which is different from false or invalid knowledge. In other words, while the word jnana is used to indicate knowledge from the psychological standpoint that helps in cognition of an object, the word prama means true knowledge in the logical sense which is able to recognize an object with its real nature and character.

Kesava Misra's View

According to Kesava Misra, knowledge is of two kinds - experience and recollection. Experience is also of two kinds - valid and invalid one. Recollection is also of two kinds, valid and invalid. Both these kinds occur

during wakeful stage. All cognitions in dreams are invalid recollections as all

that is apprehended as 'that' (in the cognition) appears as 'this' (in the dream)

due to certain defects.

i) Valid Knowledge

The term 'prama' is derived from the root ma with a prefix 'pra' and 'tap' which means valid knowledge. Knowledge is the basis of all our practical activities in relation to objects. A fruitful activity presupposes a correct knowledge of objects. One is inclined to action in a particular way with reference to an object or a thing with the expectation that one's knowledge correctly reveals its nature. All the philosophical thinkers try to analyse valid knowledge in their own way. Philosophers of different systems have forwarded divergent views on the nature of valid knowledge.

Bauddha View of Valid Knowledge

According to the Bauddhas, valid knowledge is the knowledge of an object not known previously. The knowledge of an already known thing

cannot be taken as valid because the function of knowledge is to prompt activity in relation to an object which is presented by it. Hence, smṛti or remembrance is not valid knowledge. Thus, according to Dharmottara valid knowledge is an invariable antecedent to the achievement of all that a man wants to have.

When on proceeding, in reference to the presentation of any knowledge, we get an object as presented by it, and then we call it a valid knowledge. According to Dharmakīrti, valid knowledge is the knowledge which reveals an object capable of successful volition.

Jaina View of Valid Knowledge

According to the Jaina thinkers valid knowledge is the knowledge which is uncontradicted. They say that definiteness is the essential mark of valid knowledge. Vādi Deva Suri defines valid means of knowledge as a definite knowledge which apprehends itself and an object and which is capable of prompting activity which attains a desirable object or rejects an undesirable object. According to Siddhasena also valid knowledge is a cognition, which apprehends itself and an object, and which is noncontradicted.

A knowledge in itself is valid, since it cannot contradict itself. It is valid or invalid in relation to its object. If it is harmony with its object, it is valid. If it is not in harmony with its object it is invalid.

Samkhya View of Valid Knowledge

According to the Samkhya system of thought, Puruṣa is immutable and inactive, when buddhi or intellect conceives the reflection of Puruṣa and the form of the object is revealed, then this revelation is named as prama and the means which remains unrevealed is what is called pramaṇa. According to Vacaspati Miśra valid knowledge is the function of the citta which apprehends an object which is undoubted, real and unknown. He further provides an alternate definition of prama as apprehension (bodha) of Puruṣa which forms the result of pramaṇa. The SS defines valid knowledge as determination of an object which is not previously cognized. Vijñānabhikṣu advocates prama as the manifestation of buddhi having the form of object into

Puruṣa. Vijñānabhikṣu further thinks that buddhivṛtti may also be regarded as prama. When the result of knowledge is considered to be in buddhi, prama will be sense-object contact and when the result of

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knowledge is considered to be in Purusa, prama will be the function of buddhi?

'Samkhya thinkers hold that 'buddhi or cognition takes the form of the object and therefore the truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object. The object depends on the subject to be known, and the subject requires an object to know.

The Vedanta View

Dharmaraj adhvarindra gives two alternative definitions of valid knowledge, viz. valid knowledge is that knowledge which apprehends an object that is not already known and which is not contradicted. They do not accept novelty as an essential factor for valid knowledge nor do they oppose the view of considering novelty as a mark of valid knowledge. Visistadvaita School of Vedanta believes that the validity of knowledge consists in both the fruitfulness to the object and prompting to the fruitful activity. The valid knowledge is defined therein as that which apprehends an object as it really exists and which prompts fruitful activity. The Dvaita, the Dvatadvaita and the Suddhadvaita School of Uttara-Mmiansa also accepts conformity of knowledge to the object as a mark of valid knowledge.

Bhatta Theory of Valid Knowledge

According to Kumarila Bhatta valid knowledge is a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of conformation by other cognitions. It should be noted here that Kumarila and his followers use the term 'pramana' for valid knowledge and 'pramanya' in the sense of validity.

Parthasarathi Misra defines valid knowledge as the knowledge which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which was not contradicted by any other knowledge. According to him, there are three distinctive features of , valid knowledge, viz. (1) Its object is not remembered as having been previously known, (2) It conforms to the real

nature of its object and (3) There is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus, novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is one which produces some new information about

something, not contradicted by any other knowledge and not yielded by defective conditions such as defective sense-organs in the case of perceptual knowledge, fallacious premise in the case of inference etc. The Bhatta considers knowledge in its relation to our practical needs. There is no use in knowing what are already known. Knowledge cannot be separated from the practical value it has for us.

The objects of our environment are always changing and we have to make fresh adjustment to the changing circumstances and for this purpose knowledge must reveal the changing aspect of things.

The Prabhakara View According to the Prabhakaras valid cognition is apprehension, something different from remembrance which is not valid in as much as it arises from the impression left by some previous experience. The Prabhakaras say that a knowledge illuminates three things, namely the object, its knowledge and the self or knower, just as a lamp lights the things around it, itself and its wick. In every knowledge, in other words, threefold (triputa) features, namely, the objects, the form of knowledge and the knower are experienced. It is called triple perception (triputi pratyaksa). Everywhere in substance, genus and quality there is validity and perceptibility for the elements of self and the form of knowledge. Salikanatha Misra, a commentator of Prabhakara Mimamsa refutes Bhatta's definition of valid knowledge. According to him, the need of a previous experience is the cause of invalidity of remembrance. In a continuous perception, the later cognitions arising from sense-object contact, like the first cognition, are different from memory and hence they are valid. Recognition too is valid, because it is not produced solely from impression. It is an experience aided by impression. Memory is not valid inasmuch as it depends on a former experience. It does not determine an object independently.

The Vaisesika View -The Vaisesikas consider non-contradictoriness and definiteness as the mark of valid knowledge. Prasastapada in his bhasya on the Vaisesika sutra does not define valid knowledge, but distinguishes between vidya and avidya, the former includes perception, inference, arsa and memory, and the later includes doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition and dream. Sridhara commenting on the bhasya defines vidya as firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition. Thus, the definition introduces definiteness as a mark of valid knowledge. It is clear that

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vidya is valid knowledge and avidya is invalid knowledge and that memory is valid knowledge. This definition mentions an additional mark of valid knowledge, viz. adhyabasaya,

Nyaya View of Valid Knowledge

According to the Naiyayikas, the validity of knowledge consists in the objectivity or the faithfulness of the knowledge towards the object. Valid knowledge is the knowledge which states the existence of something as it is. It is definite and an assured cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character. Valid knowledge excludes all kinds of non-valid knowledge, such as memory, doubt, error, hypothetical argument etc. Memory is excluded because it depends on previous experience. Jayanta Bhatta, author of the NM opines that memory is not valid and that it is excluded from valid knowledge by inclusion of the word 'arthopalabdhi' in the definition. So, Jayanta defines valid knowledge as an apprehension produced by an object. The later Naiyayikas, however, defined valid knowledge as true experience and they opposed experience to memory by asserting that an experience is different from memory. Doubt and the rest are excluded either because they are not true or because they are not definite and assured cognitions. It appears from this that prama has three main characteristics, namely, assuredness, truth and presentativeness. As to the first characteristic it can be said that prama, or valid knowledge is a definite categorical assertion as distinguished from all indefinite, problematic and hypothetical knowledge. In prama, there is a feeling of assurance in what is known. That is valid knowledge is always connected with a firm belief. All assurances or firm beliefs, however, are not prama. In illusion we firmly believe in what is false. Prama implies something more than a subjective certainty. The second characteristic of prama is that it is true or unerring (yathartha) knowledge. Knowledge is true when it is not contradicted by its object (arthavyabhicari). This means that knowledge is true when it reveals its object with that nature and attribute which abide in it despite all changes of time, place and other conditions. What is once true of an object is always true of it, devoid of space and time. To know a thing truly is to know as characterized by what is characteristic of it (tadvatitaprakaraka). Hence, according to Nyaya, the truth of knowledge consists in its connection to facts.

2.6 THE SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

The special source of prama or valid knowledge is called pramana as we have mentioned earlier. Pramana derivatively means the instrument of valid knowledge (pramayah karanam). Hence, we can say that pramana is the means or source of right knowledge. It gives us only valid knowledge of objects. So it has been said: there cannot be any right understanding of things except by means of pramana. A subject arrives at the valid knowledge of objects by means of pramana, for the existence and nature of objects are to be ascertained only by such cognitions as are based on pramana. Again pramana is the cause of valid cognition of objects inasmuch as it gives us a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves. Pramana has a real correspondence with objects in the sense that the nature and attributes of objects, as revealed by pramana, uncontradictorily true of them, despite all variations in time, place and other conditions. . Pramana is defined as the karana or the extraordinary cause of a prama or right knowledge. Now the distinction between karana (means) and Mrana (cause) is to be followed. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect. Conversely, an effect is invariable and unconditional consequence. There are three kinds of causes, namely, the constituent (samavayi), the non- constituent (asamavayi) and the efficient (nimitta). The constituent causes are the substratum in which the effect inheres, e.g., the threads of the cloth. The non- constituent causes is the mediate cause of an effect. It determines the effect only insofar as it stands as an inherent attribute of the constituent cause. In relation to the effect, “cloth,” the contact of threads is the non- constituent cause. So also the colour of the threads is the mediate cause of the colour of cloth. The efficient cause is different from both the constituent and non-constituent causes. It is not merely the passive substratum in which the effect inheres, nor any inherent attribute of the substratum that indirectly determines the effect. Rather it is the agency that acts on both the constituent and non-constituent cause and makes them produce the effect. In relation to the cloth, the loom and such other agents constitute the efficient cause. It is the efficient cause

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that is to be regarded as karana or means. Now reverting to the definition of pramana, it is said that pramana is the unique operative cause (karana) of right knowledge.

Nyaya View of Pramana

According to the Nyaya system of thought, pramana is the unique operative cause (karana) of right knowledge. Pramana is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and the object, which do not normally fail to produce valid knowledge. The Naiyayikas explain the term karana in the sense that is most conducive to the production of the effect. There is, however, difference of opinion regarding the nature of karana between the old and the new Naiyayikas. According to the old Naiyayikas the karana is a cause which is peculiar and operative. The modern Naiyayikas, on the other hand, define karana as the cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product. Thus, karana, according to the ancient Naiyayikas, is the nature of substance, while according to the modern Naiyayikas it is the nature of operation (vyapara) itself. For example, in the case of cutting the wood with an axe, the karana, according to the ancient Naiyayikas, is the axe itself, while according to the modern Naiyayikas, it is the operation of the axe. Among the Naiyayikas, Jayanta Bhatta defines pramana as the totality of causal conditions. The prama, according to Jayanta, is the totality of all the sentient and non-sentient factors which lead to the knowledge of an object which is in turn different from illusion.

Different systems of Indian philosophy are taking different views regarding the nature and number of the sources of valid knowledge (pramana).

In fact the number of pramanas accepted by various schools differs from one to eight. In the system of Carvaka, there is only one pramana and that is perception (pratyaksa). The Vaisesikas and the Bauddhas admit two pramanas viz, perception and inference (anumana). The system, of Samkhya believes in only three pramanas namely, perception, inference and verbal testimony

The Naiyayikas admit these three pramanas along with comparison (upatridna). The Prabhakara Mimamsakas add one more pramana called postulation (arthpatti) to these four. The followers of Bhatta Mimamsa and the Advaitins recognise the above five with the addition of on

apprehension (anupalabधि) to them. The Pauranikas admit the above six with the addition of possibility (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya) . Some Tantrikas recognize ceta (indication) also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Others add pratibha (vivid imagination) as a source of valid knowledge to the list and thus, the total number of pramanas are ten. These sources are necessary for the establishment of valid knowledge.

ii) Invalid Knowledge

Invalid knowledge is the wrong apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object which is actually not so. It is what apprehends an object as different from it. Valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new facts. If any knowledge lacks definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. Invalid knowledge includes remembrance. (smṛti), doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Remembrance is not valid because it is not presentative cognition but a representative one. The object remembered is not directly presented but recalled indirectly. Doubt is not a certainty in cognition. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is not true knowledge. It is like this “if there were no fire, there can be no smoke.”

According to Kumarila there are three kinds of invalid knowledge, viz error or illusion (mithyajnana), non-cognition or ignorance (ajnana) and doubt (samsaya). Error or illusion represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. Illusion in Indian philosophy is discussed in different theories known as the khyativadas. There are five theories of illusion namely atmakhyati, asatkhyati, akhyati, anyathdkhyati and anirvacaniyakhyati. Doubt is invalid not because it is false but because it does not have certainty.

Neither it makes a definite assertion nor a denial. According to Vaisesika philosophy invalid knowledge is of four kinds:

(1) doubt (samsaya), (2) illusion (viparyaya), (3) indefinite perception (anadhyavasaya) and (4) dream (svapna)

Nyaya includes doubt (samsaya), with its varieties of conjecture (uha) and indefinite cognition (anadhyavasaya) as well as error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning.

Check your Progress-1

Explain the Nature of Knowledge

2.7 LETS SUM UP

Theory of knowledge, pramāṇa-śāstra, is a rich genre of Sanskrit literature, spanning almost twenty centuries, carried out in texts belonging to distinct schools of philosophy. Debate across school occurs especially on epistemological issues, but no author writes on knowledge independently of the sort of metaphysical commitment that defines the various classical systems (darśana), realist and idealist, dualist and monist, theist and atheist, and so on. And every one of the dozen or so major schools from early in its history takes a position on knowledge and justification, if only, as with the Buddhist skeptic (Prasaṅgika), to attack the theories of others. There are nevertheless many common epistemological assumptions or attitudes, the most striking of which is a focus on a belief's source in questions of justification. Mainstream classical Indian epistemology is dominated by theories about pedigree, i.e., views about knowledge-generating processes, called pramāṇa, "knowledge sources." The principal candidates are perception, inference, and testimony. Other processes seem not truth-conducive or reducible to one or more of the widely accepted sources such as perception and inference. However, surprising candidates such as non-perception (for knowledge of absences) and presumption (defended as distinct from inference) provoke complex arguments especially in the later texts—from about 1000 when the number of Sanskrit philosophical works of some of the schools begins to proliferate almost exponentially. The later texts present more intricate views and arguments than the earlier from which the later authors learned. Classical Indian philosophy is an unbroken tradition of reflection expressed in the pan-Subcontinent intellectual language of Sanskrit. Or, we should say it is comprised of interlocking traditions since there are the distinct schools, all nevertheless using Sanskrit and engaging with other schools. Later

authors expand and carry forward positions and arguments of their predecessors.

2.8 KEY WORDS

Prama, true knowledge

Pramana, : means the instrument of valid knowledge.

Yathartha, valid knowledge

Ayatharta, invalid knowledge

2.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain what is prama
2. What valid knowledge is as understood by various schools of Indian Philosophy.

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2.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- Epistemology is the theory or science of knowledge
- The nature of the reality is investigated by metaphysics
- Logic is the special enquiry into the estimation of evidence. Epistemology is a general enquiry into the conditions of valid knowledge.

2. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- Different philosophical systems of India have adopted divergent attitude towards the theory of knowledge.
- All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects.

UNIT 3 THE DEBATE ABOUT THE NATURE, ORIGIN (UTPATTI) AND ASCERTAINMENT (JNAPTI) OF VALIDITY; SVATAHPRAMANYAVADA; PARATAHPRAMANYAVAD

STRUCTURE

3.0 Objectives

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Self-awareness

3.3 Must I be Aware that I am Aware?

3.4 Nayaya View about Knowing that One Knows

3.5 Inference, Confirmation, and Introspection

3.6 Let Us Sum Up

3.7 Keyword

3.8 Questions for review

3.9 Suggested Readings

3.10 Answers to Check your Progress

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn about the debate between utpati and Jnapti
- know Svatahpramanya vada
- understand paratahpramanyavada
-

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In claiming that knowing is an 'inner' episode classifiable with other similar episodes, we do not and need not claim that knowing consists in being in a special (infallible) state of mind. For if such a state of mind

means that we possess some 'inner searchlight' which guarantees absolutely the truth of the experience or the reality of the object upon which it is directed, then it will be, as Ayer has pointed out, patently wrong. It is generally agreed that if something is known, it must be true or it must exist. Nyaya says that this fact does not allow us to say that if one knows then necessarily one knows that one knows and this holds even when one is quite convinced about what one knows. One may in fact be absolutely sure about what one cognizes but such a certainty by itself does not amount to knowledge.

Nyaya conceives the matter roughly as follows. A verbalizable cognitive episode can be either a knowing episode or a 'non-knowing' episode, such as an illusion or a doubt. It is a knowing episode when it hits the 'truth'. Knowledge-ness consists in its truth-hitting character, and not in its indubitability or in its constructive character. When it misses truth it is a 'non-knowing' episode. Even an archer cannot always hit the bull's-eye. Nyaya fallibilism says that if it is possible for him to hit it, it is also possible for him to miss it. If he hits it, it is not simply by being absolutely sure that he does so. There are other causal factors that are responsible for making the incident a successful one. It may be true that the archer hits the mark mostly when he is absolutely sure and similarly a man may feel absolutely sure when he knows. But the point is that the fact of hitting the mark or missing it is independent of the presence or absence of such certainty.

There is a remarkable variety of views regarding how do we know that we know in classical Indian philosophy. It is by no means easy to explain the agreement and disagreement among different philosophers in this respect. I shall highlight different components of the main issue and formulate different rival theses with the hope that the fundamental concern of these philosophers will thereby be made clear. Let us denote each individual awareness-episode by such symbols, c_1, c_2, \dots . When I am aware of an object, a , or a fact, p , I may be truly aware or I may be falsely aware (in which case the object is wrongly characterized or p is not the case). I may be dubiously aware in which case I oscillate between alternatives, whether p is or is not the case. In such a situation the awareness-event is called a doubt (*samsaya*). An awareness-event that amounts to knowledge is a special kind of event, for I have to be truly

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aware of whatever I am aware of. Let us say that an awareness- event amounts to knowledge in this sense if and only if it has a special feature, k; if it is not a piece of knowledge, it is either a doubt or an illusion (false certainty) in which case let us say it has a different feature or property, d. (To avoid complexities, let us ignore other types of awareness-events.)

I would use the transitive verb 'apprehends' which joins the name of an awareness-event with that of an object. The object may be either a simple thing, a, or a complex having a propositional structure (call it p). For example, if I am simply aware of Pussy the cat before me, the awareness-event apprehends Pussy. If, however, I am aware that Pussy is on the mat, then the event apprehends that Pussy is on the mat. We may now formulate the rival theses:

T₁: If an awareness, c₁, arises, it apprehends not only the thing, a, or the proposition p, but also c₁ itself by the same token.

T₂: If c₁ arises, it apprehends only the thing, a, or the proposition, p, and we need another event, c₂, to apprehend c₁.

The Prabhakara Mimamsaka along with the Buddhist of the Dinnaga school accept T₁. (The Advaita Vedantin also accepts T₁ but interprets it in a different way which we will forbear to go into here.) The significant difference between the Buddhist and the Prabhakara should however be stressed. The Buddhist does not recognize the category of soul-substance and hence 'the subject is aware that he is aware' means simply that an awareness is aware of itself. The Prabhakara recognizes a soul-substance and hence an awareness is said to reveal an object to the self. Thus, 'the subject is aware that he is aware' means here that the awareness reveals itself to the self. Salikanatha, a later exponent of the Prabhakara school, says that each awareness-event apprehends or 'reveals' the trio, the object or the fact, the awareness itself and the cognizer self. In fact all these three are 'perceived' in each cognitive act or awareness-event. It seems that the earlier Prabhakara view was quite different. The earlier view maintained that the awareness, c₁, apprehends or reveals (to the self) the object only, neither itself nor the cognizing self. But nevertheless when such an awareness arises, it automatically becomes the subject matter of

vyavahara, i.e. we can talk about it, etc. just as we can talk about its object that is apprehended. Similarly the cognizing self also becomes the subject matter of vyavahara, we can talk about it, etc., only when an awareness has arisen. In other words, the awareness, c_1 , does not reveal itself or the cognizer self, but it certifies our vyavahara, our practical behaviour, our speech-behaviour, etc. with regard to these two.) The Prabhakara (Salikanatha) calls T_1 the 'self-revelation theory of awareness' (sva-prakasa-vada) while the Buddhist calls it the 'self-awareness of awareness' (sva-samvedana).

T_1 implies that just as an occurrence of pain arises and makes itself known by a single stroke, an awareness-event arises and makes itself known at the same instant. The Buddhist regards each awareness-event perceptual in the sense that it has as its integral part an 'inner' (mental) perception of the awareness-event itself. T_2 , the rival thesis, is accepted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Bhatta Mimamsaka (follower of Kumarila Bhatta), although they understand and interpret it differently.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika maintains that each awareness-episode is usually followed by another episode, an inward perceptual recognition of the first episode. The second episode is called anu-vyavasaya, a sort of 'apperception' (more or less in the sense of Leibniz) having a very specific character. The Bhaga, following Kumarila, holds that an awareness-episode is by nature imperceptible and hence although we become mentally aware of an awareness-episode that has arisen in us the second awareness cannot be perceptual. Rather the process is explained as follows: When an awareness apprehends an object, the latter (the object) takes on a new character, 'apprehended-ness' (it is 'tinged with awareness', so to say). On the evidence of this property, apprehended-ness (jnatata) in the object, the subject infers that an awareness has arisen in him. Hence the mental awareness of an awareness episode is in this way inferential, not perceptual: There is a third view among the Mimamsakas, ascribed to Murari Misra. Murari (sources lost but reported by Gangesa and others) apparently rejected the Bhana view and agreed with the Nyaya-Vaisesika about the anu-vyavasaya or inner perception of each awareness-event immediately afterwards.

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If I am aware of a thing or a fact, must I be always aware of this fact that I am aware? We can reformulate this question in terms of two rival theses:

T₁: If an awareness, c_1 , arises, it is necessarily cognized, apprehended or revealed to the self.

T₄: If an awareness, c_1 arises, it is only contingent that it is also cognized. Most such episodes are cognized or apprehended, but some may arise and go out of existence without being cognized at all.

Most philosophers with different persuasion, tend to accept T₃ without having any serious misgivings about it. The Buddhist, the Mimamsaka (both schools), and the Vedantin all agree on this point. For how can there be an awareness (in the subject) which the subject is not aware of? In fact, T₁ entails T₃, in some acceptable sense. Even T₂ seems fully compatible with T₃, (It is however not absolutely clear whether Kumarila Bhatta would insist that we always invariably make the 'unconscious' inference by which we become aware of our awareness. Murari Misra apparently would insist that there is always an *anu-vyavasaya*, apperception.) It is only the Nyaya-Vaisesika who takes the bold step to combine T₂ and T₄ and assert that an un-cognized or un-apprehended awareness-event is not an impossibility.

To put it simply: The Buddhist and the Prabhakara accept T₁, and T₃. The Bhana (Kumarila) accepts T₂ and T₃. (Murari too accepts T₂ and T₃, but interprets T₃, differently.) The Nyaya-Vaisesika accepts T₂ and T₄. However, T₄ is highly controversial. It has been claimed to be counter-intuitive. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika argues that this is simply a bias which wishes to accord a unique status to the cases of awareness-events and ultimately favours a sort of idealism! (See next section.)

If the property, k , turns an awareness-event into a knowledge-event let us represent particular knowledge-events by $c_1 + k_1$, $c_2 + k_2$, Similarly we may represent awareness-events that do not amount to knowledge by $c_1 + d_1$, $c_2 + d_2$, Now concerning a knowledge-event these philosophers ask two questions: How does a knowledge-event originate (ct: *utpatti*)? and how is such a knowledge-event known (cf. *jnapti*)? As regards the former we can again formulate two rival theses:

- T₅: Whatever causes c , to arise causes, by the same token, ($c_1 + k_1$) to arise.
- T₆: Since ($c_1 + k_1$) is a special case of c_1 , the natural causal complex G that gives rise to c_1 needs to be supplemented by some additional condition H in order to cause ($c_1 + k_1$) to arise.

Here T₅ means that when an awareness arises under normal conditions it becomes a knowledge-event automatically unless the circumstances or the causal complex that gave rise to it were 'tampered with' in some way or other. If I am aware I am normally truly aware, for truth (or knowledge-hood) is a natural property of awareness. If an awareness lacks truth or knowledge-hood it is an irregular episode caused by some illegitimate intrusion in the usual causal complex. All the Mimamsakas, the Bhatta and the Prabhakara alike, uphold this view. The Nyaya-Vaisesika upholds T₆. This means that the set of causal conditions that gives rise to awareness either include a subset called gunas which turn the awareness-event into a knowledge-event or it may include a different subset called do as which would turn the event into an illusion, false certainty or doubt. The factors that generate the property knowledge-hood in the resulting awareness do not form a natural part of the causal complex, for the factors that generate the property, lack of knowledge, in the awareness can intervene at any time!

T₅, is similar to saying that man is naturally good or mangoes are naturally sweet but intervention of bad or abnormal factors or extraneous circumstances makes a man evil or a mango sour. On the other hand T₆ argues that truth or knowledge-hood is not an intrinsic property of awareness much as goodness is not an essential property of mankind or sweetness not essential for something to be a mango. What a man becomes, good or evil, depends upon the circumstances or causal factors against which he reacts. When a mango grows it becomes sweet or sour depending upon the causal factors from which it grows. An awareness likewise becomes true or false depending upon the causal conditions from which it arises. This is the Nyaya view.

As regards how a piece of knowledge is known (by the knower) there are two rival theses:

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T₇: Whatever causes the knowledge of the awareness, c₁, causes, by the same token, the knowledge of its knowledge-hood.

T₈: The causal complex that gives rise to the knowledge of the awareness, c₁, needs to be supplemented by some additional condition in order to give rise the knowledge of its knowledge-hood.

The Mimamsakas (all sub-schools) accept T₇ and combine it with T₅. T₇ means that if a person knows that he has an awareness (and that awareness happens to be a piece of knowledge) he automatically knows the knowledge-hood of that awareness. Now there are three ways (according to the three sub-schools of Mimamsa, see above), by which an awareness is supposed to be known to the subject; it can be self-cognized, or perceived by an inward perception, anu-vyavasaya, or it can be inferred on the evidence of the apprehended-ness, jnatata, of the object apprehended. In each of these three cases, the Mimamsaka will argue that not only the awareness itself is revealed or known to the subject in this way but also its essential character, knowledge-hood, by the same token. The Nyaya-Vaisesika as well as the Buddhist finds this thesis totally unacceptable. They uphold T₈. The Buddhist combines T₁ with T₈. For according to him (e.g. Dharmakirti), an awareness may be self-cognized, i.e. apprehended by itself but to know whether it is also a piece of knowledge or not we need to depend upon the practical activity or vyavahara. Our awareness of an object is known to be a piece of knowledge when the vyavahara conforms to the expected behaviour of the object cognized

Nyaya combines T₂, T₄, and T₆ with T₈. T₈ is interpreted here as follows: Our inward mental perception (anu-vyavasaya) may apprehend the awareness of the preceding moment, but to know whether it is a piece of knowledge or not we need to depend upon an (unconscious) inference. We infer the knowledge-hood of an awareness on the basis of our successful activities that are propelled by such an awareness.

That is, we infer on the basis of confirming evidence that an awareness is actually a piece of knowledge. For otherwise our lingering doubt about the truth or knowledge-hood of many of our awarenesses that have already arisen in us would remain unexplained. For, the moment I know

that I have an awareness I cannot know that I have also a true awareness or knowledge.

I shall conclude this section by referring to another pair of views mentioned in this connection. The question is raised: How do we know that a particular awareness lacks knowledge hood? If I am wrongly aware, how do I know that I am wrongly aware? The following rival views are expressed:

T₉: Whatever gives rise to the knowledge of the awareness itself, causes thereby also the knowledge of its lack of knowledge-hood or lack of its truth-character or (briefly) its falsity.

T₁₀: The casual complex that gives rise to the knowledge of an awareness needs to be supplemented by some additional condition in order to give rise to our knowledge of its falsity.

(Only the Samkhya School is supposed to uphold T₉, along with T₇. This is how it is reported by Kumarila and others.) The Bhatta (Kumarila himself), curiously enough, upholds T₁₀. According to Kumarila therefore, if an awareness happens to be also a piece of knowledge, the subject knows that it is a piece of knowledge as soon as he knows that it is an awareness. But if it happens to be false, knowledge of its falsity is not forthcoming along with the knowledge of the awareness itself. The subject has to depend upon extraneous conditions or factors to determine that falsity. The Nyaya-Vaisesika however combines T₁₀ with T₈. There is an (unconscious or conscious) inference which helps us to determine whether an awareness is actually a piece of knowledge or simply a false certainty. In other words, we need some confirming evidence to confirm lack of knowledge-hood or falsity. If I have misperceived some object and taken it to be a dog, some other evidence will tell me that it is not a dog and hence it was a misperception, and my apperception of the perception would be of no help in this matter.

It is claimed that the Buddhist upholds T₈- along with T₉. This is just the opposite of the Bhatta position. Knowledge-hood or truth is known through the confirmation of our behaviour or vyavahara but falsity is; self-revealing! It seems to me that this applies to theory of judgement or propositional awareness in the Dinnaga-Dharmakirti school. For it is

argued here that all constructive or conception-loaded awareness events (judgements) are by definition false for they are about concepts only, not about the objects or particulars. But some of these judgements are said to yield knowledge provided they conform to our practical behaviour or activity (vyavahara). Thus, the conceptual awareness of something to be a jewel amounts to a piece of knowledge when it has the capacity to lead us to an object that would not belie the fact of its being designated by 'jewel'. According to Buddhism, a construction with the help of concepts is always propelled by our desires and drives for pleasures etc. Hence by definition it would be a distortion of reality. We construe reality as we would ardently desire it to be not as it actually is. But sometimes such construction lives up to our expectation, i.e. it does not 'fail' us, and hence it amounts to knowledge (cf. pramanyam vyavaharena, Dharmakirti). In what follows see in following paragraph the Buddhist position on 'self-awareness' depending mainly upon the texts of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. In this task it is also necessary to resolve some exegetical problem.

3.2 SELF-AWARENESS

If I am aware that something is the case it is generally assumed that I am also aware that I am aware that something is the case. The pre-theoretical assumption is that although we are generally aware of presumably an external object or non-mental fact or event we can also be aware of the mental events happening 'inside'. We can be aware of the awareness itself. But how? We have noted that regarding this matter three views are current among the Indian philosophers.

- (i) We can say that an awareness is reflexively aware of itself (T_1 above) if it is self-aware or it reveals itself.
- (ii) Let us say that one is introspectively aware of one's immediately preceding awareness (the Nyaya view and Murari's view), provided we need a separate perceptual awareness to apprehend the immediately preceding awareness. I concede that this is not the usual meaning of 'introspection' but I recommend its use in this connection to distinguish this view from the previous view.

- (iii) Lastly, let us say that one is reflectively aware that an awareness has arisen in one's mind (the Bhatta view), provided one needs an inference ('since I am aware of this object, there must have arisen an awareness in me') to be aware of one's awareness. Here too, I recommend the use of the word 'reflection' in this special sense, i.e. in the sense of an inference of the kind just described. This stipulated meaning of the adverb 'reflectively', it is hoped, will distinguish the present theory from the other two theories. (Reflexivity of awareness is thus different from the reflection (in the stipulated sense) upon the awareness.)

Dinnaga gave three succinct arguments in favour of his doctrine of self-awareness' (sva-samvedana), where an awareness is reflexively aware of itself. Dharmakirti added some more to strengthen the Buddhist view. Before we discuss these arguments we should deal with one exegetical problem in Dinnaga's text. In the Buddhist view, self-awareness is a sort of 'mental' perception. Dinnaga talked about two kinds of mental perception—one kind presumably cognizes nipa or material form while the other cognizes 'inner' events, desire, anger, pleasure, pain, etc. Dinnaga's own passage is enigmatic here. Hattori who followed Dharmakirti in interpreting this passage. (Dinnaga's cryptic statement here has created a great deal of confusion among the later commentators. Recently M. Nagatomi called it 'a conundrum in the Buddhist pramana system).

The exegetical problem lies with the above-mentioned first variety of 'mental' perception. The second variety is more or less recognizable as a variety of perception (in the sense defined) and generally accepted by the commentators without question. It is called sva-samvedana, 'self-awareness', i.e. the self-luminous character of all mental events, beginning from human passion to the Buddha's compassion. But how can an external object, such as colour, be apprehended by a mental perception and be at the same time, as the requirement demands, no conceptual or un-conceptualizable? (For Dinnaga defined perception as necessarily non-conceptual, un-conceptualizable.) Some commentators believe that Dinnaga had to talk about a 'mental' perception which is on a par with the five kinds of sense-perception in order to be faithful to the tradition of the Buddhist scriptures.

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The Buddha apparently mentioned a variety of awareness called 'mental awareness' (manovijnana), side by side with the other five types of sensory awareness. Thus Moksakara-gupta quoted a saying of the Buddha ('Colour-form is cognized, oh monks, by twofold cognition, the visual perception and mental perception induced by it') in order to justify his contention that although the mental perception of colour is not commonly experienced by ordinary people, it might well have been the case with the Buddha's experience.

Nagatomi argues that Dinnaga in the passage referred to did not talk about two types of mental perception but only about one type with a twofold aspect. If this means that the event called mental perception is identical with the self-awareness part of each mental event, then I readily accept the interpretation. Dharmakirti explicitly stated in the Nyayabindu that all mental events (citta = 'a cognitive event' as well as caitta = 'derivatives of the cognitive event', pleasure etc.) are self-cognizant. It is possible that Dinnaga only referred to the twofold appearance of the self-cognitive part of the event: the object- appearance (that aspect of a mental occurrence which makes an intentional reference) and the appearance of the cognition itself (the cognizing aspect). Since pleasure, pain, passion, anger, etc. are also cognitive in character according to the standard Buddhist view and by the same token self-cognizant, Dinnaga might well have intended to emphasize the double feature that self-awareness of such events captures, the object-aspect as well as their 'own' aspect.

Each mental event in this theory has a perceptual character and this includes any cognitive event, sensory perception, inference, conceptual judgement, etc. It is the self-awareness of such events. Self-awareness is a kind of perception because it is a mental awareness that is entirely free from conception and construction. It forces itself into a non-mediated (non-conceptual) grasp of itself. It is called mental or inner because the external sense-faculties are not directly responsible for such a non-mediated grasp of itself (Dinnaga: indriyanapeksatvat'). Suppose I now close my eyes and think of my beloved. My thoughts will be invariably attended with passion, etc. (the caitta). This particular mental event is certainly not free from conceptual construction for only an idea, a concept, of my beloved, and not she herself, is grasped by my awareness.

But my awareness itself as well as my passion or other emotive experience is self-aware. Thus self-awareness of any mental event is conception-free and hence a 'perception', according to Dinnaga. He says: 'Even conception (or a conceptual judgement) is admitted to be (a sort of perception) as far as its self-awareness is concerned. It is not (a perception) with regard to its object because it indulges in conceptualization.

Dinnaga repeatedly insists in the first chapter of his *Pramanasamucaya* upon the dual aspect of each cognitive event: the object-aspect and the cognizing aspect (*arthabhasa* and *svabhasa*), more commonly known in the Yogacara system as the apprehensible-form (*grahakakara*) and the apprehension-form (*grahakakara*). Later on this *arthabhasa* transpired as *arthakara*, the object-form of the cognition, in the writings of the post-Dinnaga exponents and hence the nickname *Sakara-vadin* (*sakara*=awareness with an object-form') was given to this school. If the object-appearance is an inherent feature of each awareness-event and particular object-appearances (blue, yellow, hard, round, etc.) are distinguishing marks for particular events, then the claim (of the *Sautrantika*) that external objects are causally responsible for the arising of the object-appearances or object-likenesses (*sarapya*) seems to dwindle. This position became very suitable for the Yogacara school to which Dinnaga belonged. For instead of saying with the old Yogacarins that the external objects do not exist, for nothing but consciousness (awareness) exists, one can now say with the exponents of the Dinnaga school that in their theory of awareness and mental phenomena in general, references to external objects are dispensable.

Dinnaga advanced some arguments to show that an awareness has always a twofold appearance and later added that even self-awareness of an awareness is proven thereby. Thus it has been said, 'The cognition that cognizes the object, a thing of colour, etc. has (a twofold appearance, namely,) the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself (as subject). But the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has (on the one hand) the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with the object and (on the other hand) the appearance of itself. Otherwise, if the cognition of the object had only the form of the

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object, or if it had only the form of itself, then the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object.

To explain: let 'e' stand for a cognitive event which can be described as my awareness of blue. We can distinguish between its two aspects, the blue-aspect and the cognition-aspect, of which the latter grasps the former; if the same event has also self-awareness, then this self-awareness aspect is to be distinguished from the cognition-aspect in that the self-awareness aspect picks out the cognition-aspect as marked or qualified by the blue-aspect while the cognition-aspect picks out the blue-aspect only. Now if instead of the dual aspect, my awareness had only one aspect, either the blue-aspect or the cognition- aspect, then the awareness of the awareness, the self-awareness, would be indistinguishable from the awareness itself. How? Suppose the cognition has only the blue-aspect for its object and another awareness, i.e. self-awareness, is taking also the blue-aspect for its object. This will collapse the distinction between awareness and self- awareness. If on the other hand the cognition has only the cognizing aspect (no object-aspect), then also the distinction between awareness and self-awareness will collapse. For both will be marked by the same cognizing aspect.

Further, it is argued by Dinnaga, there is another fact that can be happily explained under the assumption of the dual aspect of a cognitive event. Sometimes an object cognized by a preceding cognition appears in a succeeding cognition. But this would seem impossible since the objects are, according to the Sautrantika Buddhists, in perpetual flux and therefore the object ceases to exist when the succeeding cognition arises. But our acceptance of the dual aspect may save the situation here. For we can say that at moment t_1 there arises a cognitive event, e_1 , which grasps the blue, b_1 , as its object (presumably b_1 being there at t_0); and at t_2 , c_2 arises and grasps not b_1 but c_1 as an event which has the dual appearance. This will show that c_1 grasps 'the b_1 -appearance' of c_1 , which is part of its dual appearance (it does not grasp b_1 directly). For b_1 being in a state of flux cannot be present at t_1 . This argument provides an explanation of the common- sense belief that an object grasped in a cognition can be grasped by several succeeding cognitive events, but it is not clear whether it accomplishes anything else.

Dinnaga gives next his major argument. Our recollection is not only of the object previously cognized but also of the previous cognition itself. This proves not only that a cognitive event has a dual aspect but also that it is self-cognized. For 'it is unheard of, says Dinnaga, to have recollection of something without having experienced it before). If as the Naiyayika claims a cognition is cognized by a separate cognitive event, then, says Dinnaga, an infinite regression would result and there would be no movement of thought (cognition) from one object to another.

3.3 MUST I BE AWARE THAT I AM AWARE?

Must I be aware that I am aware? We have seen that Nyaya holds a view (T₄ above) which answers it in the negative. A cognition may arise in a subject and remain uncognized by the subject! We may now see how Nyaya expounded this thesis. Various twists and turns of the Nyaya argument are to be found in the writings of all the major exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. It would be difficult to reproduce them here. I shall nevertheless attempt to give a synopsis using mainly such authors as Vacaspati, Udayana, and Bhasarvajna. The Buddhist counter-criticisms of the Nyaya position are to be gleaned from Dharmakirti, Prajnakara, and Santaraksita. Gangesa, coming at the end of the Buddhist period, reformulated the Nyaya position in a defensible form which answered some of these criticisms. As against the three main arguments of Dinnaga, the following Nyaya answers may be noted. (i) First, it must be underlined that the argument based upon memory (i.e. there cannot be our memory of an awareness-event unless there has been an awareness of that awareness- event) is non-committal. For it does not entail that a cognition has to be self-cognized. It requires that a cognition be cognized. (ii) Second, the so-called 'infinite-regress' argument can be easily answered if we accept T₄. It is necessary that a cognition cognizes an object, but it is only contingent that we have a cognition of cognition. Some cognitions (e.g. a cognition of cognition) may simply arise and be not cognized for the mind may be forced into a different activity. I will

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come back to this point at the end. (iii) The third point of Dinnaga (that there would not be any movement of thought from one to other) can accordingly be answered. It is clear here that Nyaya can answer these points if it can consistently hold the thesis, T₄.

Dharmakirti's arguments to support 'self-awareness' are essentially tied to the Yogacara thesis that the distinction between the *grahya* 'apprehensible object' and the *grahaka* 'apprehending cognition' is an illusion like that of a double vision of the moon. An awareness-event is an indivisible whole, it illuminates itself, for there is nothing else, the two appearances, the object-form and the apprehension-form, being illusorily created. The non-difference of the apprehensible object and the apprehending subject (the cognition itself) is established by the *hetu*, i.e. on the evidence that these two are always, invariably, and necessarily apprehended together. Hence their difference is only a convenient myth, a matter of convention only. The self-cognition of a cognition is established because even the perception of an object cannot be otherwise established for him who does not have the perception of that perception. This idealistic argument of Dharmakirti led to a vortex of controversy in the post-Dharmakirti period. Of many counter-arguments to refute idealism, I can mention only one or two from the texts of the Nyaya authors. Bhasarvajna says, among other things, that even memory can grasp the apprehensible object only or the fact experienced, not necessarily the experience of such fact or object. For example, I may say, 'I remember I obeyed my parents.' It would be odd to say 'I remember that I experienced obeying my parents.' Therefore, there is no *niyama* or necessity that the object and its experience are always cognized together. In order to be remembered an object must be experienced prior to it but it is not necessary that such experience is also to be experienced, perceived, or cognized prior to it. Thus, we may fall back upon T₄ which asserts that a cognition need not always be cognized.

The Buddhist may argue that such remembering also remembers the experience itself, for when I am asked how do I remember my obedience to parents I would answer, Well, I had seen myself being obedient to them. Bhasarvajna replies that this answer may not necessarily be based upon my previous perception of the experience but a present inference

(viz. that such experience must have occurred since I remember the fact experienced) would just as well account for the answer. Even the Buddhist would allow similar tacit inferences to explain other facts about memory. For example, I say I remember seeing John. This is obviously based upon my non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) perception of the particular person, John. But that perceptual experience had for its object the particular, John; it did not include the name 'John'. In my report of the memory, however, I invariably use the name 'John' because I make a tacit inference: since the particular was later called John in my conceptual judgement, I can say 'I remember seeing John.'

Udayana has countered from the Nyaya point of view that there is no awareness that does not grasp the apprehensible object as different or distinct (*na grahya-bhedam avadhuya dhiyo 'sti vrtti*) and the Buddhist would have to argue for a thesis of universal delusion in order to establish that such awareness registering the difference of the apprehensible object has to be always erroneous. One may falsely cognize something provided there is some standard against which such truth and falsity would be judged. The thesis of universal delusion seems to ignore such a standard. In dreams or double-moon visions, our awareness registers a duality which is recognized as false, for an argument can be given to show that unity in such cases is real and duality or difference is only apparent. But in our ordinary perceptions, such an argument is not forthcoming to reveal unity (between *grahya* and *grahaka*) instead of duality (*bheda*). And if such non-duality (*grahya-grahaka-vaidhurya*) cannot be established, Dharmakirti's argument for self-awareness is considerably weakened.

Dharmakirti also appealed to the sensation of pain, pleasure, anger, etc. that are invariably occurrent with our cognitive state, and hence cognitive in character. The idea is that they are also self-cognized. For how can one say, 'My head aches, but I am not aware of it'? Similarly, a cognition must be cognized by itself as soon as it arises. Udayana in reply has said that pain, pleasure, anger, etc. are certainly cognized as soon as they arise, but this is because of their characteristic intensity (*tivra-smtzvegita*). It is a contingent fact. But only some cases of cognition are intense enough to be perceived as soon as they arise. Some may be feeble and pass away unnoticed.

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One may argue that if a cognition is not self-cognized, it loses its essential nature, illuminatorship (*prakasakata*). To depend upon other for illumination or revelation is a shared property of all unconscious, inert (*jada*) objects such as a piece of stone. If an awareness, which is a form of consciousness, becomes also so dependent for its illumination then the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious matter vanishes. The Nyaya says in reply that the essential nature of cognition is not self-illumination but illumination of others, its objects. The unconscious matter does not have this characteristic and hence is easily distinguishable.

Prajnakara has said in his defence of the Buddhist view : Let there be three kinds of entity, some are extremely inert and hence have two illuminators or apprehenders, the lamp light and the visual organ (e.g. a pot); some need only one illuminator, the visual organ only (e.g. the lamp), and some are even better, for they are self-illuminator, that is, do not need any illuminator other than itself (e.g. an awareness). Bhasarvajna replies as a Naiyayika that the reason (*hetu*) in this argument of Prajnakara suffers from the fault of *asiddhi* (non-confirmation), for it is the self-cognizant nature of cognition which is in question here, but Prajnakara assumes this unproven fact and adduces it as a reason to establish that all cognitive states are self-illuminative.

In a similar way the Nyaya can answer Santaraksita who re-defines 'self-awareness' from the Buddhist point of view as a combination of two factors: (i) a cognition does not depend upon anything else to make itself known or cognized, and (ii) it does not remain uncognized. The Nyaya would say that the first property here is again unproven and hence unestablished (*asiddhi*). We cannot assume it to prove 'self-awareness'.

The Nyaya view is that cognition is generally cognized by another cognition, an inward perceptual experience called *anuvyavasaya* (T_2). Let me introduce a few arguments of Gangesa who defended this theory in order to replace the 'self-awareness' theory. The verbal report of a perceptual cognition takes the form, 'A pot' or 'This is a pot', but the verbal report of an *anuvyavasaya* takes the form, 'I see the pot' or 'I am aware that this is a pot'. These two awareness-events are numerically different but take place in quick succession, which generates the false notion that a cognition is automatically self-cognized.

The Prabhakara or the Buddhist might say that since we do speak about our cognitions and since such talk of a cognitive event presupposes our (prior) awareness of such an event, and since we must therefore concede cognition of cognition, there would be an economy (laghava) of assumptions if we believe that a cognition is always self-cognized. Gangesa replies: No. This economy of assumptions is to be sacrificed for it infringes against the causal law of an external perceptual awareness. Suppose I see a pot. That pot is called here the object of such perception because it is also the locus or subjunct of the connection that the visual organ has with it and it is only such a faculty- and-object connection that generates such a perceptual awareness. The said awareness itself cannot be the locus, the subjunct of such a connection. A visual perception grasps the object to which the sense- organ is connected. A mental perception is another event that grasps the object to which the mind is connected. For lack of necessary perception-generating connection the visual perception cannot grasp, for example, the taste of the object seen. Similarly, it (visual perception) cannot grasp the perception of the object either. Both are unconnected with the visual organ. In visually perceiving that a piece of sandalwood is fragrant, the fragrance is induced by memory and then presented to the object to which the visual organ is connected. But when a perceptual awareness arises it can then be connected with the 'inner' organ, mind and that will generate the anuvyavasaya, inward mental perception. To quote one among several prayogas of Gangesa: "The visual awareness cannot be the "object" of an awareness generated by the visual organ; since it is not presented through any perceptual connection by the visual organ, it is in this respect similar to a remote pot.

The opponent may point out to a couple of counter-examples where a cognition has itself as one of its objects: (a) our knowledge that all cognitive events arc knowable includes this particular event as well in 'all cognitive events'; (b) God's knowledge (perception) must grasp also itself. Gangesa says that in the first there is a connection called jnana-lakaana pratyasatti. And in the second, God's knowledge has to be regarded as self-cognizant, but knowledge of the humans needs another perception to be known.

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The infinite regress argument has already been answered by referring to T₄. But one might still argue: Since all the causal conditions for perceiving an awareness are present invariably why can it not always be perceived as soon as it arises? Gangesa says that certain opposite force (cf. pratibandhaka) may overwhelm such causal conditions. For example, pleasure, pain, search for pleasure, different interest etc. may render the causal conditions inert and hence no farther perception of perception arises.

One may argue that this is highly improbable. For if a man is aware at all of something without being aware that he is so aware then certainly something must be wrong with him, for it would be grossly inconsistent. But this oddity can be dispelled. Our uneasiness here lies in the fact that a person cannot claim or say that he is aware that p without his being aware that he is aware that p. But consider the following. How many times, looking at a child's behaviour, can we say that he is aware that p but not exactly aware that he is aware?

It is obviously true that we cannot recall what we have not cognitively experienced. Nyaya readily accepts this but goes on to point out that we do not recall everything that we have cognitively experienced. This does not always mean that my memory impression on such occasions has been lost. It may mean occasionally, that I did not have a memory impression to begin with.

The general theory about memory impression is that a memory impression of a particular object is generated (no matter how 'faint' the impression may be) as soon as the object is cognitively experienced. (A hypnotist can evoke from us sometimes recollection of an object which we had normally taken to be not experienced at all!) But certainly we cannot recall what we have never experienced cognitively. This must be true of our awareness and other mental events when they play the role of the object of remembrance. Therefore, if under all possible provocation, I cannot recall that I had an awareness of (a perception of) an object, it is reasonable to assume that I did not have an awareness of that awareness of the object. It may be that I cannot remember that I had seen something at the moment I fell asleep, while an argument can be given to show that some seeing (perception) must have arisen at that moment, for I was awake, the lights were on, my eyes were open, etc. This will then prove

that the presence of a cognitive event at a particular moment does not necessarily imply the presence of the awareness of that cognition. For I now understand by the force of the argument suggested, that I saw something at that moment. This understanding may not be remembering that I saw something. This is a present inference of a past awareness.

Nyaya argues that it is possible to remember many objects without our necessarily remembering that we had once experienced these objects. We may now surmise or 'see' that we had experienced cognitively those objects but this new awareness would not be a revival (i.e. the memory-revival) of the previous cognition itself. It may be the memory-revival of simply the object cognized before! Such a state of affairs would be compatible with the view that we had experienced (cognitively) those objects but we did not have the awareness of this cognitive experience until now and for this reason we have been unable to recall it.

Another good argument in favour of T_4 is that it becomes necessary to save realism as well as our pre-theoretical assumption of the possibility of our knowledge of the external world from the attack of such idealists as Dharmakirti. The usual counter-argument against Nyaya is this. If we admit that an awareness-event can occur in a person about which he is unaware, we make a mental event as good as a 'material object' (jada), for both the mental and the material can exist unperceived or uncognized. This consequence leads to materialism. Nyaya will accept the charge, for otherwise mentalism or idealism would win the day! For the usual mentalistic strategy is to introduce an insurmountable barrier between the mental and the non-mental (material) and then claim that the mental (a cognitive event, a mode of consciousness) cannot be connected with the material object unless it transforms the latter into a mental object. This would therefore create what has sometimes been called the 'veil of ideas'. An argument can usually be developed to show eventually that this veil of ideas becomes in fact our veil of ignorance about the external, material world: if this is so, then, in our explanation of knowledge and awareness, a reference to the external world would seem to be dispensable.

The other argument of Dharmakirti leads to almost the same conclusion. If the awareness of blue and the awareness of that awareness of blue necessarily arise together, and hence are ultimately indistinguishable,

there is no way by which we can claim that the blue (the blue-form) in awareness is (or even corresponds to) a reality separate from the awareness itself. The causal theorists can easily be faulted and hence an idealistic explanation of knowledge and awareness will win the day. The philosophic motivation of Nyaya behind its thesis T_4 , is to deny this possibility at the very beginning. T_4 is consistent with common sense, because it is possible for me to say that this baby is aware of the red flower before him but he is hardly aware that he is aware. Why does T_4 initially seem so odd? The answer is that we tend to confuse first-person statements (which are necessarily true) with third-person statements (which are only possible, that is, only sometimes true). I cannot say that I am aware without my being aware that I am aware. But I can say of Mr X that he is sometimes aware without being aware that he is aware. Then I can argue that what is true of Mr X should be true of me, viz. that I could be aware without being aware that I am aware, although I cannot say that I am aware without being aware that I am aware. For saying it (a sort of vyavahara, to use the Sanskrit term) presupposes first my being aware of the awareness of it.

3.4 NAYAYA VIEW ABOUT KNOWING THAT ONE KNOWS

Gilbert Ryle once criticized the platitude of many traditional (Western) philosophers who held knowledge of knowledge to be virtually equivalent to knowledge simpliciter. The platitude is based upon what Ryle has called 'argument from introspection'. Ryle claimed this argument to be false and hence rejected the platitude or the thesis that knowledge of knowledge is virtually equivalent to knowledge simpliciter. Most Indian philosophers entertained a very similar view about knowledge of knowledge. Nyaya rejects this view in unequivocal terms albeit on different grounds and propounds a theory which may not be acceptable to a follower of Ryle. Translated in terms of episodic notion of knowledge, the Nyaya view means that the episode of knowledge in a person is non-identical with the episode of knowing that

knowledge, for what leads to the former is not identical with what leads to the latter episode.

In fact, according to Nyaya and other philosophers in India two different issues are generally conflated in the discussion of knowledge of knowledge. The first concerns the utpatti or 'arising' of knowledge-hood of knowledge while the second concerns the jnapti or 'knowing' of the knowledge. Regarding the first Nyaya says that the two episodes are separable for their causal conditions are non-identical. Regarding the second, Nyaya says that knowledge of knowledge must be separated from knowledge of that same awareness as a simple awareness, for the first involves knowledge of the knowledge-hood (or truth) of the said awareness while the second involves knowledge of the awareness as mere awareness. To explain: let us suppose a non-dubious awareness arises in the subject and it happens to be true although the subject may be unaware of its truth. According to the Nyaya conception of knowledge (prama) the subject's awareness in this case has the character, knowledge-hood, i.e. it is a piece of knowledge. Now the Nyaya says that the subject's knowledge of this awareness (that he has a non-dubious awareness) does not amount to his knowledge of its knowledge-hood. The subject may know that he is aware with certainty that p but he would not know that he knows that p unless some further evidence is adduced (e.g. successful behaviour, conformity with proven facts). Knowledge of knowledge in this theory is actually an inference while knowledge simpliciter is simply a true and non-dubious awareness. Such a notion of knowledge simpliciter is however different from the commonly accepted notion of knowledge in the Western tradition. The thesis of non-identity of knowledge of knowledge and knowledge simpliciter seems to go against the new 'formal' proof offered by J. Hintikka in defence of the thesis that 'a knows that p' virtually implies 'a knows that he knows that p'. But I do not think that there is any conflict here as far as the 'formal' proof of Hintikka is concerned. Hintikka sharpens the notion of knowledge well enough and makes several assumptions in order to make his thesis almost irresistible. In fact, his basic assumption is the condition C.K.K.', which is based upon the rule A.PKK, and the equivalence of knowledge of knowledge with knowledge simpliciter really turns on this assumption. But the infallibility of this rule may be disputed. Hintikka

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himself is quite aware of the problems involved here. He also requires, for his thesis to obtain, that the person referred to by a in 'a knows that' knows that he is referred to by it.

E.J. Lemmon once clearly rejected the thesis that maintains that 'a knows that' implies 'a knows that he knows that'. He said: 'there is a clear sense in which it is untrue: there are many things people know without realizing that they know them. It is important to realize that Lemmon disagreed with the view (which Hintikka later defended) even without developing a sense of knowledge that may be identical with that of Nyaya. The upshot is that one cannot deductively prove that knowledge simpliciter is equivalent to knowledge of knowledge, unless one prefixes the notion of knowledge so as to make the thesis irresistible. And this is what Hintikka has apparently done. The insight that we may derive from Lemmon's disagreement would be that in some acceptable sense of knowing, very little of the kind of epistemic logic (that Hintikka envisioned) would be forthcoming.

It is true that we have sharpened the notion of knowledge to suit the Nyaya sense of prama. But I think this use of 'know' is not entirely counter-intuitive. Besides, this stipulative use has the following advantage. It is easy in this way to separate knowledge of knowledge from knowledge simpliciter. Knowledge of knowledge again is not in this view simply another act of 'self-observation' but an inference based upon evidence. This allows us to say that a subject knows as long as he has a non-dubious awareness (a certainty) and it happens to be true, but a subject knows that he knows only when he inferred its truth or knowledge-hood from adequate evidence. In the Gettier cases, we can say from this point of view that the subject knows (in this special sense) provided he has a certitude (justified or not) which also happens to be true, and that he does not know that he knows for he inferred its knowledge-hood from wrong evidence (he has wrongly inferred). (See also Chapter 4.) The Nyaya theory seems to require that in order to assert that p or to talk about what one knows the subject must not only be aware that p but he should also know that he is so aware. But I wish to repeat the points I have already noted (previous section). The fact that a subject remembers that p presupposes his prior knowledge (or awareness) that p, not necessarily his knowledge of that knowledge or

awareness. Naturally when a person remembers something it becomes immediately obvious to him (that is, he immediately presumes or infers) that he must have been aware of whatever he remembers now. But this present (inferred) knowledge of his previous awareness is not equivalent to his knowledge of the awareness-event which usually follows the (first) arising of the awareness (or knowledge). The subject may of course remember that he knew that p in which case he not only knew before that p but also knew that he knew that p. But the point is that sometimes we remember simply what we knew before and not automatically the fact that we knew it.

In the light of the points mentioned above, some comments on E. J. Lemmon's example may be in order. Lemmon says that if he suddenly remembered an obscure fact about Persian history which he had learned as a child, it would be said that he knew this fact; but until he remembered it, he did not know that he knew it. This is misleading. Lemmon is obviously against taking knowledge to be episodic ('current action', in his language), as Nyaya would like to have it. But in spite of this difference, the following Nyaya observation is possible. Nyaya would say that it all depends upon what exactly Lemmon remembered. If he remembered simply that obscure fact about Persian history, then he is only justified in assuming that he knew it before. But if he remembered that he learned (knew) it in his Persian history class, as is often the case, then he would be justified in assuming, as we would be to assume about him, that he knew that he knew it (when he learned it). In fact Lemmon's example is unfortunate from this point of view, for learning in the class is very often the case of knowing that one knows (in the Nyaya sense of the term). Thus unless one so defines knowledge as to make it analytically true that knowledge simpliciter implies knowledge of knowledge, it would always be possible to say of somebody that he knew that p, although he did not know at that moment that he knew that p. Thus, much of the Nyaya thesis may very well be defended.

Our criticism of Hintikka here may appear to be too hasty. For, after all, Hintikka constructed a 'formal proof. But it is rather refreshing to note that we are not alone in rejecting the second part of the Hintikka thesis. Among modern philosophers, A. C. Danto has very convincingly argued that the above part of Hintikka's theory (or that of Schopenhauer whom

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Hintikka cites as a predecessor in upholding it) is false, provided Hintikka by his use of the verb 'to know' intends to capture usage. In short, Danto points out, by using what he calls his 'style of grosso-modo proof, that the conjunction of 'a knows that p' and 'a does not know that a knows that p' is not inconsistent.

The main argument of Danto is that 'a knows that a knows that p' has a truth-condition in excess of the truth-conditions for 'a knows that p', and 'in such a way that the full satisfaction of the truth-conditions of the latter leaves indeterminate whether the excess truth-condition of the former is satisfied'. It is thus possible to hold that the former could be false while the latter is true. Danto explains this point as follows: We can take the notion of 'understands the sentence p' as giving a truth-condition for 'knows that p'. Thus the former would require that a understands the sentence 'a knows that p' while the latter simply that a understands the sentence p. Danto further comments: 'And surely it is possible to understand a great many things without understanding what knowledge is, or what "knows that" means'. All this goes to support the Nyaya view against Hintikka and the Mimamsakas of India. But we should also note that Danto does not contribute to the episodic conception of knowledge as Nyaya does. And this might explain the fact that Danto reaches a conclusion similar to Nyaya against Hintikka through a slightly different route. Presumably Danto would be reluctant to accept the Nyaya notion of knowledge (as distinct from knowledge of knowledge) as a non-dubious, truth-hitting cognition!

The Nyaya view of knowledge of knowledge, or rather knowledge of the knowledge-hood of an awareness, is that it is derived by an inference. What kind of inference would it be? A rich variety of material is available on this matter. The overall picture becomes very complicated as the Nyaya exponents proceed to explain the nature of such inference as would establish the knowledge-hood of an awareness. I shall use mainly Vacaspati and Udayana in this section, and in the next section which will continue to sort out the problems that arise in this connection I shall mainly depend upon Gangesa and Vardhamana.

Vacaspati expounds the Nyaya view by introducing distinction between different kinds of knowledge. It is argued that different kinds of inference would be needed to ascertain the knowledge-hood of different

kinds of knowledge. The question is also raised whether or not we need to ascertain the knowledge-hood of every piece of knowledge. For unless we can answer it we cannot satisfy a Nagarjunian sceptic. First we should distinguish the scriptural matters from mundane matters for scriptures are different kinds of action- guide. Concentrating upon mundane matters, we should notice the following: the mundane matters of our acquaintance may be classified as those with which one has acquired familiarity (e.g. daily chores) and those with which one has not (cf. *anabhyasadasapanna*). My familiarity with a cup of tea in the morning, or that there is a cup of tea on the table, belongs to the first case. My perception of an unfamiliar man approaching me would belong to the second type. *Vacaspati* says that in both cases the truth of my awareness is known to me by an inference, but the nature of the inference varies substantially one from the other. In the second case I know that my perception has been veridical (that I am not under illusion) because it leads to confirmatory behaviour (*pravrtti-samarthya*). For example, I can go and talk to the man; and his behaviour that follows, if confirmatory, would allow me to infer: this perception has been a case of knowledge, for it has led to confirmatory behaviour. It may be argued that no ostensible behaviour is likely to follow unless the perception has been a case of knowledge. Hence the said inference will never arise unless it presupposes what it is supposed to prove. *Nyaya* makes room for this common intuition, but proposes to resolve the issue differently. A perceptual awareness, whose veridicality is in doubt or unestablished (*sandigdha-praimanyaka* or *agrhit-pramanyaka*) is as good as a dubious cognitive awareness (*samsaya*). But even a dubiety, *Nyaya* asserts, may prompt us to act, and such action can very well be crowned with success. In such cases, *Nyaya* says, we infer the knowledge-hood of the awareness on the basis of some confirmatory behaviour as evidence. Behaviour, here, includes activities. *Vacaspati* has said that our actions and awarenesses (beliefs?) are (causally) related in the following way: Action or propensity to act depends upon the awareness of the object (*artha*), not upon the certain determination of it; for intelligent people act even from a dubious cognitive awareness of the object. It is not that those who act even being certain that the means will bring about an end (e.g.

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farmers ploughing fields for future crops) do not entertain (occasional) doubt about the result that is yet to come'.

The point is that even if we do not as yet have the knowledge that my present perception is veridical (or that it yields knowledge), my present perception, whose knowledge-yielding character (truth-hitting character) has not yet been determined, can all the same initiate action or behaviour that may be confirmatory in the end. Udayana says elaborating the Nyaya view: 'Everywhere, one tends to act, having considered that there is more to gain by acting, and that even if the result is not confirmatory, the loss is less (than gain).' (I follow Vardhamana's interpretation.)

Evidence of confirmatory behaviour is not always needed to establish knowledge-hood. In the cases where the matters are sufficiently 'familiar', another type of inference is used to establish the truth of an awareness. Vacaspati calls it the *tajjatryata* inference. I shall call it 'inference from likeness'. Briefly, it is this. Every time that I am in the kitchen in the morning, I see a cup of tea on the table. In order to know that my perception that there is a cup of tea on the table is veridical in such cases, I do not always need confirmatory behaviour (I go and take it in my hand, drink it, etc.). Rather I infer then and there that the perception that there is a cup of tea on the table is veridical (knowledge-yielding), for it belongs to the same type, i.e. it is like others, many others. I have had before. In such cases therefore our action or tendency to act (or our behaviour) is prompted by a certainty about the object, for we already know that this perception is veridical. This explains our strong common-sense intuition that in many cases we act on the basis of a dead certainty about an object. This is admittedly an inference based upon a premise involving the rather intriguing notion of likeness. It says that if A and the likes of A have been proven before to have the property K, then if X is like A (in essential points), X has K.

Udayana discussed this intriguing notion of likeness: H Briefly, the likeness varies with each type of cognitive structure. Besides, one sort of 'likeness' would be emphasized in the case of perception, another for the case of inference. Basically, the idea is this. On the first occasion, my awareness, 'there is a cup of tea on the table' (suppose on the first day) was no doubt a piece of knowledge, but I did not know immediately about its being a piece of knowledge until confirmatory behaviour

proved it to be so. After some days, however, I would start knowing its knowledge-hood immediately after I see the cup of tea. I would infer its knowledge-hood on the basis of its likeness to my past veridical experience. The likeness is also based, in this case, upon the identical structural content of the previous experience and the present experience.

Udayana says that all of us have an inherent propensity to wish and look for knowledge (cf. *samutkata-vasana*). We do not usually wish for or search after falsities. But the fact is that a cognitive event only occasionally amounts to knowledge. As a result, we frequently take (mistake) a false awareness to be a case of knowledge. A man, for example (Udayana's example), can assume the appearance of a wandering monk and we would quickly (*jhatiti*) take him to be a monk but we cannot say that we know in such cases unless we also know whether the appearance is faked or not. For a doubt as to whether or not the appearance was genuine would arise and be overwhelming (*askandita*). This is what Vacaspati called an 'unfamiliar' situation. In such cases, an awareness may arise and be also apprehended but it is commonly felt nevertheless that an overwhelming doubt regarding the knowledge-hood of such awareness would also arise within a short period (say, in the second or third moment). This fact cannot be easily explained if we supposed that when a person knows that he is aware of something he *ipso facto* knows that he knows.

Knowledge of the awareness commonly arises even when the knowledge-hood of the awareness becomes dubious in the above manner. For, Udayana says, knowledge-hood is a property of the awareness and in order to doubt whether the said awareness has knowledge-hood or not one must know at least that this is an awareness *simpliciter*. Doubt regarding the qualifying characters, A-ness or the lack of it, A-ness or B-ness (when they are contrary properties), presupposes knowledge of the subject-entity (*dhannin*). This is called in Nyaya the *dharmi-jnana*, requirement of a doubt. If somebody doubts whether an object is a camel or a kangaroo, he must have some acquaintance (at least a visual experience from a distance) with the object itself.

Just as the distinction between an awareness and perception of that awareness has been emphasized by contrasting the 'first-person singular' statements with the 'third-person singular' ones, a similar point can be

made here. The statement 'I know that p but I do not know that I know' is plainly absurd, but 'a knows that p but he does not know that he knows' is not necessarily so. To sum up: according to Nyaya, in the cases of perception as well as awareness derived from linguistic expression (sabda), knowledge-hood is established (known) by an inference based upon either confirmatory behaviour or likeness (according as it is an 'unfamiliar' or 'familiar' situation). But there seems to be a controversy among the Naiyayikas (most probably initiated by Vacaspati) about the knowledge-hood of some other kinds of awareness, e.g. the kind of inference used here to determine knowledge-hood as well as the inward perception (anuvyavasiya) that apprehends another awareness.

Check your Progress

How do we know?

3.5 INFERENCE, CONFIRMATION, AND INTROSPECTION

Gangesa has sorted out the Nyaya position as follows:

- (1) Doubt is infectious. If a entertains a doubt regarding the knowledge-hood of his awareness that p, then a's awareness becomes infected with doubt and this means that a cannot be sure whether p.
- (2) Human action is not always prompted (i.e. caused) by knowledge. Thus a may act assuming that p even when he has simply an awareness that p (even when he cannot be sure).
- (3) A person can be sure that p, only if he has a certitude (an awareness) that p and this awareness is not infected or overwhelmed with doubt as regards its falsehood. He does not always have to be sure by ascertaining the knowledge-hood of his awareness.
- (4) One may say: if c_2 ascertains the knowledge-hood of c_1 , we may need another c_3 , to ascertain the knowledge-hood of c_2 and so on.

This infinite regress can be stopped in the following way: If c_2 ascertains the knowledge-hood of c_1 , and no doubt about the falsehood of c_2 arises, there is then no need to look for c_1 etc. to ascertain the knowledge-hood or otherwise of c_1 .

- (5) Actions, behaviour etc. are 'shaky' (sakampa) when they are prompted by dubious awareness. They are 'unshaken' (niskampa) when prompted by a certitude about p . Such certitude may arise because either no doubt regarding the falsehood of the awareness has arisen; or when such doubts arose, they were removed on the basis of evidence.
- (6) In sum, action in us is not usually produced by knowledge of knowledge. A person acts because he knows (not because he knows that he knows) or he is simply aware, or he is in doubt but wishes to have the benefit of doubt, etc.

All these would apply to perceptual knowledge and they can be applied (as Vacaspati and Udayana have shown) *mutatis mutandis* to scriptural knowledge. Three further cases remain to be examined: (i) general inferential knowledge, (ii) knowledge of the 'result' (phala), that ensures confirmatory behaviour, and (iii) inward perceptual recognition.

First, let us deal with inference. The sceptic, who is fond of the 'infinite regress' argument might say that if some inference is supposed to impart knowledge of the knowledge-hood of an awareness, we may need another inference to examine what the former inference is said to establish. Vacaspati answers this by saying that an inference properly made would be 'self-verifying' in nature. This cryptic statement of Vacaspati became a matter of controversy for the later Nyaya. Here again I am obliged to discuss some exegetical issues, for it has some obvious philosophical significance. The problem is, of course, whether or not the knowledge derived from sound inference should be accepted as indubitable according to Nyaya. Vacaspati says that an inference is 'properly made' if and only if it is based upon a reason or evidence (figuratively called the inferential mark) that is invariably connected or concomitant with the property that is to be inferred (anumeyavyabhicarilinga-samutthatvat). In other words, if invariable concomitance is guaranteed between A and B, then from A, we infer B, and in this nothing can go wrong. If inference follows this logical rule, it

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imparts indubitable knowledge (niskampam upapadyate jnanam). For, the mark is there (present), and the mark cannot be present unless the marked (the property to be inferred) is present.

It is not clear whether the point of Vacaspati is that a logical argument-like inference is valid a priori, because the principle of such inference embodies a necessary truth. Perhaps this would be a volte face for a Naiyayika. Vacaspati says that any inference, whether it is of the kind (described above) based upon the logical 'mark' called confirmatory behaviour or upon a logical 'mark' about which all kinds of doubt regarding its non-concomitance or deviation have been removed (nirastamasta-vyabhicara-sainkasya), would impart knowledge and that knowledge-hood of such inferential cognition cannot be doubted.

Vacaspati's expression 'self-verifying' (svata eva pramana) would, of course, mean that the knowledge-hood of such inferential awareness (conclusion) would be known by the same set of conditions that would generate knowledge of that awareness itself. According to Nyaya, each awareness is cognized by an inward perception. Therefore, when an inferential awareness arises, an inward perception would grasp such an awareness as well as its knowledge-hood. In other words, when I have inferred that p I inwardly perceive that I have inferred that p and by the same token I inwardly perceive this inferred awareness to be a piece of knowledge-this is what Vacaspati intends to say.

Udayana reformulates the matter and maintains that the lack of doubt regarding inferential knowledge is only a contingent factor. In the case of inference, i.e. inferential awareness, doubt may arise as regards its knowledge-hood in either of two ways. We may doubt the adequacy of the causal factors involved. Or we may doubt the knowledge-hood of the concluding (resulting) awareness. Two relevant causal factors are involved: Knowledge of the concomitance (invariability) between A and B, and knowledge of the presence of A in the case under consideration (in pakaa) on the basis of which we infer B. Now if these two pieces of knowledge are established (known), Udayana says the first contingency, i.e. possibility of the first kind of doubt, is removed.

The second contingency is removed as follows. The inferred conclusion is 'B is there.' The relevant doubt would be of the form: whether this awareness is a piece of knowledge or not. This would, according to

Nyaya, inflect the conclusion and the awareness would then be virtually equivalent to a doubt of the form 'perhaps B is there, perhaps not.' But this latter doubt is, according to Nyaya theory, what actually initiates the process of inference. (It is technically called *paksata*.) In other words, people infer generally in order to remove such a doubt and hence when inference has taken place (an awareness 'B is there' has arisen), the said doubt would have been removed already. Therefore, both types of doubt are removed in this way. Hence when the inward perception takes place to grasp the inferential awareness (when I know that I have inferred that B is there), it grasps also, in the absence of any possible doubt, the knowledge-hood of the said awareness. This means that we do not need a further inference in order to know the knowledge-hood of the inferred conclusion (awareness). (And this may be a good answer to a Nagarjunian sceptic who talks about a vicious circle or an infinite regress.)

The position of Vacaspati (that inference is self-verifying) does not admittedly fit well with the rest of the Nyaya system. But I do not think it is entirely unsatisfactory. We should notice that the so-called 'self-verifying' character of an inference is not essentially the same as it is in the rival (Mimamsa) schools. The Mimamsa School seems to assume that knowledge-hood is the natural trait of an awareness-event (only faulty causal factors give rise to the cases of faulty awareness, falsehoods) and hence when the awareness is known, its knowledge-hood is also necessarily known along with it. For Vacaspati, however, the knowledge-hood of the inferential awareness is known only contingently along with the knowing (inward perception) of the awareness itself. It is insisted upon, for example, that this happens only when all the possible doubts are removed. Udayana has shown how such possible doubts can be removed (see above). In other words, inference is not said to be indubitable here on a priori grounds: what is appealed to is only a practical impossibility (cf. 'contradiction of practice' = *vyaghata*) of raising any doubt.

Vardhamana tries to explain the remarks of Udayana and Vacaspati as follows. He adds that the inward mental perception that grasps the inference, 'B is there', grasps it also as an inference. Since 'inference' means an awareness derived from sound evidence or reason, our inward

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perception grasps the awareness as one derived from sound evidence. In Nyaya theory of inference, what is derived from sound evidence can never go wrong. As Vardhamana insists: 'For, an inference produced by the consideration of (logically) sound evidence is never false or a pseudo-inference. If this is correct, then our knowledge of our own awareness as an inference would automatically be knowledge of its soundness, i.e. its knowledge-hood. This implies that the Nyaya theory of inference is computational and the mechanism of inference can never deliver false inference as output! The output could be a false awareness (a pseudo-inference) if only the input (the 'consideration' of evidence = paramarsa) were false. If the input (the premiss or premisses) is not false but the conclusion is not really entailed by it, the Nyaya mechanism for inference would not generate any output, any inferential awareness. For it would reject the input and say, as it were, 'It does not compute'. In other words, while in the Western theory of inference one can draw a fallacious conclusion from some premiss (and hence we talk about 'logical fallacies' in such cases), one cannot infer, in the Nyaya sense of the term, using such a premises as one's input or initial awareness.

In spite of the above explanations by Udayana (and Vardhamana) later Naiyayikas never felt happy about the above view of Vacaspati regarding inferences. While one can agree with the point that inference, properly made, is always true and hence a piece of knowledge (in other words, truth would arguably be its omnitemporal, but probably not its necessary, character) one cannot see why it would not be possible sometimes to raise doubts as regards the truth or knowledge-hood of some particular inference. Gangesa, Vardhamana, et al think that such doubts can be entertained. And when they arise in us, a further inference is needed to resolve them. Hence Vacaspati's expression 'svata eva' should actually be interpreted to mean 'with ease' (sukara eva in Vardhamana). Vacaspati's cryptic comment would then mean, according to Gangesa, that the knowledge-hood of an inferential awareness is easily grasped. And this means that doubts as regards its falsehood are generally absent and hence there is 'unshaken' activity after inference. In other words, inference is not 'self-verifying' but verifiable only with excessive ease!

Vardhamana suggests another alternative interpretation of Vacaspati. This self-verifying nature does not apply, according to Vacaspati, to all

types of inference, but only to the inference by which we infer the character of knowledge-hood in any other awareness. Hence the inference based upon confirmatory knowledge or likeness would be knowledge and knowledge-hood of such inference would be known as soon as that inferential awareness itself is known (by an inward mental perception). The ground would be almost the same as before: all doubts as regards this particular type of inference going wrong are removed and hence further doubt should not arise.

We can now look more closely into the notion of confirmatory behaviour. The notion was first introduced in the Nyaya tradition by Vatsyayana who also used it as the 'logical mark' to infer the knowledge-hood of an awareness. To explain it, Jayanta refers to the interpretation of some previous teacher or teachers, who say that confirmatory behaviour means another awareness that ensues upon the first or an awareness of the logical evidence to confirm the first awareness. The idea is that if I see a man approaching and later on shake hands with him, this second awareness of mine confirms the first. Or, the shaking of hands would be the logical mark, my awareness of which (*visesadarsana*) will establish that he is a man, which in turn would show that my perception was veridical. However, Jayanta rightly rejects such interpretation and says that Vatsyayana meant by it a sort of confirmatory knowledge or confirmation by virtue of the 'effects' or 'result' expected of the object known (*arthakriyakhya-phalajnanam*). My perception that it is water there would be known to be veridical if, for example, it quenches my thirst. Awareness of the latter fact would be called *phalajnana*, confirmatory knowledge-or knowledge of the 'result'.

The question now arises about how we know the knowledge-hood of the confirmatory knowledge, according to the Nyaya scheme. Here Jayanta differs from Vacaspati in resolving the issue. Vacaspati insists that cases of confirmatory knowledge are similar to that of 'familiar' situation, and hence an inference based upon likeness is needed to know its knowledge-hood. Jayanta says that confirmatory knowledge does not stand in need of verification. In other words, it goes against the invariable practice of all persons to raise doubt about the knowledge-hood of the confirmatory knowledge. Jayanta almost claims that it is impossible to entertain a doubt here. For one thing, since my purpose has been served (*siddha-*

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prayojanatvat), i.e. my thirst has been quenched, there is no necessity to examine or question the awareness any further. In other words, absence of any doubt accounts for the non-arising of the question whether it is a piece of knowledge or not. For Jayanta says, how can I doubt whether I have a knowledge of water or not when I am already in the middle of water-taking a bath, for example? But this is only a practical impossibility, not a logical one. For one can easily imagine that it is all a dream, my thirst and the quenching of it etc. Assuming this objection, Jayanta says something that he himself repudiated in another connection. He says that the difference between dream experience and waking experience can be marked by our inward feeling (samvedyatvat). 'Here I am awake, not dreaming'-an inner perception of this kind is concomitant with our waking experience.

This, however, is a desperate attempt to get out of a tight corner. For Jayanta himself agrees (a few pages earlier) with the sceptic, as against the other Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas, that when a perception arises, there cannot be any ostensible mark that we are necessarily aware of, to help us decide whether it is veridical or not. He challenged his opponent to spell out such a specific mark as would unmistakably distinguish veridical perception from the non-veridical one. For it cannot be clarity or vividness (spastata-visesa, probably mentioned by Dharmakirti in one connection), nor can it be unshakable disposition to act (niskampata, Vacaspati refers to it), nor absence of any doubt, nor perceived absence of any contradiction, for all of them would equally and indiscriminately characterize both an illusion and veridical perception and, one may add, even a dream. Even if we concede Jayanta's point about dreaming and the presence of our 'inner' evidence in waking experience, it is quite possible to imagine a situation, following Vasubandhu, which is equivalent to that of mass hypnosis, or a Cartesian situation imagined to be created by an evil demon, or the case of a 'brain in a vat' as imagined recently by Hilar Putnam, where inner evidence will not be of any help. Jayanta however tries an alternative way to establish our knowledge of the knowledge-hood of the confirmatory knowledge. We become certain about the truth of the confirmatory knowledge only after a satisfactory examination of all its causal factors. This would therefore imply that confirmatory knowledge may need verification on occasion. I can

examine, for example, whether my eyesight is defective or not, whether I am excessively hungry (and therefore hallucinating those sumptuous dishes), whether I am dreaming or awake, and so on.

The opponent might say that we can in the same way engage ourselves in examining the causal factors to determine the veridical-ness of the first perception for which confirmation was needed. Why do we have to resort to such a method in the second, confirmatory knowledge, and not in the first one? Jayanta answers that this is also possible but generally people resort to examining the confirmatory evidence rather than examining the causal factors of the first perception when it arises. If I see water, I immediately act to see whether it quenches my thirst (provided I am thirsty) and if it does, my first perception is confirmed to be a piece of knowledge. This is a much easier way than examining the causal factors of the first perception and people usually take the easier way out. To quote: 'If you find honey in your own home why should you go to the (distant) hill?' In sum, there is a practical solution to the sceptic's problems, but the super-sceptic can probably never be answered satisfactorily (see below).

In confirmatory knowledge, we in fact reach the end of the line. If the regress which the sceptic points out has to stop anywhere then it stops here. Moritz Schlick has commented about the nature of confirmations. 'They are an absolute end. In them the task of cognition at this point is fulfilled ... it gives us a joy to reach them, even if we cannot stand upon them (my emphasis) Jayanta holds another view that coincides with that of the sceptic. He says that it is possible for all cases of our awareness to be considered as infected with doubt or uncertainty in the beginning (prior to confirmation etc.). For so long as the certainty about its knowledge-hood (or otherwise) has not arisen we can say that there is a lack of certainty as regards the truth of my awareness, although an actual doubt has not arisen. This lack of certainty transmits itself to the object of my awareness or 'infects' it. Hence there is a possibility of universal doubt in this extended sense of the term 'doubt'. Jayanta says that by 'doubt' here he would designate the lack of certainty which characterizes each awareness due to the lack of our knowledge about its truth. The reason for conceding this position to the sceptic has already been explained. The Nyaya position that the knowledge-yielding character of

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an awareness cannot be known at the moment the awareness arises, may entail such a possibility of universal doubt. We will initially lack certainty about the truth of any awareness. Jayanta says clearly that he is not arguing for the establishment of the possibility of universal doubt but the Nyaya position might entail this possibility. Each awareness, in other words, is suspect until proven not guilty.

Vacaspati, I have already noted, has a different view about the cases of confirmatory knowledge. He thinks that they should be treated in the same way as our perception of 'familiar matters' (abhyasadasapan-na) is treated. For they are, after all, familiar through habit, repetition, practice etc. Hence our knowledge of the truth of the confirmation is given by the inference (of the kind described before) based upon 'likeness' as the logical mark. Many times, for example, I drink water and thirst is quenched. Hence the 'instant' inference based upon likeness gives the required knowledge that the confirmatory awareness of the quenching of thirst is true or is a piece of knowledge. The former confirmatory awareness only reinforces the latter. But it is possible to reach a point when I am drinking water for the first time to quench my thirst (before now, suppose I drank only coke) in that case the inference based upon likeness would not be available to me. Vacaspati anticipates this point and answers that in this case my tasting (drinking) of water belongs to the class of mundane objects or matters with which no 'familiarity' has been developed (anabhyasa-dasapanna). Therefore, here my action or tendency to act would follow (causally) from mere awareness which may even be a dubious one, but not from my knowledge that it is a piece of knowledge. When confirmatory behaviour follows, I become truly aware that I have a piece of confirmatory knowledge. Vacaspati qualifies this statement by saying that such further confirmation of the initial confirmatory knowledge is needed only when we entertain a doubt about the veracity of the initial confirmatory awareness on the analogy of dreams etc. The idea is that I might experience quenching of thirst but still I may not be sure whether it is not a dream etc. For in dreams etc. I can also have the same experience. When such a problem arises, I depend upon confirmatory behaviour to support my confirmatory knowledge (e.g. I may just examine whether the thirst is gone, wait for a few minutes etc.).

Vacaspati, therefore, gets out of the dilemma posed by the sceptic in his own way. The problem is precisely this. In saying with Nyaya that an awareness is known to be knowledge by another knowledge, in fact, an inference, we may end up with either a vicious circle or an infinite regress. For even to make such an inference possible we need a knowledge of the logical 'mark', i.e. either a knowledge of what we have called likeness or the confirmatory behaviour. Now the second knowledge may need further confirmation. In other words, we have to know its knowledge-hood to prevent the infection of doubt. (A dubious awareness of the logical mark does not generate inference.) Vacaspati says in unmistakable language:

The awareness of the logical mark likeness, belonging to the first awareness, is a mental perception. Falsity of such mental perception is not (never?) to be found, and hence all doubts about its being wrong are completely (paritah) removed. Therefore, knowledge-hood of this (mental perception) is 'self-established'. Hence there is no infinite regress.

Here 'self-established' raises again the exegetical problems in the Nyaya tradition. It is explained again by Vardhamana as 'being known (established) by (another) inward (mental) perception, which grasps the first mental perception'. An awareness, say c_1 , whose veracity is not known yet, certifies the knowledge-hood or veracity of another awareness, say c_2 , provided no doubt has originated regarding the lack of veracity of c_1 . If such a doubt arises, it infects the object of c_1 and thereby renders the veracity of c_2 dubious. In such cases we have to remove the initial doubt by a knowledge, say, c_0 which will certify the veracity of c_1 and it, in its turn, will certify the veracity of c_2 . This need not lead to an infinite regress as long as we admit with Nyaya that a piece of knowledge does not have to be known first as a piece of knowledge for it to certify the veracity of another. The last in the series (backwards), c_0 can by itself do the job of certifying and the cognizer may meanwhile move to a different subject and/or may not pause to question the veracity of c_0 . This seems to be a better and pragmatic explanation of the Nyaya reply to the skeptical charge of infinite regress.

If Vacaspati is to be interpreted literally, then one has to say that he divides knowledge's (knowing events) into two groups. There are those

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cases whose knowledge-hood is established by a separate inference: external perceptions and knowledge from scriptures or linguistic expressions. There are others whose knowledge-hood is 'self-established' (i.e. established by whatever grasps the awareness itself): inference, upamana (analogical identification), and mental perception. Udayana adds one more item to the second list: dhanni-jntina (perceptual awareness, internal or external, of the entity that constitutes the subject-entity of a 'propositional' or constructive awareness), e.g. awareness of a which is a constituent of the awareness 'a is F'. Udayana believes that the knowledge-hood of the awareness of a cannot be doubted in this case, for that would make the construction 'a is F' practically impossible. In other words, if i am already aware that a is F, I must have an awareness of a. (See previous section.)

The prevailing Nyaya view, however, is that knowledge-hood of all knowing events can be established by an inference (of either kind described above) whenever it is possible to doubt whether the cognitive event concerned is a piece of knowledge or not. Udayana therefore offers the following compromise between Vacaspati's statement and that of other Naiyayikas. When Vacaspati uses the expression 'self-established', he simply means that it is not the case that these are never self-established and this implies that these knowing events are mostly (though not always) self-established.

In other words, according to Udayana, Vacaspati's intention is to underline the undeniable fact that these knowing events are such that their knowledge-hood is easily established by the immediately succeeding mental perception of these events. This is so precisely because chances of doubt, as have already noted, are practically non-existent in these cases. But, Udayana insists, it is quite (logically) possible that a person is in doubt as regards their knowledge-hood. In such remote cases, however, their knowledge-hood can be established by another inference (parata 1). The supposed infinite regress can be stopped through practical considerations that we have already noted. Another important point that we must note in this connection is this. Both Gangesa and Udayana seem to allow that our mental inward perception of inner events, such as, cognition, pleasure, pain, and desire, is invariably a piece of knowledge (pramanya-niyatatvat, Gangesa),

although we may not always know its knowledge-hood automatically. To demonstrate this the following argument is suggested.

Let us suppose that a person, a, is aware that this is silver. This awareness may be true or false according as the object identified or referred to on that occasion by 'this' is a piece of silver or not. Next, he has an inward (mental) perception of this awareness, in which he is aware that he is simply aware that this is silver. Since the second awareness grasps the first simply as an awareness (not as knowledge or illusion) nothing can possibly go wrong with it. The second awareness could have been wrong or false only if the first awareness were not, in fact, an awareness. But this is ruled out from the beginning. This point seems to be intuitively grasped when somebody says 'How can I be wrong about my own feelings, intense pain, etc.?' Udayana says that our inner episodes are sometimes characterized by an intensity (tivra-samvegita) such that they force themselves into our consciousness, much as some intense pain. Some cognitive events (awareness) have this character of intensity and hence there always arises a mental inward perception of them and such perceptions can never be misperceptions. This would mean that according to Nyaya, one cannot be deluded about one's being in pain etc.

How is the falsity of an awareness known? The answer is given by Udayana as follows:

Just as the knowledge-hood (of an awareness), with regard to an 'unfamiliar' situation is ascertained (i.e. known) by confirmatory behaviour, the falsity (of an awareness) is ascertained by failure of such behaviour. Similarly, just as before the confirmatory behaviour ensues in a 'familiar' situation knowledge-hood is ascertained by likeness, falsity (in such situations) is also ascertained (through likeness)}"

A person suffering from eye-disease will see a double moon repeatedly in the evening sky, and this will therefore be a case of 'familiar' situation. But he will still take it to be false on the basis of the 'likeness' inference. He will see that this cognition resembles in relevant respects other cases of false awareness (where falsity has already been determined). This is the general likeness. He would also see that his cognition resembles, in essential details, his first awareness of the double moon (when his eye-

disease started and when he ascertained its falsehood by asking others etc.).

Check your Progress-1

We can be aware of the awareness itself. But how?

3.6 LETS SUM UP

This shows that Nyaya is consistent in maintaining that a person may be aware that he is aware that p, but this is not enough for him to know whether p is true or not. Knowledge hood and falsehood are properties of his (first) awareness and he may remain unaware which one of these properties his awareness has even when he is aware of his (first) awareness. Usually an inference (of either kind described above) helps us to establish the knowledge hood as well as falsity. However, when an inward perception is grasped by another inward perception, Udayana says that its specific characters, inwardness, etc., are also grasped thereby. This is another way of saying that we grasp its knowledge hood also by the same token. But if we still indulge in a doubt as regards knowledge hood, we have to fall back upon an inference to resolve it.

3.7 KEY WORDS

Utpati, 'arising' of knowledge- hood of knowledge

jnapti 'knowing' of the knowledge.

Svatampramanyavada, knowledge-hood can be established by self itself

Paratahpramanyavada knowledge-hood can be established by another inference

3.8 QUESTION FOR REVIEW

1. Examine the nyaya position of the debate of Jnapti and Utpati

2. Expound the Buddhist view on Svatahpramanyavada and Paratahpramanyavada.

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3.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- There is a remarkable variety of views regarding how do we know that we know in classical Indian philosophy.
- As regards how a piece of knowledge is known (by the knower) there are two rival theses:

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- Whatever causes the knowledge of the awareness, c_1 , causes, by the same token, the knowledge of its knowledge-hood.
- The causal complex that gives rise to the knowledge of the awareness, c_1 , needs to be supplemented by some additional condition in order to give rise the knowledge of its knowledge-hood.

2. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- three views are current among the Indian philosophers.
- We can say that an awareness is reflexively aware of itself (T_1 above) if it is self-aware or it reveals itself.
- Let us say that one is introspectively aware of one's immediately preceding awareness (the Nyaya view and Murari's view), provided we need a separate perceptual awareness to apprehend the immediately preceding awareness.
- Lastly, let us say that one is reflectively aware that an awareness has arisen in one's mind (the Bhatta view), provided one needs an inference ('since I am aware of this object, there must have arisen an awareness in me') to be aware of one's awareness.

UNIT 4 A BRIEF STUDY OF PRAMANAS: PRATYAKSA

STRUCTURE

4.0 Objectives

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Different Opinions of Pratyaksa

4.3 Role of Senses in Perception

4.4 Modes of Perception

4.5 Non-Sensuous Perception in Philosophy

4.6 Let Us Sum Up

4.7 Keywords

4.8 Questions for review

4.9 Suggested Readings

4.10 Answer Check your Progress

4.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn about the pratyaksha pramana
- Know how pratyaksha is understood in various darshanas

4.1 INTRODUCTION

IN Indian epistemology, two words are used to mean knowledge. They are jnana and prama. Jnana means all kinds of knowledge, true or false. When reality reveals true knowledge it is called prama or valid knowledge. Sources of right knowledge or means of cognition are essential for the establishment of a valid knowledge. In this point almost all the thinkers of Indian systems are unanimous. But regarding the number of pramana they are different. One may question the truth of the knowledge derived from inference, testimony, etc. but the truth of

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perception is in a way beyond question. Perceptual verification is thus the final test of all other knowledge and as such, perception is the chief of all the sources of human knowledge. It is widely accepted by all the philosophical systems since all the systems have to support their theories through perception in the arena of epistemological investigation. The very simple but correct definition of perception has been given by Salikanatha Misra when he says that perception is the direct apprehension.

In European philosophy, the validity of perception as a source of knowledge is rather overstressed by the empiricists and some modern realists. According to them, the truth of perception is unquestionable and self-evident. Thus J.S. Mill remarks: "Whatever is known to us by consciousness (intuition), is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. So also W.T. Mervin thinks that "perception is the ultimate crucial test, and as such, it does not presuppose its own possibility. It simply is; and the man who questions it assumes it in order to do the questioning. Similarly Russell tells us repeatedly that the truths of perception are self-evident truths, for which we require no test at all.

The philosophers of Samkhya-Yoga system have stated that perception has been treated as superior to all other forms of valid knowledge and they assign the following reasons - (i) perception as a form of valid knowledge has been accepted by all logicians, and (ii) other valid forms of knowledge presuppose perception whereas perception presupposes none of them.

The term pratyaksa consists of two parts, prati and aksa, prati means before or near or related to and aka means eye. The process through which immediate knowledge of an object arises or the instrument, by which the object is conceived, is also called pratyaksa. That is why perception is sometimes defined in terms of the process as well as instrument therein. There is difference of opinion among the different systems of Indian philosophy regarding the definition of pratyaksa.

4.2 DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF PRATYAKSA

CARVAKA VIEW OF PRATYAKSA

All the schools of Indian philosophy, both astika and nastika, accept pratyaksa (perception) as a source of valid knowledge. Thus Carvakas hold that perception is the only pramana or dependable source of valid knowledge. The perceptual knowledge is so vivid that there arises no question about its validity. External perception and internal perception are the two broad divisions of perception. External perception is that immediate knowledge which arises out of the contact of senses and object. And internal perception is the immediate perception of the mental states like pleasure, pain, etc. The internal perception depends on external perception. Anything beyond the range of perception is not real. The world of our perception is the only reality. Hence, the Carvakas reject the reality of heaven and hell as they are not objects of our perception.

The Carvakas do not consider the validity of anumana and sabda. The author of the Mahabharata says that the Carvakas do not treat anumana or inference and agama or authority as pramanas. He states that both anumana and agama are based on pratyaksa and this is the reason why the Carvakas do not consider them as the means of valid knowledge. The author of the epic also states that these philosophers do not recognize anumana as pramana for another important reason. The reason is that they cannot assert the validity of the vyapti or the invariable concomitance which plays the most significant part in inference. The materialists do not consider this vyapti as infallible. Therefore, the author of the Mahabharata observes that the materialists do not recognize anumana as a pramana.

Actually, it is not always possible to attain the correct knowledge of something with anumana. Similar is the case of upamana, etc. But the fact cannot be denied that one cannot totally dispense with anumana in his practical life. Sometimes, it is found that pratyaka alone does not serve the purpose. The author of the Nyayakusumanjali observes that if a Carvaka depends entirely on pratyaksa he will invite his own miseries

due to his dogmatic view. According to the author, when Carvaka will go away to a remote place by leaving his wife and children at home, naturally, he will be unable to perceive them from that place. Thus according to his own standpoint, they will be non-existent to him and hence he will have to lament for their loss. A section of later Carvakas probably realized this problem. Therefore, Gunaratna informs that the Carvakas recognize anumana also as a pramana for practical purposes. Gunaratna says that these philosophers agree to accept such an inference only as is essentially necessary for proving the existence of fire in a hill with the help of a column of smoke. But they do not recognize such extrasensory inference (alaukika anumana) as are commonly accepted by some other philosophers to establish the existence of heaven, adrsta etc. Purandara also says that the Carvakas recognize laukika anumana or popular inference as a pramana.

THE JAINA VIEW OF PRATYAKSA

From the viewpoint of the Jainas valid knowledge has been treated in two ways, namely, Agamic tradition and logical tradition. From the Agamic point of view, determinate knowledge has been divided into five types, namely mati, sruta, avadhi, mana -paryaya and kevala.

From the viewpoint of logical tradition, valid determinate knowledge has been classified into two: pratyaksa or direct and paroksa or indirect. Bhadrabahu in his Avasyaka-nirukti, follows the Agamic tradition, while Nyayavatara of Siddhasena Divakara follows the logical tradition. Umasvati in his Tattvarthadhigamasatra has followed both these traditions, and his method has been borrowed by Madhavacarya in his Sarvadarsanasarhgraha. According to this classification, knowledge has first been divided into five types, namely, mati, sruta, avadhi, mana -paryaya and kevala. Then they have been brought under two main heads of pramiittas: pratyaksha or direct and paroksha or indirect. Mati and sruta have been included in the paroksa class, while the rest are regarded as belonging to the pratyaksa class. Here, pratyaksa means that knowledge which is directly acquired by the self (aksa) without the mediation of the mind or the senses, and paroksa is that knowledge which is acquired by the self through the mediation of the mind and the senses.

The Jaina logicians define perception as clear knowledge. According to Vidhyanandi pratyaksa is the knowledge which is clear. Akalanka says pratyaksam visadam. Manikyanandi, Vadideva and Hemacandra also define perception as clear knowledge. Thus according to the Jainas, perception is clear knowledge. Perception is defined as distinct knowledge. Distinctness consists in the apprehension of an object with its specific qualities without the mediation of any other knowledge. Pratyaksa is classified into two: (i) empirical (samvyavaharika) and transcendental (paramarthika). Empirical perception is uncontradicted perception which prompts successful action in the form of attainment of a desired object or rejection of an undesired object. It depends on sense-organs and other conditions. Transcendental perception, on the other hand, does not depend on sense-organs or any condition. Again the empirical perception has two forms: (i) sensuous and (ii) non-sensuous perception. Sensuous perception is due to the external sense-organs stimulated by external objects. Non-sensuous perception is mental perception. It apprehends pleasure, pain, etc. through the mind which is not a sense organ. Distinct apprehension of an object with its infinite qualities and relations is not possible with sensuous and non-sensuous perception.

BAUDDHA VIEW OF PRATYAKSA

The Buddhists define perception as the unerring cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all ideata. In it the object of cognition is a unique individual and the process of cognition is a mere sensing without any element of ideation (kalpana) in it. Vasubandhu, a Bauddha logician of the Yogacara School, characterizes perception as a cognition that is directly produced by the object, of which it is the cognition. The cognition of fire, for example, is a perception. Dinnaga, the greatest Bauddha logician, brings out the implications of Vasubandhu's definition of perception. According to Dinnaga, pratyaksa is different from imagination and has no connection with names, genus, etc. Dharmakirti defines pratyaksa as non-erroneous cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all constructions (kalpana). He further states that kalpana is a distinct cognition (pramitih) of a mental reflex (pratibhasa) which is capable of being united with verbal designation. Pratyaksa is

such knowledge as is free from such construction when it is not affected by an illusion produced by colourblindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship and other causes.

THE VIEW OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

Sankara refers to three sources of valid knowledge: perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Later writers add comparison, postulation and negation. In the Advaita Vedanta, perception as a pramata is the unique cause of perception as a form of valid knowledge. In this sense the sense-organs constitute the karana or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. According to Advaita Vedanta perception is the direct consciousness of objects obtained generally through the exercise of the senses. It is the knowledge acquired through the operation of antahkaranavrtti. In perception the transparent anta karana goes out through the sense-organs, pervades the object, say, the pot and assumes the form of that object. This transformation of the internal organ in the form of the object is called antahkaranavrtti. Perception is the immediate knowledge in which the mental modification is non-different from the object and is lit up by the self 's light. When the eye is fixed on a jar the internal organ is supposed to go out towards it, illuminate it by its own light, assume its shape and cognize it. This inner activity is assumed to account for the transformation of the physical vibration into mental states. If one, simply stares at the blue sky one cannot perceive anything.

The internal organ functions like light, its vrtti moves outwards in the form of ray of light. The vrtti identifies itself with the object, and its identification might spread over the whole surrounding scene. What one perceives depends on the nature of the mode. If the mode takes the form of the weight of the object, one perceives weight, if of colour, one perceives colour. In the case of perception of the jar, the consciousness determined by the jar is found to be unified with that determined by the vrtti of the internal organ falling on that jar, even as the space enclosed within a jar in the room is unified with that enclosed within the room itself. The two limiting conditions of ultimate consciousness, the modification and the object do not produce a difference. This unification makes the cognition of the jar perceptual in character. Perception is distinct from memory, since only past events are recollected. A further

qualification is mentioned, that the object and the mental mode must belong to the present time (vartamanatvam).

VAISESIKA VIEW OF PRATYAKSA

According to Vaisesika valid knowledge is what apprehends an object in its real nature. Invalid knowledge is what apprehends an object as different from it. Four kinds of valid knowledge are admitted according to Vaisesikas which are perception (pratyaksa), inference (laingika), remembrance (smrti) and intuitive knowledge (arsajnana). Perception enables us to apprehend substances, qualities and actions. Prasastapada defines perception as the cognition that is dependent on sense organs. Pratyaksa according to Vaisesika is external or internal. Internal perception is due to conjunction of the self with the internal organ. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are apprehended by internal perception. External perception is of five kinds, olfactory, gustatory, visual, cutaneous and auditory. The Vaisesika admits yogic perception, by which the perceptual cognition of the soul (atmapratyaksa) arises.

THE MIMAMSA VIEW OF PRATYAKSA

Jaimini's aphorism - sat samprayoge purusasyendriyanam buddhi janamatat pratyaksam animittam vidyamanopalambhanat - forms the basis of the Mimamsa theory of perception. There are, however, divergent views regarding the interpretation and application of this aphorism. Some commentators such as Sabara hold that the entire aphorism is simply a pointer to establish the fact that dharma cannot be known by perception. According to Kumarila Bhatta, perception is a knowledge which is the result of the right functioning of the sense-organ with reference to their objects. The Prabhakara School of Purva-Mimamsa has presented a peculiar theory of perception called the triputipratyaksavada (the theory of triple perception). Prabhakara has propounded this theory, which has been again elaborated by Salikanatha Misra in his Juvimala and Prakaranapancika. In the Amrtakala Prakarana of his Prakaranapancika Salikanatha has stated that perception is the direct knowledge which pertains to apprehend object (prameya), the apprehending person (pramata) and to the apprehension itself

(pramiti). In each act of perception, the idea of each of these comes to be its constituent factor. This definition of perception gives us the theory of triple perception and in the Pramana Prameya chapter of the Prakaranaapancika also, we have the reference to this peculiar theory.

Check view of progress

1. Advaita and Mimamsa View of Pratyaksha

- According to Advaita Vedanta perception is the direct consciousness of objects obtained generally through the exercise of the senses
- Prabhakara and Kumarila, have given different view on perception

THE SAMKHYA-YOGA VIEW OF PRATYAKSA

The Samkhya system consists of three different traditions in defining perception, viz. (i) the one initiated in the Samkhyasutra probably by Kapila himself, (ii) the one propounded by Vindhyavasin and (iii) the one proposed by Isvarakrsna. The Samkhyasutra defines perception as that discernment which being in conjunction of an object portrays the form thereof. A popular definition of perception as the "operation of cognitive organs, ear and the rest" is ascribed to the followers of Varsagaanya Pulinbihari Chakraborty thinks that Vindhyavasin revised the definition given by Varsaganya by embodying the epithet avikalpika. As regards the classical sources of Samkhya-Yoga, Patanjali does not define perception. Hence, the Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna is the earliest classical source about the definition of perception. In the Samkhyakarika the term drsta has been used instead of pratyaksa. None of the commentators of the Samkhyakarika explain why the author of the Samkhyakarika used the term drsta instead of the term pratyaksa. But the term drsta is very significant. All cases of immediate experience are not due to sense-object contact. The experiences namely "I am happy," "I am sorry" etc. do not require the help of sense organs and manas. Thus the term pratyaksa is not applicable in these cases because though the experience is immediate, it is not sensuous. In order to cover such cases, the term drsta is only appropriate. Unfortunately, the author of the Samkhyasutra does not take notice of the inner significance of the term drsta used by Isvarakrsna. The term pratyaksa used in the

Samkhyasutra denotes only a small portion of immediate experience. The experience of inner phenomena remains outside the range of the definition of pratyaksa.

The Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna gives the definition of drsta in the following way - perception is a determinate knowledge in respect of every individual object. The definition when interpreted independently of the commentaries of the Samkhyakarika reveals that there is no reference to sense-object contact. Further Isvarakrsna unlike Varsaganya defines perception in terms of knowledge. This knowledge is qualified by "pertaining to individual object." Such a definition also is unique in the arena of Indian philosophy. Knowledge of all kinds, according to Isvarakrsna, is the function or attribute of buddhi. Buddhi is taken in the sense of both - actual agent of knowing and means of knowledge. Thus the question naturally arises as to what is the factor which differentiates perception from sources of non-valid knowledge accepted by Samkhya. The expression "determinate knowledge" differentiates it from doubtful knowledge, the word object from already perceived knowledge and the word prati from memory etc.

There is a set of scholars who do not interpret prativisaya as cognitive organ. However, they introduce sense-object contact through importation. Mathara followed by Gaudapada interpret one definition offered by the

Samkhyakarika as perception is the knowledge with reference to particular object. Here Mathara seems to define perception in terms of indeterminate perception as determinative knowledge cannot arise in cognitive organ. Thus Mathara and Gaudapada import indriyanam in the above definition given by the Samkhyakarika.

Interpreting the definition of Isvarakrsna, Vacaspati states that perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense-object contact. In his opinion, through intellect (buddhi), ego (aharhkara), mind (manas) and the senses, external object is apprehended by the subject. When an object incites the senses the manas arranges the sense impression into a percept, the ego refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept. The author of Yuktidipika elucidates Isvarakrsnas definition and holds that the term visaya refers to the objects of cognition, the word prati in the definition stands for

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proximity and the word *adhyavasaya* implies the function of the intellect. The author of the *Yuktidzpika* splits up *prativi ayadhyavasaya* into two component parts - the first *prativisayadhyavasaya* covers the perception of external objects and the second *prativisayadhyavasaya* covers the immediate experience of the inner phenomena. He holds that it is a case of *ekasesa*, i.e. one component factor which is similar to the next one is dropped according to the rule of grammar. Though one word is dropped, its meaning is conveyed by the remaining component. It denotes its own meaning as well as that of the other (the dropped one). Regarding the number of the word, the author of the *Yuktidipika* does not explain why singular number has been used instead of the dual one. The *Yuktidipika* further shows the significance of the word *prativisaya* in the definition. The word *adhyavasaya* excludes application of the definition to the knowledge of absolutely non-existent objects like mirage, the circle of fireband and the city of the Gandharvas. If the definition would have been worded as *adhyavasayadrstam* it will include non-existent objects also because one will get determinate knowledge of these objects. According to *Yuktidipika* the word *Visaya* only can exclude the knowledge of the above non-existent objects from the domain of perception as these are mental concepts and not the objects in reality. The word *prati* in the definition excludes inferential knowledge from perception. The word *prati* means near and thus, denotes sense-object contact which is not found in inference. Again the *Yuktidipika* states that the word *prati* is used in the definition to exclude understanding of mutual intention by the cognitive organs. In *Samkhya* philosophy when one sense-organ cognizes its object, the other understands its intention and takes action. For example, when colour of a ripe mango is observed by the eyes, the organ of taste attains eagerness for that after understanding the decision of the eyes. Thus understanding of mutual intention arises in organs through their mutual contact and not through the contact of organs with the object cognized. Therefore, the term *prati* excludes understanding of mutual intention by the cognitive organs.

The *Samkhyasutra* defines perception as the knowledge which portrays the form of object coming in contact with it. Here, knowledge according to *Vijnanabhiksu* stands for *buddhivrtti*. The *buddhi* goes to the object

with the respective cognitive organ and gets the form of that object. This is perception. The essence of the definition is that perception is *vrtti* of *citta* followed by its contact with the object and through the cognitive organ. According to Jwalaprasad the definition has two special features: (i) that the knowledge called *pratyaksa* is regarded more as an act than as a product and (ii) that it is the form of object (*tadakara*) which is cognized and not the object itself. Here it is noticed that knowledge in *Samkhya* is itself an act as well as a result in the form of a particular modification or state of *buddhi*. As to the second observation, *buddhi* which is a determining principle is a form which is not imaginary but real, and thus, what is cognized is the object only and not the form created with mental imagination as supposed by the Buddhists. According to *Samkhyasutra* the above definition cannot apply to perceptive knowledge of yogins as also to the perception of *Isvara*. In their opinion perception defined here is the external perception while the perceptive knowledge of yogins does not come under the purview of it. Again to avoid the defects of the definition they try to explain that yogins due to their exaltation can come in contact with the objects lying in their cause in the past and future states also. As to the defect of its non-applicability to *Isvara's* perception the *Samkhyasatra* states that existence of *Isvara* is not proved.

After *Isvarakrsna* we come across the definition of perception in the *Yogabhasya* of *Vyasa*. In the *Yoga* system of *Patanjali*, there is no definition of perception. The *sutra* mentions only perception as one of the three valid forms of knowledge. According to *Vyasadeva*, the *bhasyakara* on the *Yogasutra*, the mode of the intellect goes out through the channel of sense-organs and becomes united with the object by means of its mode. The mode is the part and parcel of the intellect itself. It is like the rays of the sun that go out and catch the form of the object with which they are united. In perception, the particular is emphasized though the universal element in the object used is not overlooked. *Vacaspati* brings out the following implications of the definition: since perception is knowledge of a real object, it is free from all unreal mental imagination imposed upon it. The statement that *citta* is coloured by the form of an object implies that knowledge existing in *citta* comes in contact with external object. Though there is no direct contact of *citta* with the object

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known yet the cognitive organ serves as the medium. Perception apprehends chiefly the specific nature of an object. It implies that although generic nature also is apprehended in perception yet it is subordinate to specific nature. Vijnanabhiksu observes that the expression after its being coloured with the form of external object through cognitive organs should not be considered a part of the definition. It speaks of merely the cause of perception. Otherwise the definition will not be applicable to perceptive knowledge of soul, etc. as also perception of Isvara for the former does not stand in need of colouring of citta by external object and Isvara has no cognitive organ.

For a critical estimate of the Samkhya-Yoga position, it will be worthwhile to consider the criticism of these definitions. The definition offered by Vindhyavasin is criticized by Jayanta Bhatta and Hemacandra; that given by Varsaganya, by Akhanka, Dinnaga, Udyotakara and Vacaspati Misra; and that offered by Isvarakrsna is criticized by Jayanta Bhatta followed by Hemacandra. The definition given by the Samkhyasutra is not criticized by the critics of Samkhya. It seems that the Samkhyasutra is a later composition and hence could not draw the attention of eminent old logicians.

Jayanta Bhatta criticized Vindhyavasin's definition on the ground that it is having much in common with the Buddhist definition and is refuted with the Buddhist definition itself. Here the similarity with the Buddhist definition is with reference to the condition of being "free from imagination." Hemacandra criticizes the definition mainly from Jaina point of view. He presupposes that means of knowledge must be conscious only. The senses are unconscious and consequently their function will also be unconscious. As such they cannot be the means of knowledge. The definition offered by the followers of Varsaganya as the function of (cognitive organ) ear and the rest has invited severe criticism from Dinnaga, Akhanka, Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra. The points of their criticism are given below:

Dinnaga finds following faults in the definition: The Samkhyas hold that perception is the function of cognitive organs to apprehend a specific object. The object of apprehension is composed of three gunas. However, if a particular cognitive organ cognizes a particular proportion of the gunas, there will arise the undesirable contingency of acceptance of

many cognitive organs, as the objects in particular proportion of the gunas are innumerable. Akhanka rejects the above definition on the ground that it would apply even to the erroneous knowledge. Uddyotakara rejects the definition on the ground that the Nyaya position is the only correct one and that which differs from it is unacceptable and incorrect. Vacaspati Misra adds that the above definition is wrong because it is equally applicable to doubtful knowledge, etc.

Jayanta Bhatta, followed by Hemacandra, expresses his dissatisfaction over Isvarakrsna's definition of perception. Isvarakrsna's defines perception as determinate knowledge of objects. Jayanta Bhatta states that the above definition is not correct as it does not mention sense-object contact as a necessary condition of perception. Consequently, it becomes too wide as it is applicable to the other pramanas like anumana which are also the means of definite knowledge.

The above discussion leads to the following conclusions: Samkhya-Yoga had its own tradition of defining perception which was not originally influenced by other systems. It has undergone various changes during its development. The earliest available definition was offered by Vindhyavasin which was revised by the followers of Varsaganya. The condition of being free from imagination was dropped mainly because it was not necessary from Samkhya point of view and because it could not stand the critique also. The definition of Varsaganya was rejected by the later Samkhyas because it is not applicable to the internal perception as also to the extraordinary perception of yogins. Isvarakrsna defines perception in terms of determining an individual object. The logicians of other schools have criticized these definitions on various grounds but most of the objections can be easily alleviated by Samkhya Yoga.

4.3 ROLE OF SENSES IN PERCEPTION

Perception is primarily unconditioned by the activity of the senses in relation to some objects. Hence, perception is usually defined in terms of sense stimulation. Everyone admits sense activity as a factor conditioning all perception. But there is some difference of opinion as to the exact nature of the senses and their functions in perception.

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According to the Buddhists, the senses are the external organs occupying different parts of the surface of the body. The visual sense for example is the pupil of the eye, since objects can be seen only when the pupil is in order but not otherwise. For the Jainas a sense is the physical organ with a specific energy. According to the Samkhyas, the senses are not physical bodies like the pupil of the eye, but modifications of the subtle material principle called ahamkara. They think that a physical organ cannot account for the perception of distant objects. In perception the senses must function in direct contact with the objects of perception. But a physical organ like the eye-pupil cannot have direct contact with an object lying at a distance or behind a glass. This is possible only if the sense-organ be all-pervading in character and not a limited physical substance. So the Samkhyas think that the senses are modifications of a subtle all-pervading matter and are themselves all-pervading in character. The Nyaya rejects both the Bauddha and the Samkhya views about the nature of the senses. It agrees with Mimamsa and the Vedanta in holding that the senses are neither the end-organs nor modifications of any all-pervading subtle matter. According to these systems the external senses are material substances constituted by the physical elements and localized in the different end-organs. Another definition of sense given by some Naiyayikas is that it is the medium of a contact between the mind and an object to produce such knowledge as is different from memory. This definition, however, is not applicable to mind as a sense since it cannot be said to be the medium of contact between. itself and objects like pleasure and pain. The sastradipika defines sense as what produces a clear and distinct knowledge of the object it is brought in contact with. This definition holds good with regard to all the senses including the mind.

According to the Nyaya and Mimamsa, there are six sense-organs. Of these some are called external and some internal. There is only one internal sense called manas or mind. There are five external senses namely, the olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the cutaneous, and the auditory. These senses are physical in character, because they are constituted by the physical elements. The olfactory sense is the organ of apprehending smell. The gustatory sense is the condition of taste sensations. The visual sense is the ground of colour sensations and is

itself coloured. The cutaneous sense is the source of touch sensations and temperature sensations. The auditory sense is the source of sensations of sound. To the above list of the six senses, recognized by the Nyaya and the Mimamsa, the Samkhya system adds five other senses. These are the five senses of action (karmendriya). They are called speech, hands, feet, rectum and the sex-organ and perform respectively the functions of speaking, apprehension, locomotion, evacuation and reproduction. The Vedanta accepts this with one exception. It excludes the mind or anta karana from the list of the senses.

Function of the Senses

The function of the senses is to produce perception of objects. For a sense-organ, to function is to give us immediate knowledge about certain objects. According to the Buddhists the senses function without direct contact with the objects of perception. They are all "distance receptors" (aprapyakari) and do not require immediate contact with their objects. This is especially seen in the case of the senses of sight and hearing.

We see far off objects that cannot have any direct or approximate contact with the eyes. We hear sound produced at a long distance from our ears. Similarly, the eye perceives objects much larger than itself and so incapable of being covered by it. Many of us can, at the same time, see the same object or hear the same sound from different places. Conversely, one man can, almost at the same time, see two things or hear two sounds, quite apart from each other. This shows that the senses of sight and hearing may function without actual contact with their respective objects.

According to the Nyaya, Samkhya, Mimamsa and Vedanta systems, the senses can perceive only such objects as are in direct or indirect contact with them. This is obvious in the case of the so-called lower senses namely, touch, taste and smell. Sensations of touch and taste arise only when the sense-organs are in immediate contact with their respective objects. To taste a thing is to place it in direct contact with the tongue. To touch a thing is to bring it in contact with the skin. If the smelling object be in our immediate surrounding, there is obvious contact of it with the olfactory organ. In the case of the lower senses all systems of philosophy admit a direct sense-object contact. The remaining two senses of sight

and hearing also act in contact with their objects, although not quite as directly as the rest. According to the Vedanta, the sense of hearing travels to the sounding objects and gives us sensations of sound. The Nyaya, however, agrees with modern science in holding that sound waves sent by the object are received into the ear-passage and these are perceived as sound.

4.4 MODES OF PERCEPTION

Broadly speaking, there are three divergent views regarding the modes of perception, viz. (a) The Buddhist view, according to which nirvikalpaka is the only mode of perception and there is no such thing as savikalpaka pratyak a, (b) The Grammarians' view, which is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist position, refers to savikalpaka as the only possible form of perception and rejects nirvikalpaka altogether. The Carvakas and the Madhva and Vallabha sects of Vedanta also fall in this category, and (c) The majority view, according to which both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are the valid modes of perception.

THE BUDDHIST VIEW

According to the Buddhists nirvikalpaka is the only type of valid perception. It is such cognition of an object as contains no element of thought or ideation in it (kalpana podham).

Ordinarily knowledge involves two elements namely, the given or sensed and the meant or ideated. The Buddhists hold that what is given is a unique individual that belongs to no class and is not related to anything. One can call it by a name, bring it under a class and think of it as having certain qualities, actions and relations. But its name, class, quality, action and relation are not any part of what is directly given. These are the contributions of our mind (kalpana) to the given experience. Hence, nirvikalpaka perception is a cognition which is not modified by any idea or concept like those of its name, class, etc. Nirvikalpaka perception is not a verbalized experience. As contrasted to this, savikalpaka perception is a verbalized experience in which the object is determined by the concepts of name, class, relation, etc. Here we think of the objects having attributes, bearing certain name and having certain relations. Such

knowledge, however, is false, since it is not due to the given object, but due to our conceptual construction of it. Thus the Buddhists reduce nirvikalpaka to pure sensation which is valid but blind and savikalpaka to conceptual knowledge which is definite but false.

Check your Progress-1

Charvaka, Jain, Buddhist view of Pratyaksha

THE GRAMMARIAN'S VIEW

According to some linguistic thinkers there cannot be any nirvikalpaka perception in the sense of an un verbalized experience. They hold that we cannot think of things except through words. All objects are inseparably connected with the words by which they are denoted. To cognize a thing is to know it as such and to relate it to a denotative word. Likewise, we can act in relation to a thing only when we know it precisely as of this or that kind, i.e. determine it by means of a class name. In fact, all our cognitions are embodied in verbal propositions, such as "I know a colour," "I have a taste," "it is a smell" and so on. All cognitions being thus inseparable from verbal expressions, there can be no nirvikalpaka or un verbalized cognition. According to the Carvakas, the Jainas, the ancient Sabdikas and the Visistadvaita Vedanta of Ramanuja, all perceptions are savikalpaka or determinate and that there is no such thing as a perfectly indeterminate perception. According to Ramanuja, to know a thing is to know it as possessed of certain attributes. A thing's existence cannot be separated from its nature and attributes. There being thus no absolutely indeterminate knowledge, the distinction of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception is a relative distinction. While in nirvikalpaka the object of perception is partially determined, in savikalpaka it is determined more fully and clearly.

The Carvakas, the Sabdikas and the Jainas go further than Ramanuja and hold that nirvikalpaka perception is not real in any sense. According to the Jainas all true knowledge must be a definite and an assured cognition of objects. What distinguishes true knowledge from doubt, error and the rest is the fact that it is a firm belief which is also true. It is a definite judgement of an object as this and not as that. In it there is a definite

affirmation or denial that an object is or is not. In the so-called nirvikalpaka perception, however, there is no such definite assertion of anything about any object. Hence, it cannot be recognized as a form of valid knowledge. In perception there need not be a transition from an initial stage of vague and unorganized sense-impressions to that of distinct and determinate knowledge. All true perceptions are, therefore determinate (savikalpaka) cognitions of objects as they really are in themselves.

THE MAJORITY VIEW

According to the Mimamsa, the Samkhya, the Nyaya Vaisesika, any perception, nirvikalpaka or savikalpaka, is a direct cognition of the real individual which is a unity of the universal and the particular. It is probably Kumarila who has initiated the proper analysis of the problem of indeterminate and determinate forms of perception of Indian philosophy. He refers to nirvikalpaka as mere apprehension (alocana) and a non-reflective knowledge, which resembles the cognition of a child or of a mute and is caused by the mere object. He admits reflective knowledge (savikalpaka) but condemns it as a second stage of perception. The Prabhakara School also admits two forms of pratyaksa. They agree with the Bhatta School but their expressions differ in the nature of nirvikalpaka perception. According to Kumarila, the particular and generic characters are not perceived at the first moment while according to Prabhakara they are perceived but not as particular and generic characters. The Vedanta also refers to two types of perception: (i) savikalpaka, and (ii) nirvikalpaka. Gautama introduces the epithets avyapadesya and vyavasayatmaka in the definition of perception. Vacaspati holds that the Sutrakara refers to nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka forms of perception through these words. However, there is some difference of opinion as to the nature and structure of nirvikalpaka perception between the Bhatta Mimamsa and Samkhya systems on the one hand and the Prabhakara and Nyaya-Vaisesika systems on the other. According to the Samkhya and the Bhatta Mimamsa both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are equally valid and necessary modes of perceptual knowledge. By nirvikalpaka they mean that cognition which spontaneously arises at the first moment of contact between sense and

object. It is a knowledge of the object as one individual whole of generic and specific attributes. There is no differentiation between the universal and the particular that are combined in the body of the individual. Hence, there is only an apprehension of the individual as an indefinite object, but no definite understanding of it as this or that kind of object. Nirvikalpaka perception thus resembles the perception of the children and dumb persons.

According to Nyaya-Vaisesika and Prabhakara Mimamsa ordinary perception is of two kinds, namely nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, both of which are equally valid and grounded in reality. They hold that nirvikalpaka is not merely a cognition of the bare particular (svalaksana) since it manifests the universal as well. If the universal is not cognized at the nirvikalpaka stage; our knowledge of it at a subsequent savikalpaka stage becomes inexplicable. According to Naiyayikas, nirvikalpaka is a real but not a perceived fact (atindriya). It is conscious but not a self-conscious state.

The Samkhya-Yoga text accepts two kinds of perception: normal (laukika) and abnormal (alaukika). The former requires a particular process in sense-object contact with the respective sense-organ. Vacaspati refers to Yogic perception as abnormal (alaukika) kind of perception. The yogins can perceive the objects like subtle elements (tanmatras) which are not the object of sense perception for ordinary people. The perception of yogins unlike that of normal persons does not depend upon the contact of their external organs with objects.

Srikrishna Vallabhacharya states that in addition to yogic perception Samkhya-Yoga accepts jñanalaksana type of abnormal perception. It is the perception of an object which is not directly connected with the sense but through a previous knowledge of that object. For example, after perceiving a piece of sandalwood one comes to have the knowledge of its fragrance. The past experience of fragrance in sandalwood serves as contact between sense and the object. The texts of Samkhya-Yoga do not discuss abnormal kind of perception. Vacaspati gives the reason for such an absence. Samkhya-Yoga system is meant for understanding by common people. The supernormal knowledge of yogin is not useful for common people. The absence of such a discussion does not mean its non-existence. Such a yogic perception must be admitted.

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The Samkhya accept nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka as two stages of perception. They refer to indeterminate perception as the immediate, pure and simple cognition of an object. It presents a vague idea of the object. Determinate perception, on the other hand, is the definite cognition of an object related to its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics. In Samkhya works, Vacaspati Misra is the pioneer to subdivide perception into two sub-classes, namely (i) nirvikalpaka (indeterminate perception) and (ii) savikalpaka (determinate perception). Vacaspati Misra follows the footsteps of Kumarila Bhatta in this respect. He quotes verses from Slokavartika of Kumarila Bhatta to define indeterminate and determinate perception. But no such terms are found in the authoritative Samkhya works. The word *alocana* has been used in the Samkhyakarika. Vacaspati Misra interprets *alocanajnanam* as indeterminate perception which does not discriminate the two elements of an object namely the particular from the universal. In the very definition of *drsta*, the term *adhyavasaya* has been used. *Adhyavasaya* is defined by Vacaspati Misra himself as the form of determinate knowledge. Vacaspati Misra admits that *alocana* is indeterminate. So far as we understand the sense of the definition of *pratyaka* as given by the Samkhyakarika, it is always indeterminate. Vacaspati Misra in his classification includes indeterminate perception in the class of perception but does not justify its possibility. If we go through the explanation of the author of *Yuktidipika*, we find that he explains *alocana* as equivalent to the form of the object as seized by the sense-organ.

The determinate perception is due to the operation of *manas*, as Vacaspati Misra interprets. *Manas* alleviate the doubt regarding the definiteness of the object cognized. At this stage genus and particular qualities of an object are decided. *Ahamkara* then determines the relation of an object with the cognizer. Finally, *buddhi* decides whether to accept or to reject the object. This is the final state called *adhyavasaya*. At this stage knowledge is turned into determinate. Here we can say that the above process differs from that given by the Naiyayikas regarding determinate perception. According to the Naiyayikas vague apprehension is turned into determinate knowledge at the stage of *manas*, while according to the Samkhyas determinate knowledge takes place at the stage of *buddhi*. The author of the Samkhyasatra and *Vijnanabhiku* are

wise enough not to discuss the problem of the classification of pratyaksa. They do never utter a word like nirvikalpaka or savikalpaka pratyak a. Vijnanabhiku criticizes Vacaspati Misra very often on different topics but the classification of perception as given by Vacaspati Misra escapes his notice and he kept silent on this topic.

The above discussion is according to Samkhya system. In the system of Yoga we come across a different account of process in perception. Vyasa states that citta goes to the external object through senses and gets the form of that object. According to Vijnanabhiku citta goes to the external object along with the senses. The statement through the senses does not mean that citta alone travels to the objects cognized. The fact that the defect of eye like jaundice affects perceptual knowledge and the citta is modified into the form of object along with the sense-organ. Vijnanabhiku further states that this citta or buddhi again reflects its modification into the Purusa after getting the reflection of Purusa earlier. There arises the apparent knowledge in Purusa through this reflection.

Perception in this way depends upon the contact of sense organs with the object on the one hand and with the internal organs on the other. When the object is clearly visible or when one feels fear or the like, the contact of external sense with the object and among internal senses is simultaneous. For example, when one sees a lion facing him, operation of the aggregate of internal organs and the external sense is simultaneous. There is, however, difference of opinion amongst the Samkhyas in this respect. The Yuktidipika maintains that the theory of simultaneous action is not the view of Samkhya. Isvarakrsna treats it as a prima facie view and rejects it for establishing his theory of successive action of senses.

On the basis of the nature of objects perceived, perception comes to be of two kinds: external and internal. The former depends upon the intercourse of external senses with objects, while the latter requires the intercourse of organs with the objects which are also situated internally and are beyond the reach of the senses which are extrovert in nature. It comprehends the qualities of buddhi like pleasure, pain, desire, aversion etc. In this there is no need of postulating indeterminate perception because being found at the stage of senses it does not have any scope there. The nature of intercourse between buddhi and the object cognized

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is tadatmya in the case of perception of its quality and that of tadatmya in the perception of generic feature of the quality.

The Samkhyas strongly advocate the intercourse between sense and object. They also insist that the function of every sense-organ, or in other words the sense-organ itself moves to the object cognized. The Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas, however, feel that such a case does not hold in case of perception of sound. The view of the Samkhyas differs from the Naiyayikas in two respects. Firstly, unlike the Samkhyas, the Naiyayikas hold that sound reaches auditory sense and not vice versa. One sound produces the other in the manner of a wave giving rise to another wave (vicitaranganyaya). The last one is produced in the ether enclosed by the cavity of the ear. Secondly, according to the Naiyayikas, the auditory sense perceives sound through the relation of inherence (samavaya) while the Samkhyas think that the auditory sense perceives sound through contact. The Mimamsakas like the Naiyayikas and unlike the Samkhyas hold that the sound travels to the ear. Thus it is observed that while there is no difference between act and its agent in the theory of Samkhya, other schools of philosophy raise objections pertaining to this very theory of the Samkhya of non-difference between function and its agent.

Vijnanabhiku and his follower Bhavaganesa discussed one problem of perception. Actually Bhavaganesa repeats the view of Vijnanabhiku in this regard. According to Vijnanabhiku the sense-organ goes out but not get detached from the body. It prolongs itself and the prolonged part remains united with the sense-organ. It goes straight to the object and catches the form of the object with which it becomes united. The prolonged part is called vrtti. Since a distant object is perceived small, the question arises whether the sense-organ goes out through vrtti. The object remaining at a distant place is not really small. The observer perceives it small. One simultaneously perceives the light post and the Sun. The distance between the observer and the light post is little but the distance between the Sun and the same observer is far greater. It is to be discussed whether the same vrtti can be united with both of them at the same time. If it cannot do so, the two objects cannot be perceived at the same time. Neither Vijnanabhiksu nor Bhavaganesa utters a single word to explain these difficulties. Again all the sense-organs excepting

the visual one do not go out in order to be united with their objects. Therefore, Vijnanabhiksu's discussion on this topic is not at all complete. Another problem of perception has not been discussed either in the Samkhya works or in the Yoga works. The problem is, in case of illusory perception, is it partially or entirely illusory? The perceptual judgement has three parts - subject, copula and predicate. If the predicate is only illusory it is questionable whether this wrong predicate invalidates the whole judgement. But none of the authors discussed this matter.

Internal Perception and Its Objects

Internal perception is due to the internal sense or manas. Hence, it is called manasa or antara pratyaksa. It is the knowledge of mental facts brought about by their contact with the inner sense or manas. Thus manasa or internal perception is, like introspection, the source of our direct knowledge about mental or subjective facts. But while modern introspectionists take introspection as mind's knowledge, the Naiyayikas treat internal perception as knowledge of certain subjective facts other than, but due to the mind as a sense. Generally speaking, the self and its contents are the objects of internal perception. These are perceived when they come in contact with manas or the mind. In introspection the mind or self turns back on itself and perceives what is going on there without requiring any sense.

Among the objects of manasa-pratyaksa or internal perception, the Bhasaparincheda mentions the feelings of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, cognition or knowledge and all kinds of mental effort or volition. All of these are perceived when there is contact between them and the internal sense of manas. According to the Vedanta, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are perceived but their perception requires no sense-organ like manas or the mind. They are the different parts or aspects of the anta karana. As such, there is a natural identification between these and the anta karana or the mind. This identification means a perception of all that is identified with the anta karaika. It can be said that mental states are perceived facts because they are mental and so do not require any sense to perceive them.

As to the question how cognition or knowledge is known, there is a sharp difference of opinion among the philosophers. According to Samkhya, the Prabhakara Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta, knowledge is known

by itself. Cognition or knowledge is a conscious fact and it is the very nature of consciousness to be aware of itself. The point has been elaborated by the Prabhakaras in the theory of triputisarhvit. According to it every knowledge manifests itself at the same time that it manifests an object and the knowing subject. It is at once a manifestation of three things, namely, knowledge, the object and the knower. The Jainas also take a similar view with regard to the nature of knowledge. The Advaita Vedanta takes knowledge or intelligence to be the essence of the self, the very stuff of it. As such, knowledge is self-manifest and self-shining. It does not require anything else to manifest or know it. According to the Bhatta Mimamsa, knowledge cannot be directly known. We can never know any knowledge immediately by itself or by any introspection called internal perception.

Recognition (Pratyabhijna)

Recognition is also another kind of perception. Recognition may be understood in two senses. In the wider sense recognition means understanding the nature or character of a thing. In this sense to recognize a thing is to know it as such. In the narrower sense however, recognition means knowing a thing as that which was known before. Pratyabhijna is recognition in this sense. It consists in knowing not only that a thing is such and such but that it is the same thing that we saw before. For example, this is that Devadatta. According to Naiyayikas recognition is a kind of qualified perception, in which the present object is qualified by a distinct recollection of its past experience. The Mimamsakas and the Advaita Vedantins also hold that recognition is a kind of perception. The Mimamsakas, however, do not distinguish it from an ordinary savikalpaka perception. According to them, recognition is that kind of perception in which the object is determined by the name by which it is called, e.g., this is Devadatta. For the Advaitin, pratyabhijna is a perception of the nirvikalpaka kind, since there is in it no prediction of anything about the perceived object, but an assertion of its identity amidst changing conditions.

According to Samkhya and Yoga systems pratyabhijna or recognition is a kind of perception. It is possible because buddhi is eternal, and quite different from the momentary cognitions of individuals. The eternal buddhi undergoes modifications, by virtue of which it becomes

connected with the different cognitions involved in recognition. This would not be possible of the self which is unmodifiable.

According to the Samkhya, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but is perceived by the self. For cognition is regarded as a function of buddhi, which is unconscious and so it cannot be its own object, but can only be apprehended by the self.

4.5 NON-SENSUOUS PERCEPTION IN PHILOSOPHY

The concept of non-sensuous perception is found in most of the systems of Indian philosophy. All Indian systems except the Carvakas and the Mimamsakas believe in Yogic perception. The non-sensuous perception is called atindriya pratyaksa. It is intuitive experience which arises in the self. In the first place such perception is not caused in the ordinary way. The sense organs do not play a role in its production. Secondly, there is no limitation of space, time and place for it. One who has the power to acquire the non-sensuous perception, can know the objects of the past, present, future, far and near. Again the systems, which believe in atindriya pratyaksa accept that it arises in the self directly when the ignorance is destroyed by the regular practice of mental and bodily discipline. The self-shines by the light of great knowledge in the state of purification or perfection and some supernormal powers or the siddhi or labdhi arise in the self. These are not forms of miracle, but the power of the self itself which arises by the destruction of ignorance.

The aim of the yogi is not to acquire the supernormal power. He practises for his purification in an effort to get freedom from the bondage of the world.

THE NYAYA THEORY OF ALAUKIKA PRATYAKSA

The modern Naiyayikas classified perception into two types, laukika or ordinary perception and alaukika or extraordinary perception. The first type of perception is based on the sense object contact. In the second type of perception, the objects are not actually present to the senses, but are experienced through an extraordinary medium. All the various kinds

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of extraordinary sense-object contacts are called *alaukikasannikara*. Extraordinary perception is of three kinds, namely, *samanyalaksana*, *jnanalaksana* and *yogaja*. The perception of the generic character is called *samanyalaksana* perception. Sense object contact not only gives us the knowledge of the object, but we become immediately aware of the class essence (*samanya*) existing in the object. On looking at a particular animal we can perceive it as a cow, because we directly perceive "the cowness" in that cow. "Cowness" is the generic character (*samanya*) of cow.

The second type of extraordinary perception is called *jnana laksana*. It is the perception of an object which is in contact with sense through a previous knowledge of itself. When on seeing something one says: "I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood," he has an immediate knowledge or perception of its fragrance. This cannot be explained without the help of *jnana laksana*. It is extraordinary perception, because in it the quality of the object is perceived by the sense-organ which is not competent to give us that knowledge. Here our past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood does the work of contact between sense and object. Our past knowledge of fragrance brings about the present perception of it, although it is not actually smelt by us.

The third kind of extraordinary perception is called *yogaja*. It is the intuitive perception of all objects - past, distant and future due to some super-normal powers generated in the mind by devout meditation (*yogabhyasajanitodharma visesa*). The reality of *yogaja* perception is generally accepted in Indian philosophy on the authority of the scriptures. *Yukta* and *yunjana* are the two kinds of *yogaja* perception. In the case of *yukta* who have attained spiritual perfection, intuitive knowledge of all the objects is constant and spontaneous. The second i.e. *yunjana* is the intuition of a yogin who is practising Yoga to attain union with God but has not yet attained it. Those who are on the way to perfection, it requires the help of concentration as an auxiliary condition. From the chart shown on next page one can have the perception of Nyaya philosophy:

THE ADVAITA THEORY OF NON-SENSUOUS PERCEPTION

According to Samkara, Brahman is present in every man and is the universal self in all. Brahman is reality but different from the phenomenal world and not sensible. Brahman is of the nature of consciousness. Knowledge is its essential property. It is sat (real), cit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss). One cannot attain the knowledge of reality or the Brahman, so long as one is subject to avidya or ignorance. Vidya gives the highest conceptual knowledge of Brahman. There is no difference between Brahman and Atman. Atman is Brahman. The anubhava of Atman or the integral experience is a type of intuitional consciousness which may be called the knowledge of Brahman, in which the individual self feels the identity with Atman or Brahman. It is the inexpressible experience beyond thought and speech. It is saksatkara or direct perception of the awareness of the empirical self and the Atman. One can get this intuition of Atman by faith, devotion, meditation, study and by a preparation of mind.

THE VAISESIKA VIEW

The Vaishesika too believes in the capacity of yogins to perceive things which are beyond the reach of ordinary people. Prasastapada says that yogins, acquire extraordinary excellence resulting from the practice of Yoga and during the state of ecstasy, perceive through their minds alone. He further holds that in the post-ecstatic state, not only the mind but even the external senses acquire excellence and yogins can perceive subtle and remote objects with their help.

THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF YOGAJ-PRATYAKSA

Dharmakirti defines yogi pratyaksa as the knowledge which is manifested in the highest state of deep meditation on transcendental reality. Dharmottara says that when concentrative contemplation (bhavana) reaches the point of perfection, mystics have a vivid vision of objects as if they were lying behind a transparent wall of mica. The cognitions of mystics are perceptual in character because they are direct, distinct and devoid of subjective images.

THE JAINA VIEW

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According to the Jaina view souls in their natural condition are omniscient. It is due to the accumulation of karmic matter during transmigratory state that they lose omniscience and consequently they know only so much as is permitted by the sense-organs. But when through the practice of right conduct the veil of karmic matter is destroyed they regain omniscience. Knowledge in their state depends purely on the soul and it is called transcendental perception (paramarthika pratyaksa). Transcendental perception does not depend on sense-organs or any condition. The omniscience of a soul liberated from the bondage of karma is called transcendental perception. Transcendental perception is either incomplete (vikalpa) or complete (sakalpa). Incomplete transcendental perception is of two kinds- avadhi and mana paryaya. (1) Due to the partial removal of the karma matter that obstructs knowledge, the self perceives remote sensible objects. This perception is independent of the sense-organs or mind. But as this perception is limited, it is called avadhijnana or limited knowledge. (2) When a man gets rid of jealousy, hatred and other like passions, he attains the power of entering the minds of others and knowing their thoughts directly without the help of any sense-organ or mind. This is called manahparyaya. When all the karma matters obstructing knowledge are removed once for all, the self attains its natural power of omniscience. This is called kevala jnana, and this is known as sakalpaparamarthika pratyaksa or complete transcendental perception.

THE SAMKHYA VIEW

Yogic perception is admitted by the Samkhya, which holds that all things exist involved or evolved at all times. The mind of the yogin can come into contact with the past and the future objects, which exist at present in a latent condition, by virtue of certain powers produced by meditation. Yogic perception produced by the powers of mind is unlike sense perception.

The Supernormal Powers in Yoga System

Through the practice of Yoga, the sadhaka acquires some supernormal powers in particular state of the yaugika sadhana. These are called siddhi or the supernormal powers, and a knowledge of supernormal objects.

Through it the yogi or the sadhaka knows the inmost core of objects and reaches the great light of wisdom (prajnaloka). He acquires heightened powers of the senses by which he can see and hear at a distance, have direct knowledge of the past, and can acquire knowledge of others' mind (paracittajnanam). He can also know past, present and future by the supernormal power. The yogi can make his body invisible also and by the realization of the difference between the self and the outer world he gains omniscience. A yogi can acquire all those supernormal powers by the discipline of body and mind. The aim of a yogi is not to acquire them but he tries to make his self-perfect and to get freedom. According to the Yoga system of philosophy, these supernormal powers are not considered as miracles, because they hold that the world open to one's senses is not the whole world of nature. One's physical senses do not have the power or capacity to perceive the whole world. The world beyond one's capacities has its own science and laws, which are apprehended by the supernormal power of the yogi. A yogi acquires this capacity by discipline and meditation.

The Mimamsakas do not recognize the yogic perception. In the yogic perception, the yogins have some extraordinary yogic power through which they can perceive the past and future, imperceptible and distinct. This intuition is either sensuous or non-sensuous. If the former, then, since the senses cannot come into contact with past, future and distinct objects, there can be no cognition of them. Even the internal sense of manas can produce only cognitions of the mental states of pleasure and pain. It is meaningless to argue that the senses can comprehend objects without coming into contact with them when they attain a high degree of development, because no amount of development can change the nature of the sense organs. If the yogic intuition apprehends things perceived in the past, then it is a case of memory. If it apprehends objects that have not been previously apprehended, then its validity is doubtful. A knowledge of past, distinct and future objects can be got only through the Vedas and nothing else.

Check your Progress-1

Samkhya View of pratyaksha

4.6 LETS SUM UP

Yet it is interesting that all the schools of Indian philosophy both astika and nastika are unanimous about perception or *pratyaksha* pramana as the first and foremost of all the pramanas. Perception is the primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid knowledge and it is universally recognized. Perception is most powerful among the means of valid knowledge, because it gives a direct or immediate knowledge of reality of an object and therefore is the root of all other pramanas. According to the Nyaya, perception is not the only source of our knowledge, but it is the basis of the other sources or means of knowledge. Hence, it has been said that all the other means of knowledge presupposes perception and must be based on knowledge derived from perception. Perception is the basis on which we have knowledge of other truths by inference as well as by comparison and testimony. Perception is the final test of all knowledge.

4.7 KEY WORDS

Pratyaksha, first of the five means of knowledge, or *pramanas*, that enable a person to have correct cognitions of the world.

4.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Nyaya View of perception
2. Buddhist View of perception
3. Jain View of Perception
4. Samkhya view of perception
5. Advaita View of perception
6. Samkhya View of perception
7. Mimamsa view of perception
8. Carvaka View of perception

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4.10 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your progress-1

Notes

- Carvakas hold that perception is the only pramana or dependable source of valid knowledge. The perceptual knowledge is so vivid that there arises no question about its validity.
- pratyaksa means that knowledge which is directly acquired by the self (aksa) without the mediation of the mind or the senses,
- The Buddhists define perception as the unerring cognition of a given sensum in complete isolation from all ideata.

2. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- In the Samkhyakarika the term drsta has been used instead of pratyaksa.
- perception as the knowledge which portrays the form of object coming in contact with it.
- knowledge according to Vijnanabhiksu stands for buddhivrtti.
- The buddhi goes to the object with the respective cognitive organ and gets the form of that object. This is perception. The essence of the definition is that perception is vrtti of citta followed by its contact with the object and through the cognitive organ.

UNIT 5 ANUMANA

STRUCTURE

5.0 Objectives

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Anumana as defined by various schools

5.3 The Constituents of Inference.

5.4 The Types of Anumana

5.5 Fallacy

5.6 Let Us Sum Up

5.7 Keywords

5.8 Questions for review

5.9 Suggested Readings

5.10 Answers Check your Progress

5.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn about anumana
- know how anumana has been explained in different schools

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Both perception and inference are equally valid sources of knowledge. But perception is independent of any previous knowledge, while inference depends on previous perception. Inference is a knowledge which is preceded by perception. It depends on perception for the knowledge of *linga* or the middle term as subsisting in the *paksa* or the minor term. It depends on perception for the knowledge of *vyapti*. Thus, inference is knowledge derived from some other knowledge. That is, inference is mediate knowledge and perception is immediate knowledge of an object. All perception is of one kind that is the knowledge of what is given. But there are different kinds of inferences based on different

kinds of vyapti or universal relation. Perception takes place between the contact of sense-organs with the objects. It gives the knowledge of only those objects which lie within the range of the senses. Hence, it is limited to present objects. But the knowledge of inference is due to the knowledge of vyapti or universal relations among objects. It is by means of such universal relations that inference gives us knowledge of objects beyond the reach of our senses. It extends our knowledge from the present to the past, distant and future.

5.2 ANUMANA AS DEFINED BY VARIOUS SCHOOLS

THE VIEW OF THE CARVAKAS

The Carvakas do not consider the validity of anumana and sabda. The author of the Mahabharata says that the Carvakas do not treat anumana or inference and agama or authority as pramanas. He states that both anumana and agama are based on pratyaka and this is the reason why the Carvakas do not consider them as the means of valid knowledge. The author of the epic also states that these philosophers do not recognize anumana as pramana for another important reason. The reason is that they cannot assert the validity of the vyapti or the invariable concomitance which plays the most significant part in case of inference. The materialists do not consider this vyapti as infallible. Therefore, the author of the Mahabharata observes, the materialists do not recognize anumana as a pramana.

Actually it is not always possible to attain the correct knowledge of something with anumana. Similar is the case of upamana, etc. But the fact cannot be denied that one cannot totally dispense with anumana in his practical life. Sometimes, it is found that pratyaka alone does not serve the purpose. The author of the Nyayakusumanjali observes that if a Carvaka depends entirely on pratyaksa he will invite his own miseries due to his dogmatic view. According to the author when a Carvaka will go away to a remote place by leaving his wife and children at home, naturally he will be unable to perceive them from that place. Thus, according to his own standpoint, they will be non-existent to him and

hence he will have to lament for their loss. A section of later Carvakas probably realized this problem. Therefore, Gunaratna contends that the Carvakas recognize anumana also as pramana for practical purposes. He says that these philosophers agree to accept such an inference only as is urgently necessary for proving the existence of fire on a hill with the help of a column of smoke. But they do not recognize such extra-sensory inference (alaukika anumana) as is commonly accepted by some other philosophers to establish the existence of heaven, adrsta, etc. Purandara is also of the view that the Carvakas recognize laukika anumana or popular inference as a pramana.

THE BAUDDHA VIEW

Dinnaga, chief of the early Buddhist logicians and author of the *Pramana Samuccaya*, described two means of knowing - perception and inference, and two corresponding objects are realized through them - the particular and the universal. The universals are cognized by inference and the particulars by perception. Dinnaga described the characters of the middle term (hetu) and we may form a definition of inference from these characters. Inference is the valid knowledge of an inferable property (sadhya) from the knowledge of a mark of inference which is invariably related to the sadhya and which abides in the minor term or subject of the inference (paksa). Dharmottara, however, states that this definition refers to the source and not to the essence of an inference. According to Dharmakruti, author of the well-known *Nyayabindu* and *Pramana avarttika*, anumana is of two varieties: (1) inference for one's own sake (svathanumana) and (2) inference for the sake of others (parathanumana). Dharmakirti defines anumana thus: inference to the cognition of the inferable from the sign having a threefold character.

THE JAINA VIEW

The Jainas, however, add anumana to the list of pramanas. The definition of anumana according to the Jainas, is the knowledge of the major term derived from the knowledge of the middle term. Fire is inferred from smoke. Smoke is the middle term, and fire is the major term. Anumana is based on vyapti derived from induction (tarka). Vyapti

is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term. In inference, there are three terms- the middle term (hetu or sadhana), the major term (sadhya) and the minor term (pak a). The middle term is that which is definitely known to be inseparably connected with the major term. If the major term does not exist, the middle term cannot exist. If the middle term exists, the major term must also exist. This is the only mark of middle term.

NYAYA VIEW OF ANUMANA

According to the Naiyayikas, anumana is the knowledge of a object through the medium of the knowledge of some mark by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance between the two. Gautama does not define anumana. He simply holds that inference presupposes perception. It is of three types. Vatsyayana, author of the Nyayabhasya, a well-known exposition on Gautama's Nyayasutra deals with the etymological aspect of the term anumana and states that it is the knowledge of lingi arising after the knowledge of linga. According to Vatsyayana "no inference can follow from the absence of perception." Only when the observer has perceived fire and smoke to be related to each other, he is able to infer the existence of the fire and on the next occasion he perceives smoke. According to Jayanta, anumana is the instrument of knowledge of an unperceived probandum through the apprehension of a probans with fivefold characteristics together with the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two. Bhasarvajna in his Nyayasara defines inference as the means of knowing a thing beyond the range of the senses through its "inseparable connection (samavaya sambandha) with another thing" which lies within their range. Gangesa following Sivaditya defines inferential knowledge as knowledge produced by other knowledge.

VAISESIKA VIEW OF ANUMANA

Kanada, founder of the Vaisesika system, holds that anumana is the knowledge of probandum derived from the knowledge of the probans. Prasastapada defines anumana as the knowledge which results from the apprehension of a sign (linga). He explains linga as that which is related to the probandum and which has co-presence and co-absence with the

probandum. According to Vaisesika the knowledge of anumana is derived from the mark, from which the existence of the probandum is inferred as its effect, or cause or conjunct or antagonist. From a heavy rainfall in the source of a river, flood in the river is inferred. From smoke the existence of fire is inferred. From the infuriated serpent, the existence of a mongoose hidden behind a bush is inferred. Thus, it can be said that mark is the means of inference which is based upon the relations of causality, conjunction, etc.

MIMAMSA VIEW OF ANUMANA

The definition of anumana as propounded by Sabara, a renowned commentator on the Mimamsasutra, is that when a certain fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any one of these things we have an idea of the other thing, this latter cognition is called

inferential knowledge. Kumarila Bhatta explains the compound jnatasambandhasya in four alternative ways, viz. (1) as referring to a person who knows the invariable relation between two things, e.g. smoke and fire, or (2) as referring to the substratum where the relationship, e.g. of smoke and fire is apprehended, (3) as referring simply to a known relationship or (4) as referring to both the linga and lingin together. Smoke and fire are parts (ekadesa) of a logical whole. Prabhakara on the other hand, holds that the word jnatasambandhasya qualifies the term ekadesa in the compound ekadesadarsantit and refers to that whose invariable. concomitance with another is known.

Thus, though there are points of difference between Bhatta and Prabhakara schools of thought, a comprehensive definition of anumana can be found out from the Mimamsa standpoints based on Sahara's definition of anumana in the following form: anumana is the knowledge of a thing, not in contact with the sense-organs from the perception of another object when an invariable relation is known to hold between them.

VEDANTA VIEW

Inference (anumana), according to Vedanta, is made by the notion of concomitance (vyapti jnana) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (samskara). The notion of concomitance is generated by

the perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known (vyabhicā jnana) regarding the subject.

SAMKHYA-YOGA VIEW OF ANUMANA

The most authentic work on Samkhya logic is the Samkhyakarika. In the system of Samkhya-Yoga, the definition of inference is influenced by the Nyayasatra of Gautama. The Samkhyakarika defines anumana as the knowledge derived from sign and signate. Vacaspati Misra explains the definition elaborately. He states that *linga* means pervaded (*vyapya*) and *ling!* means pervasive (*vyapaka*). These may, in other words, be called probans and probandum. He states that in the wording of Samkhyakarika probans and probandum stand for inferential knowledge. Thus, inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that probans like smoke is pervaded and probandum like fire is pervasive. Vacaspati Misra further realizes that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to inferential knowledge. Everything like light on burnt up ashes existing on the mountain is not helpful in inferring fire from smoke. Therefore, it requires, in addition, an application of probans on the subject or the place whence probandum is inferred. Here, Vacaspati Misra states that the word *linga* in the text of the Smkhyakarika should be considered as an example of *ekasesa*. While explaining the *karikii*, it should be repeated. The first gives an idea of pervasive *vyapaka* or probandum forming the part of invariable concomitance while the second means that (subject) which is possessed of probans, thus leading to the idea that probans is endowed with the condition of being present in subject (*paksadharmata*).

The Samkhyacandrika also explains *linga* as probans and the *ling!* as probandum. The perception by the means of probans and probandum is deliberation that the *paksa* is possessor of the probans which is pervaded by probandum. This deliberation is inference.

Mathara and Gaudapada also establish the necessity of both probans and probandum for inference but they draw further conclusion that sometimes *linga* leads to the knowledge of *linga* and sometimes *linga* to the knowledge of *linga*. For example, sometimes *linga* like *tridanda* lead to the knowledge of mendicant and sometimes *linga* like mendicant leads to the knowledge of *linga* like *tridanda*.

The Samkhyasutra defines anumana as knowledge of invariably associated vyapaka through the knowledge of invariable association. It seems that the Samkhyasutra defines it in terms of inferential knowledge of which invariable association serves as the cause. The definition is similar to the definition offered by Vindhyavasin. Aniruddha, however, offers a different interpretation. He interprets pratibandhdrsa as "a case of a man who has known the invariable association." He imports the word vyapyajflantit (through the knowledge of pervaded) in his interpretation. The inference according to Aniruddha is "the knowledge of pervasive after knowing the pervaded in case of one who has observed the invariable concomitance between the two. Vijnanabhiku interprets the sutra as "inference is the knowledge of pervasive, through observing the invariable concomitance. In the system of Yoga, the definition of anumana is found in the Yogabhasya of Vyasa. Vyasa defines inference as modification of citta brought about by the relation which exists in objects of homogeneous nature and does not exist in objects of heterogeneous nature, and ascertains chiefly the generic nature of an object. The distinguishing factor of inference lies in the fact that such modification is caused by the knowledge of relation. The knowledge of sambandha and pratibandha (relation) is the commonly used expression in definition of inference by Varsaganya, Vyasa and the Samkhyasutra. Sambandha means relation or invariable concomitance. Hence, it can be said that the definition of inference in Samkhya-Yoga means the modification of citta brought about by invariable concomitance.

Check your Progress-1

1. Define anumana

5.3 THE CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE.

From the definition of inference, it is noted that an inference is a distinct means of knowledge, because it gives us knowledge concerning things

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we are not immediately acquainted with, but the things in question must be such that we can immediately be acquainted with them. From the definition of inference it will appear that there must be three propositions and three terms in any inference. In inference one arrives at the knowledge of some unperceived character of object through the knowledge of some *linga* or sign in it and *vyapti* or a universal relation between the sign and the inferred character. There is first the knowledge of *linga* in relation to the *paksa* or the subject of inference. Secondly, inference requires the knowledge of *vyapti* or a universal relation between the *linga* and the *sadhya* or the middle term and major term. This knowledge of the *linga* or middle term as always related to the *sadhya* or major term is the result of the previous experience of their relation to each other. Thirdly, the inferential knowledge results from the previous knowledge of the *linga* and that of its universal relation with the *sadhya*. Corresponding to the minor, major and middle terms of the syllogism, inference in Indian logic contains three terms, namely, *paksa*, *sadhya* and *hetu*. The *paksa* is the subject in the course of the inferential reasoning. It is that individual or class about which we want to establish something or predicate an attribute which is suspected but not definitely known to be present in it. While the *paksa* is the subject, the *sadhya* is the object of inference. It is *sadhya* which we want to know or prove by means of any inference. The *sadhya* is that character of the *paksa* or minor term which is not perceived by anyone but indicated by some sign present in it. Regarding the exact nature of the *sadhya*, there is some difference of opinion among the different systems of Indian philosophy. According to the Advaita Vedanta what is inferred is the unperceived character of the subject or minor term of inference. In the inferential knowledge that the hill is fiery, it is not the hill which is inferred though it is perceived. Actually "the fire" is inferred. According to Buddhists "the fire" cannot be the object of inference from smoke. One can know it just when one knows the smoke as related to fire. The term relation cannot be used unless there are two things to be related. But in inference only one thing, i.e. the hill is perceived. The hill being perceived cannot be said to be the object of inference. Therefore, "the hill as possessed of fire" is inferred. According to Mīmāṃsākas the subject or minor term which is related to the predicate or the major term is inferred. The Naiyāyikas,

however, maintain that the object of inference may be different in different cases. What is inferred may be either the subject or minor term as related to the major term, or the major term as related to the minor, or the middle term taken as a particular individual and related to the major term. The third term of inference is called the *linga* or sign because it serves to indicate that which one does not perceive. It is also called the *hetu* or *sadhana* insofar as it is the ground of the knowledge of *sadhya* or what is inferred. It is found once in relation to the *paksa* or minor term and then in relation to the *sadhya* or the major term. It is through an universal relation between the *hetu* and the *sadhya* or the middle and major terms that the *paksa* or minor term which is related to the middle, becomes connected with the *sadhya* or major term. There are five characteristics of the middle term. The first is *paksadharmata*, or its being a character of the *paksa*. The middle term must be related to the minor term, e.g. the hill is smoky. The second is *sapaksatva* or its presence in all homogeneous instances in which the major term exists, e.g. all smoky objects are fiery. The third is *vipaksatva* or its absence in all heterogeneous instances in which the major term is absent, e.g. whatever is not smoky is not fiery. The fourth is *abadhitavi ayatva* or the uncontradictoriness of its object, e.g. the middle term must not establish absurd and contradictory objects as the coolness of fire, etc. The fifth character of the middle term is *asatpratipaksatva* or the absence of counteracting reasons leading to a contradictory conclusion.

The logicians have put forth several views regarding the number of these components. A variety of opinions are also observed in the system of Samkhya-Yoga. The *Yuktidipika* enumerates ten components of inference. *Mathara* records five components of inference. *Vijnanabhiku* and *Aniruddha* also recognize the five components of inference. The ten components of inference enumerated by *Yuktidipika* are the following - inquisitiveness, doubt, purpose, conjecturing, throwing aside doubt, proposition, probans, example, application and conclusion.

Check your Progress-1Constituents of Anumana

The Ground of Inference

In inference the knowledge of the sadhya or major term as related to the paksa or minor term depends on the knowledge of vyapti between the middle and major terms. It is on the ground of vyapti or a universal relation that the middle term leads to the knowledge of the inferred object. Vyapti and paksadharmata are the two main grounds of inference. If fire is inferred on the hill when smoke is perceived in it, it is paksadharmatti and when universal relation between fire and smoke is taken into consideration it is called vyapti. Vyapti literally means the state of pervasion, i.e. one of the facts pervades (vyapaka) and the other is pervaded (vyapya). A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. Contrariwise, a fact is said to be pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other. Etymologically vyapti is a special relation between two facts which is universal in its nature. This special relationship has been referred to by various seemingly synonymous words such as linga-lingi sambandha, sadhyasadhanabhava, gamakagamyabhava, avinabhava niyama, prasiddhi, pratibandha, avinabhava, etc. Though the Indian thinkers who regard inference to be a means of knowledge unanimously accept the principle of invariable concomitance (vyapti) as an indispensable condition for inference, yet they differ with regard to its function, denotation, nature and the ways of its ascertainment. According to the Jainas, anumana is based on vyapti derived from induction (tarka). Vyapti is the invariable concomitance between the middle and the major term. According to the Buddhists, vyapti is the inductive relation. It is the relation of invariable concomitance between the middle term (hetu) and the major term (stidhya). Arcata, the Buddhist philosopher in Hetubindutika, states that vyapti is the character of the probans as well as of the probandum. Kanada seems to be aware of invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum and its necessity for inference. He, however, calls it prasiddhi. Prasastapada mentions vidhi as a general principle of invariable concomitance derived from the observation of particular instances of co-presence and co absence of the probans and probandum. The Naiyayikas hold the necessity of invariable concomitance or vyapti. Udayana holds the invariable concomitance, vidhi, as non-separateness of the probans from the probandum. Sahara

introduces the element of invariable relation in the definition of inference. Kumarila Bhatta holds that the term sambandha in the definition of anumana in the Sabarabhasya refers to the invariable concomitance (vyapti) of the middle term with the major term. According to Advaita Vedanta anumana is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance (vyapti jnana) of the sadhana or middle term with the sadhya or major term. The knowledge of vyapti is the instrumental cause of inference. According to them vyapti is the co-existence of the middle term and the major term in all the substrata of the middle term. It is known by observation of concomitance of the middle term with the major term and non-observation of their non-concomitance.

In Samkhya-Yoga philosophy, Vacaspati's discussion of pervaded and pervasive gives an idea of vyapti. He explains the term vyapya (pervaded) as that which is invariably and naturally associated with the nature of an object, without involving certain conditions suspected or ascertained. The term vyapaka (pervasive) is that with the nature of which the former is related. The relation stands here for invariable association which is denoted by the term vyapti. The case of relation involving condition can be explained thus: one infers smoke from fire. But it is observed that fire is not naturally related to smoke. If fire would have been invariably associated with smoke, it would always be accompanied with smoke and would never have been found without smoke. But in some cases like iron ball fire exists without smoke. Therefore, the association of fire with smoke involves condition. The fire requires wet fuel in addition to itself to give rise to smoke. Thus, fire does not accompany the smoke naturally. On the contrary it involves further condition of wet fuel. It may be clarified with one example. The example given in the sub commentary of Balarama Udasina on the Tattvakaumudra is very appropriate. Suppose a lady named Maitreyi has nine sons. One comes to see eight of them and finds all of them are black in complexion. From this he comes to the conclusion that black complexion is associated with the fact of being the son of Maitreyi. But, however, such a conclusion, i.e. the black complexion associated with the son of Maitreyi is based upon a wrong notion. The eating of green vegetables, etc. is a condition for black complexion. This fact is deduced

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from the fact that the ninth son of Maitreyi is of fair complexion. If there would have been natural and unconditional relation between being the son of Maitreyi and darkness of complexion the ninth son would also be dark in complexion.⁴³ The condition involved in this can be conjectured or ascertained. In the case of the complexion of son of Maitreyi the condition, viz. eating green vegetables is conjectured because it is not ascertained through some means of knowledge or reasoning. The case of ascertained condition is the inference of smoke from fire. It is ascertained through perception that smoke is invariably associated with wet fuel while fire exists without that also. It may be observed that Vacaspati Misra assimilated the view of the Bauddhas and the Naiyayikas while offering the definition of vyapti. According to the Bauddha, vyapti means the natural relation (svabhavika-sambandha) while according to the Naiyayikas it is the unconditional relation (nirupadhika-sambandha). Both of these views are brought together in the Sarabodhinf while discussing the definition of vyapti.

The Samkhyasutra defines vyapti as invariable concomitance of properties in case of two or one of them. The part of the definition in case of both refers to the case of equal pervasion (samavyapti); while the latter half, viz. in case of one of them refers to the cases of unequal pervasion (visamvyapti).

The Jayamangala enumerates seven kinds of relation between sign and signate: (i) master and servant, (ii) original and its modification, (iii) cause and effect, (iv) pot and its possessor, (v) association as between cakra bird and its mate, (vi) opposition, as between cold and hot and (vii) the object and the being for which it is meant as between an object of enjoyment and its enjoyer. In the Samkhyasutra, some more details are found regarding pervasion (vyapti). According to them vyapti is not a different category from the co-existence of properties, otherwise it would lead to the cumbrousness of self-evident fact as it would compel to consider vyapti as an independent category. According to Aniruddha, if vyapti is considered as an independent category the invariable association would require separate mention. Therefore, it is said that invariable association itself is vyapti. Vijnanabhiku adds that if vyapti is an additional entity to those admitted by Samkhya, it would lead to the acceptance of the substratum of vyapti as another additional entity and it

would be difficult to carry. In the opinion of some acaryas vyapti is the result of the power of objects and as such an additional entity which is quoted in the Samkhya-sutra. On this point Aniruddha states that vyapti is the power in pervasive and pervaded and is observed through observing the two. In the opinion of Vijnanabhikṣu vyapti should be considered as arising of power of pervasive and pervaded and not that of objects. Pancasikha holds that vyapti means the relation connected with power of being sustained. In the Samkhya system every effect exists in its cause before its manifestation and after unmanifestation. So the cause is having a power of sustaining the effect while the effect has got a power of being an object located. Vyapti is the power of being associated in the pervaded. Aniruddha justifies the meaning of the word adheyasakti in the definition. It should be the power of being related as pervaded and not the object itself, otherwise just after seeing the object even a person ignorant of particular power of a particular object would consider the object capable for a particular thing. According to Pancasikha, vyapti means possession of power of being related as a sustained and hence not an independent category in form of the power essentially belonging to objects, before its manifestation. In fact, the view of Pancasikha differs from that of the other teachers mainly in two respects. Firstly, unlike other teachers, Pancasikha does not consider vyapti as a separate concept. Secondly, Pancasikha considers that vyapti is vyapakatva or the state of being pervaded and is found in case of pervaded only. The other teachers, however, relate vyapti to both the associates.

Indian systems of philosophy take inference as a process of reasoning which is not only formally valid but also materially true. This inference depends on vyapti (universal relation). So, the most vital question regarding inference relates to the way of getting the universal proposition. One intends to know the process of knowing vyapti so as to realize how one can pass from particular cases of the relation between smoke and fire in the kitchen, etc. to the universal proposition such as all cases of smoke are fire.

THE CARVAKA VIEW

All Indian thinkers other than the Carvakas have discussed the ways of ascertaining vyapti. The Carvakas do not accept anumana as a source of valid knowledge. For them perception is the only source of knowledge.

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In their opinion, it is impossible to ascertain that smoke is invariably and universally accompanied by fire because if it is accepted that a person knows all cases of smoke in the past and present, future cases will remain outside the limits of his knowledge. So, in their opinion, a universal relation, i.e. vyapti cannot be ascertained.

THE BUDDHIST VIEW

The Buddhists accept vyapti as a ground of inference and have propounded the theory of identity and causality in this regard. They maintain that a universal relation can be ascertained without considering all its past, present and future cases if it is proved that the referred cases are related either through causality or through identity of essence.

THE JAINA VIEW

The Jaina logicians refer to tarka as a means of ascertaining vyapti. Tarka is regarded as a way of knowing the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term in the past, in the present and in the future arising from the observation of their co-presence and co-absence.

THE VAISESIKA VIEW

Prasastapada holds that the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is known by the repeated observation of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence.

THE BHATIA VIEW

According to Kumarila Bhatta, vyapti is known through repeated observation. By vyapti he means a necessary relation generally between two particulars. Vyapti is established by the joint method of agreement and difference. Kumarila holds that vyapti is induction from a limited number of observed cases.

THE PRABHAKARA VIEW

According to Prabhakara, though the knowledge of vyapti is gained by a single act of sense perception in the very first observation, e.g. of smoke and fire, subsequent observations confirm the vyapti apprehended in the first observation. The Prabhakaras refer to repeated observation but they assign separate roles to the first and the subsequent observation.

THE VEDANTA VIEW

According to the Vedanta, vyapti or a universal proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration. It rests on the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. When one finds that two things go together and that there is no exception to their relation, one may take them as universally related.

The Nyaya agrees with the Vedanta in holding that vyapti is established by means of uncontradicted experience of the relation between two things. It is based not on any principle like causality or identity, but on the uniform experience of concomitance between two objects. The Nyaya goes further than the Vedanta and supplements the uncontradicted observation of agreement in presence by that of agreement in absence and tarka or indirect proof.

THE SAMKHYA-YOGA VIEW

In Samkhya-Yoga philosophy also the question naturally arises as to how can such an invariable association between two objects be ascertained. One cannot personally experience all the cases of two objects found together. In the opinion of Vijnanabhiku such an invariableness should be apprehended through appropriate confutation (anukulatarka). He explains it in this way: If one has to know the relation of smoke with fire, one observes smoke associated with fire and starts thinking that smoke is invariably associated with fire; if smoke would not have been invariably associated with fire, it would have been perceived without fire, but such a case is not observed, and so there is no possibility of smoke without fire. Therefore, the invariableness is ascertained through such a confutation.

As regards the kinds of vyapti, the Samkhya-Yoga texts do not discuss the problem explicitly. While discussing the nature of inference, the Yogabhasya differentiates the vyapti into positive invariableness (anvaya vyapti) and negative invariableness (vyatireka vyapti). Inference is said to be caused by the relation which is found present in the similar cases and absent in the dissimilar cases. The difference between anvaya vyapti and vyatireka vyapti is simple. In the case of the anvaya vyapti, existence of probans and probandum at the same place is stressed and illustrated, while in the case of the vyatireka vyapti, their negation is stressed and illustrated. While discussing the nature of vyapti, the Samkhyasutra gives

another division of vyapti. Aniruddha and Vijnanabhiksu enumerate two kinds of vyapti as samavyapti (equal pervasion) and visama vyapti (unequal pervasion). When the space or time of the pervader and the pervaded is similar it is samavyapti and when the pervaded occupies lesser space or time it is termed as visamavyapti.

5.4 THE TYPES OF ANUMANA

In Indian logic, anumana has not been divided into formal and material or deductive and inductive or mediate and immediate or pure and mixed types. The Indian logicians are, no doubt, aware of the varieties and subvarieties of anumana. But the principles upon which the varieties of anumana are based are different from those of Western inference. In Indian philosophy, anumana has been classified in various ways, for example (a) purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta, (b) kevalanvaya, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki, (c) svartha and parartha and (d) vita and avita.

Various divisions of anumana based on various principles are found in the system of Samkhya-Yoga. The Samkhyakarika refers to the division of anumana into three kinds, which according to its commentators refer to purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. In addition to the above three kinds, Aniruddha mentions other three kinds, viz. kevalanvayi kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki raising the number of kinds of anumana to six. While discussing anumana, the Yuktidipika and Mathara divide inference into one's own self (svartha) and that for others (parartha). However, the Yuktidipika and Vacaspati incorporate division of inference into vita and avita.

PURVAVAT, SESAVAT AND SAMANYATODRSTA

The Samkhyakarika refers to the division of anumana into three kinds which is propounded by Gautama in his Nyayasutra. Vatsyayana offers two alternative explanations of the nature of purvavat, etc. The commentators of the Samkhyakarika follow either of the two explanations offered by Vatsyayana. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to

discuss Vatsyayana's explanation of the nature of these varieties before discussing them on the basis of the commentaries of Samkhyakarika.

According to the first explanation, the purvavat is that in which an effect is inferred from its cause, e.g. from the rise of cloud it is inferred that it will rain. The sesavat is that in which the cause is inferred from its effect, e.g. seeing the water of river as different from that in the past, as also the fullness of the river, i.e. stream and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that it had rained. The samanyatodrsta is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place is caused by movement, as the sun is observed at different places. Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the sun, imperceptible. Another interpretation of the term parvavat as suggested by Vatsyayana is that it is a type of inference in which out of two things one that is not perceived is inferred from the perception of the other on the basis of a former perception of both of these things together, e.g. inference of unperceived fire from perceived smoke on the basis of the previous perception of fire and smoke together. As an alternative interpretation of the term sesavat, Vatsyayana states that it may also signify as remainder. There could be many possibilities with regard to the explanation of a fact. When all the possibilities except one are rejected, the remaining one is cognized through the means of sesavat inference, e.g. sound is distinct from the categories of generality, individuality and inherence. The second explanation offered by Vatsyayana refers to samanyotodrsta as an inference in which the relation between the antecedent and the consequent, not being a matter of perception, is established. On the ground of an abstract similarity with something else, e.g. inference of soul on the basis of the fact that desire, etc. are qualities and that qualities must abide in some substance namely the self.

The Yuktidipika states that the term purva means cause and parvavat means that which has a cause as a probans. It means the inference in case of which after observing the cause one comes to know the future effect. For example, one apprehends future rains after observing the rise of cloud. The author of Yuktidipika, however, realizes the difficulty in the above example. The valid probans by its very nature should necessarily lead to the probandum and failing it the probans ceases to be a probans. But the above example lacks in the above condition and hence ceases to

be a proper example. The rise of cloud is not necessarily the cause of rain. There is no invariable relation between rise of clouds and rains, because there is the possibility of obstruction by wind and the rest. Hence, the Yuktidipika defines purvavat thus - purvavat is that through which observing the causal power arrested amongst the assisting powers free from obstructing elements one comes to know future rise of effect just as after observing the clay possessed by the potter who is active and having the instrument like the iron rod and the rest one comes to know the future preparation of a pot. According to Vijnanabhiksu and Mathara, purvavat depends upon the past experience. For example, one infers the future rain through particular rise of cloud. Gaudapada follows the Yuktidipika in explaining it as the inference which has cause as the probans.

Sesavat is variously interpreted in three ways: (i) from effect to cause, (ii) from one part to the rest, and (iii) through elimination. The Yuktidrpikti gives the first interpretation. The Yuktidipika defines sesavat as that in which after observing the accomplishment of an effect one comes to know the prior existence of its cause. For example, one comes to know the meeting of the couple after seeing a boy. The Yuktidipika however, feels that such an example is also not faultless. There is no invariable relation between meeting of a couple and birth of a boy. The birth of Drarsta is heard to be without meeting of the couple. Therefore, the example is rejected by the Yuktidipika. The Yuktidipika gives a faultless example as after seeing the leaf one comes to know the root of water lily or after seeing the sprout one comes to know the seed. Mathara and Gaudapada give the second of the interpretations mentioned above. For example, after finding a drop of water from the sea to be saltish one infers that the rest of the water is also saltish. Vacaspati Misra gives third of the above-mentioned interpretation. He quotes the Nyayabhasya of Vatsyayana that sesavat is the definite knowledge with reference to the residual after eliminating the undesirably involved objects when there remains no undersirable involvement of something else.

The samanyatodrsta type of anumana is understood in two ways: (i) based upon analogy and (ii) inferring a characteristic in other cases after observing it in one case. Some of the commentators of the

Samkhyakarika give both of these interpretations while some give one of them. Mathara gives the latter interpretation. For example, observing the mango tree having flower, one infers the flowers on other trees as well. Gaudapada gives both of the above interpretations. For the former he gives the following example: the moon and stars have movement because they change the place. Whatever changes the place has movement just as Caitra. For the latter he gives the same example as offered by Mathara. The Yuktidipika discusses the samanyatodrsta more elaborately. It states that after observing the invariable association of two objects one comes to know the invariable association of the objects of same group at some other place at some other time.

For example, after observing the relation of smoke and fire one comes to know at other time the existence of some other fire through some other smoke.

Check your Progress-1

Kinds of anumana

SVARTHA AND PARARTHA

Though the division of anumana into svartha and parartha is not found in the Nyayasutra or Vaisesikasutra, Prasastapada has mentioned it on the Vaisesikasiltra. This division is accepted by Buddhists also. Etymologically what is intended for oneself is svarthanumana and what is intended for others is pararthanumana. In the svarthanumana, premises are known from our own experience, while in pararthanumana premises are discovered by one man and imparted to another through the medium of language. pararthanumana is, however, based upon svarthanumana in the sense that one cannot convince other if he himself is not convinced. The Saritkhyakarika does not discuss the division of anumana. The Yuktidipika and Mathara seem to imply such a division in their discussion of inference.

KEVALANVAYI, KEVALAVYATIREKI AND ANVAYAVYATIREKI

Notes

Uddyotakara is the first logician to introduce kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki as the varieties of inference. If a middle term is positively related to the major term it is called kevaliinvayf. If the middle term is negatively related to the major term it is called kevalavyatireki. If the middle term is positively and negatively related to the major term in an inference then it is called anvayavyatireki. Aniruddha mentions kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki in addition to the three kinds of inference, i.e. purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. In the case of kevalanvayi the vyapti is affirmative only and there is no possibility of counter example. In the case of kevalavyatireki the vyapti is negative only and there is no possibility of homogeneous example, while in the case of anvayavyatireki the vyapti can be stated in both the forms. The example of kevalanvayi is: Man is mortal because he is born. The example of kevalavyatireki is: the cloth does not differ from threads, because it is of the nature of threads. In this case there is no possibility of homogeneous instance. An instance of the third kind of inference, i.e. anvayavyatireki is fire through smoke.

VITA AND AVITA

Vita and avita mean direct inference and inference through elimination. The Samkhya texts specially the Yuktidipika has given importance to vita and avita type of anumana and has discussed the characteristics of these two in detail. In his Saritkhyatattvakaumudi Vacaspati discussed the division of vita and avita types of anumana correlating it with the other division of anumana like purvavat, etc. But the discussion of vita and avita types of anumana is not found in some other texts of Samkhya-Yoga. The division has found an important place in the system of Nyaya also. In the system of Nyaya, Uddyotakara is the earliest logician to discuss the division of anumana into vita and avita. The vita gives rise to the knowledge of an object when employed in its own essential form while the avita does so through refuting the other's stand. The former establishes an object in a positive way. The avita, however, works through rejection or negation.

The Samkhya has given importance to the division of anumana as vita and avita. The Yuktidipika in its opening verse compares the Samkhya system with an elephant having vita and avita as its tusks and thus easily

enjoying in the forest of subject (paksata). The Yuktidipika divides anumana into two types: vita and avita. According to the Yuktidipika, vita is that when the probans is applied in its very form and the avita is through elimination when other possibilities are eliminated. The Yuktidipika states that the essential form of probans can be of two kinds - generic and particular. In the case of vita the probans is employed in its essential without a reference to the exclusion of the other's stand. This is vita division of anumana. In the case of avita the probans does not prove the probandum directly but wards off the other possible alternatives. Vacaspati Misra in his Nyayavarttikatatparyatika and also in his Samkhyatattvakaumudi mentions the two-fold division of anumana, viz. vita and avita. According to him vita means that which is available in various ways, i.e. besides its presence in paksa it is present in sapaksa and is absent in other dissimilar cases (vipaksa), e.g. whatever is smoky is fiery, the hill is smoky, therefore, the hill is fiery. The avita is different from it. Avita is not found in sapaksa. In the Nyaya system, however, they are anvayi and vyatireki. Vacaspati Misra reconciles the above division with the other three divisions, i.e. parvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. According to him anumana is firstly of two kinds, vita and avita. He defines vita as that which gives rise to the inferential mainly through positive invariable concomitance and which leads to positive result. Vita should not be understood as identical with kevalanvayi. It is applicable to both the kevalanvayi and anvayavyatireki. The vita is of two kinds, purvavat and samanyatodrsta. The avita is opposite to vita in nature. It is defined as that which gives rise to the inferential knowledge through negative invariable concomitance and which stresses the negative aspect. Vacaspati states that it is a case of kevalavyatireki. He further states that avita is identical with sesavat type of anumana. For example, sound is specific quality of ether because it is not a specific quality of earth, water, fire, air, space, time, manas and the self. By elimination of other alternatives it is inferred that sound is the specific quality of ether which is the only remaining substance.

5.5 FALLACY

Notes

The term fallacy is associated with reasoning. Reason is regarded as true or valid when it has threefold property or character, lacking one of which means false or invalid reason. The triple nature of valid reason is as follows: (1) Its definite presence in the subject of inference, substratum, e.g. smoke must be present in the hill. It means that reason must be present in the subject of inference. The presence in the subject, i.e. paksadharmata, is the first characteristic of valid reason. (2) Its definite presence must be in all the objects similar to substratum (paksa). The middle term must be present in all positive instances as in the kitchen where fire exists. (3) Its definite absence in the negative instances, that is, the middle term must be absent in the negative instances. This is the third nature of valid reason named vyatireka. Thus, the three characteristics are conditions of valid reason. Therefore, their inversion of either one or two characteristics turns the probans, as Kanada observes, into fallacy. According to Gagabhata, the valid knowledge of the counter correlate which presents as inferential knowledge is called fallacy. The discussion on fallacy is not found in the Mimamsasutra and Sabarabhiisya. Kumarila and Prabhakara explain it. Kumarila admits three types of fallacy. Gautama in his Nyaya philosophy finds five varieties of fallacy.

But in the extant text of the Samkhya-Yoga, the subject "fallacies in anumana" is not discussed.

5.6 LETS SUM UP

But the knowledge of inference is due to the knowledge of vyapti or universal relations among objects. It is by means of such universal relations that inference gives us knowledge of objects beyond the reach of our senses. It extends our knowledge from the present to the past, distant and future.

5.7 KEY WORDS

Anumana, "inference" or "knowledge that follows." It is one of the pramanas, or sources of correct knowledge, in Indian philosophy. Anumana is using observation, previous truths and reason to reach a new

conclusion and truth. A simple example is observing smoke and inferring that there must be fire.

Vyapti, universal statement that expresses the "niyata sahacharya" or relation of constant concomitance between hetu or the middle term and sadhya or the major term and implies the "sahacara" i.e. the knowledge of invariable relation of causality or co-existence between sadhya and hetu in all the three instances of time, which is possible when the "anupadhik sambandha" i.e. relation of unconditionality between the two is known. It is defined as the unconditional and constant concomitant relation between "vyapya", the pervaded, and "vyapaka", the pervader.

Hetu, the mark on the strength of the character

Sadhya Character which is inferred

Paksha the subject where the character is inferred

5.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Nyaya View of anumana
2. Buddhist View of anumana
3. Jain View of anumana
4. Samkhya view of anumana
5. Advaita View of anumana
6. Samkhya View of anumana
7. Mimamsa view of anumana
8. Carvaka View of anumana

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5.10 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your Progress-1
 - Charvaka View
 - Buddhist View
 - Jain View
 - Nyaya View
 - Samkhya View
2. Answer to Check your Progress--1
 - Paksha
 - Sadhya
 - Hetu
3. Answer to Check your Progress-1
 - Purvavat
 - Sesavat
 - Samanyatodrsta
 - Svartha and Parartha

UNIT 6 THE THEORIES ABOUT INVALID PERCEPTUAL COGNITIONS (KHYATIVADA): ANYATHAKHYATI,

STRUCTURE

6.0 Objectives

6.1 Introduction

6.2 The Nyaya Analysis of Illusion: Anyathakhyati

6.3 Explanation of Fiction and Fantasies

6.4 Sense-datum versus Direct Realism

6.5 Let Us Sum Up

6.6 Keywords

6.7 Questions for review

6.8 Suggested Readings

6.9 Answer to Check your Progress

6.0 OBJECTIVE

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn about the perceptual error
- Know Anyathakhati

6.1 INTRODUCTION

It is well known that a sensory illusion of a snake and a veridical perception of it are very much alike, so that the percipient cannot distinguish between them at the time of experiencing, and yet there is a basic difference between them which the percipient may quickly learn. A theory of illusion is supposed to account satisfactorily for this likeness as well as difference

6.2 THE NYAYA ANALYSIS OF ILLUSION: ANYATHAKHYATI

I shall now try to expound the Nyaya analysis of illusion, which is called the 'misplacement' (anyathakhyati) theory. In fact, some form of anyathakhyati is implied in the attempt of many realists, even in the West. Thus, they avoid unnecessary multiplication of objects which are either abstract, or mental, or intentional. The theory, as I shall show later, is generalized in Nyaya to explain other philosophical problems connected with vacuous names and descriptions which are apparently meaningful, although there is nothing that they name or that answers such descriptions. This is also a relevant analysis in connection with what may be called the old Russeli-Meinong controversy over the problem of fictional entities. Part of the philosophic insight that might have prompted Russell to propound his theory of definite description can be seen to be at work as the Nyaya tackles the problem of empty terms in logic by generalizing the 'misplacement' (anyathakhyati) theory. For certain problems of perception can be transposed back into the problems of reference. For example, if I cannot see a non-existent object, how can I name it, or try to refer to it or describe it? Moreover, the initial name-giving occasion, as the modern (Kripkes) theory of reference would emphasize, requires a 'perceptual' sort of situation (comparable to baptism). It is well known that a sensory illusion of a snake and a veridical perception of it are very much alike, so that the percipient cannot distinguish between them at the time of experiencing, and yet there is a basic difference between them which the percipient may quickly learn. A theory of illusion is supposed to account satisfactorily for this likeness as well as difference. Representationalists believe that the acceptance of entities like sense-data makes this explanation simple. It is argued that the likeness is due to the fact that both cases of awareness, one veridical and the other illusory, share a common sensory core, i.e. they both consist of the immediate perception of the same object, viz. a sense-datum, while the difference is due to another fact. In veridical perception the sense-datum being a correct representation or picture of what lies before the perceiver leads to the correct mediate

awareness of the object, the snake, while in illusion the datum misleads. Phenomenalism accepts the first explanation of the likeness, but claims that the difference is to be explained in terms of the coherence (or lack of it) of the particular datum with the others in the web of data; if the datum is a 'misfit' (visamvadin), the awareness is an illusion. For example, Dharmakirti defined correct awareness as that which does not run counter to any other relevant awareness or action (cf. avisamvadakatva). If I see a piece of silver and later on lift it and place it in my palm, and conduct several tests, all these behaviour episodes would have to cohere with the first awareness of the piece of silver. If they do, the veracity of the perception is established, if they do not, the awareness is illusory. This also shows why the Buddhist may agree with Nyaya in maintaining that knowledge-hood is known otherwise (paratha) i.e. not when the awareness is known but when successful activity follows.

Dharmakirti uses the example of a jewel and a lamp, both being hidden from the eye and emitting rays. This simile can be exploited in favour of both the representationalist and the phenomenalist. We see the rays, the same (or similar) rays in both cases, and we may in both cases approach the object. If I approach with the awareness that it is a jewel and obtain a lamp at the end of the line, then the object does not 'fit' or does not perform its expected role (arthakriya) as a jewel. Or I may rush with the awareness that it is a lamp and obtain a jewel. In that case, it does not do its job either. Both cases exemplify illusion. But if I rush with the awareness that it is a jewel and a jewel is what I obtain, then it is known to be veridical.

Nyaya says that the theory that is called 'misplacement' (anyathakhyati) can give a much simpler explanation than the above. It explains the likeness between two cases of snake perception, illusory and veridical, by referring to the similarity of properties, features, aspects, etc. between the two objects, one of which (a rope) I see, and the other of which (the snake) I misperceive. Obviously there will be little chance of misperceiving A while B lies before me unless there is some similarity of features etc. between A and B. I cannot mistake a mustard seed for an elephant, for example. These features etc., we must note, are not odd sorts of entities such as sense-data. They are attributable to the material

object we see, or to the physical environment etc. They are not sense-impressions private to the percipient but rather in most cases observable features of the external world. Some sense-data philosophers believe that sense-data are physical, or part of the material world, and hence it may be claimed that what they are saying does not differ from the position I am defending here. G. E. Moore, for example, would consider that sense-data are 'properties' of the material object, sometimes of the visible (front) part of the opaque physical object. It is important to realize the difference here. The features, properties, parts, and so on which I am invoking as the basis of similarity are attributable (in fact, they may be said to belong) to the material object in the same way as some philosophers would attribute sense-data to the material object, or to the physical occupant. But what the sense-data philosophers say, and Nyaya does not say, is that they are also the objects of our immediate perception, on the basis of which perception we see the material object. The Nyaya position is that we see the opaque physical object, the piece of silver for example, because of the presence of these properties, but not necessarily because we first see these properties, features, parts, etc. as a preliminary to the second, mediate perception. The shining white feature causes me to see the piece of silver, and sometimes a similar feature shared by another object, a piece of shell, may cause my perception, i.e. misperception, of silver. This likeness between a veridical perception and an illusion leads us to mistake one for the other.

The point made in the last paragraph may be elaborated. It is usually believed by sense-data philosophers, as it was by the Buddhists, that we first see the colour of the object (say the red of my car) and then through the mediation of this seeing, we 'see' (or at least we think we 'see') the car. When under neon-light the red is changed into purple and I see the purple, I may doubt whether it is really my car. Somewhat in this way, sense-data philosophers like H. H. Price would argue in favour of a direct or immediate perception of a red or purple patch with a certain bulgy shape: 'When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. In my example of an illusory case, I can doubt whether it is not another car but I cannot doubt my seeing immediately a purple patch with a

certain bulgy shape. But must I see the colour always and invariably before I see my car? Could it not be the case that I walk to my car seeing that it is there without thinking (i.e. seeing) even what colour it has now? Frequently I see my car without even stopping to look at the colour. This does not mean that the car has become colourless all of a sudden. Nor does it mean that I can or could see it even if it did not have a colour. For, as Nyaya has emphasized (and I repeat for emphasis), I see it because it has a colour, but not necessarily because I see that colour. Of course I see the colour also, because it is the re to be seen. But unless my perception is propositional (in the Chisholmian sense) so that I see that the car is red (or that it is a red car), I do not need the immediate and independent perception of the red to 'mediate' in my perception of the car itself. Suppose I am sitting by my desk near the window, and I notice (i.e. look up, see) whenever a car passes by. Now you come in and ask me: 'Did you see that car that passed by a moment ago?' I can truthfully answer 'Yes, I did'. You may then ask, 'What colour was it?' And I can still truthfully reply, 'I did not see (notice) its colour'. I would not have been able to see it, however, if it had been an uncoloured (invisible) car (like the invisible man in science fiction). Therefore it stands to reason to say that I saw the car (because it had a colour) but did not see its colour. It can of course be argued that I saw the colour because it was there even though I now think I did not. I am reminded here of an old Bengali joke: A physician asks his prospective patient, 'Do you have a headache in the morning?' The patient replies, 'No sir'. And the physician says, 'Of course you have it every morning, but you are not able to know it'.

According to the 'misplacement' (anyathakhyati) theory, the snake I see in my illusion is a real snake (an existent entity), and does not belong to the separate class of (mental) existents like the class of sensedata; it is part of the already existent snake community, part of the 'furniture' of this material world. To understand this argument, we have to consider several other points; in so doing, we can also explain the difference that is there between the two cases of awareness, veridical and illusory. First, the 'perceived' character of the snake in our sensory illusion cannot be easily dismissed or underplayed. Nyaya therefore rightly rebukes the Prabhakara for trying to undermine this fact and to turn what is a genuine case of perception (though not a case of genuine perception) into

Notes

something different (a case of remembering only) by a tortuous explanation (cf. ativyakhya, Vacaspati). The Buddhist, the phenomenalist, and also the representationalist are therefore right in insisting upon this 'perceived' character of the experience in illusion. The Prabhakara is also right in talking about past experience and memory-revival in the context of illusion. If we follow this lead, we can avoid the insecure and rather debatable realm of sense-data, percepts, appearances (pratibhasa), and 'forms' (akara).

Second, the role of past experience, acquired concepts, anticipations, habitual association etc. in generating a present perceptual knowledge and by the same token a perceptual illusion, can hardly be overestimated. Possibly excluding a few days in early childhood, we constantly build upon our past experience—a process that probably never ends. In each non-simple perception, in each seeing-as, I constantly draw upon my previous experience knowingly or (more often) unknowingly. I can probably see (as a child does) a snake as something without any past experience or previous association with a snake either by perception or by a picture or by some description. But I cannot see something as a snake unless I am aided by past experience, concept, etc. By the same token, I cannot very well misperceive, i.e. see what is not a snake as a snake without such aid. Therefore, a shared causal factor of both my veridical and illusory perception of a snake would be my acquired snake-concept or past experience of a snake or snakes.

Third, I have already mentioned that according to Nyaya the piece of silver we see in a 'shell-silver' illusion situation does not lie outside the silver bullion of this material world, but in fact it is a part of it. By the same token, the snake in the 'rope-snake' illusion, the purple that covers my red car in neon light, my bitter taste of sugar when I am suffering from jaundice, and the dagger in Macbeth's hallucination—all are part of this world we know best. The problem here is to explain how I can see (or perceive) these objects which are not present or connected (physically) with my sense-faculty. Nyaya, in partial agreement with the Prabhakara, invokes the service of past experience and memory. The revived memory triggered off by the similarity of shared character brings in its wake the object of the past experience. The object of the past experience cannot enter the visual field physically for the eyes to see, but

it can have a non-physical connection (alaukika sannikarsa) with the eyes to make it possible for us to perceive (i.e. misperceive). It is not an image or a shadow that we perceive in illusion. For that is not the meaning or implication of the expression 'non-physical' here. Revived memory presents the object non-physically to allow the sense-faculty to communicate or consider it. And in this way it appears in perception (or rather misperception) as a characteristic or a qualifier.

Fourth, illusion, as I have emphasized, is a non-simple perception. Therefore, it can potentially deliver a judgement. Such a judgement can be interpreted as either identifying or predicative (or attributive). If it is the former, 'this is silver' has to be interpreted as 'this piece of silver'. If the latter, it should be interpreted as 'this has silverness or silver-essence' or 'this belongs to the silver-kind'. Now we have of course been familiar with silver or some piece of it for a long time from seeing it in old coins and spoons or in a silversmith's shop. Memory presents some (indefinite) familiar silver, which, though it is not physically present, can enter into a nonphysical relation with the sense-faculty. Such a 'non-physical' relation (sannikara) with the sense-faculty would be enough to make a perception possible.

Fifth, can I see cold ice or a fragrant flower? One way to answer this is to say no. For it will be explained that we see the ice and the flower and infer the coldness and fragrance from past associations, though such inferences are very rapidly made. I think, along with Nyaya, that this way of answering the question is not satisfactory. For sometimes I unmistakably seem to see the fragrant jasmine and the cold ice! I see a sweet fruit and my mouth immediately waters. To say that a quick process of inference intervenes here is to accept only a poor theory. Nyaya takes all these as cases of perception (seeing), and veridical cases at that. The explanation here follows the previous model of memory presentation and the resulting 'non-physical' connection with the visual sense organ. Thus it is that the model of memory presentation and 'non-physical' connection is invoked not simply to explain the problem of sensory illusion. In other words, the model is not devised in desperation, to save realism against the argument from illusion. The model has more explanatory power, for it explains standard cases of illusion as well as some veridical perception. Properties like fragrance, coldness, and

sweetness, by definition cannot have any 'physical' connection with the eye (cf. vavastha theory). Hence it is said that memory acts as a go-between in generating correct perceptual knowledge. Memory provides the nonphysical connection here.

Sixth, there is one important difference, according to Nyaya, between the 'physical' connection with the visual organ and the memory-intervened 'non-physical' connection. In a non-simple perception (obviously the question of memory-intervened perceptual connection does not arise in the case of simple perception), whatever is 'physically' connected with the visual organ can either play the role of a dharmin (a qualificand) or that of a dhanna (a qualifier). If, however, something has the memory-induced 'non-physical' connection with the visual organ, it must always play the role of a qualifier or a characteristic. In other words, what is 'physically' connected can be either the 'chief' or the 'subordinate' (to use our previous terminology), but what is 'non-physically' presented (cf. upanita) must always take the subordinate role. If I look outside the window and am asked 'what do you see?', I could answer, 'I see the car', 'I see the red car', 'I see that the car is red', 'I see the red (colour) of the car', 'I see that red colour characterizes the car', and so on. Similarly, I can answer 'I see the jasmine', 'I see the fragrant jasmine', 'I see cold snow' and so on, but according to Nyaya, I would never say 'I see the fragrance of the jasmine' or 'I see coldness qualifying the snow'. In perceptions of this kind, the object (jasmine, snow, sugar) that is physically connected with the eye must be given the prime role of the qualificand or 'chief' in the object-complex. In its verbal report, therefore, the 'chief' occupies the position of the substantive (the 'subject') while the 'non-physically' presented element turns into an adjective or a 'predicate'. Seventh, this brings us to another important characteristic of a nonsimple awareness. It has been said that perceptual illusion is possible only in the case of a non-simple awareness where there is a 'chief' along with a 'subordinate' in the object-complex, a thing that is being characterized and what characterizes it (a 'subject' and a 'predicate'). If the characteristic ('subordinate') mis-characterizes the chief, we have an illusion. The characteristic (that which plays the role of the characteristic) is supplied in such cases by the above-mentioned memory-induced 'non-physical' connection. We have pointed out above

that whatever is presented to the sense-faculty in this way can only play the role of a characteristic. Therefore, in illusion a previously experienced silver-piece is being identified (subordinately, predicatively) with the subject of my visual experience. This, by implication, shows that nothing can go wrong with the 'chief' in any perceptual situation. For what plays the role of the 'chief' must necessarily be physically connected with the visual organ. If the object (which plays the role of the 'chief') is connected physically with the sense-faculty and if I see it, what else can go wrong? This means that I can never misperceive the object that plays the role of the 'chief' (the 'subject'); I can misperceive in so far as its characterization is concerned. This point is stated in Nyaya by the commonly accepted dictum: all cases of awareness (non-simple) would be correct, in fact, unerring, as far as the 'chief' is concerned but they might be wrong with regard to the characteristic that characterizes the 'chief'.

6.3 EXPLANATION OF FICTION AND FANTASIES

In its simplest form, the 'misplacement' theory (*anyathakhyati*) asserts that error or perceptual illusion is the misplacement of a real *Fin* a real *X*. The basic assumption in this theory is that nothing appears in our visual perceptual awareness, which is not also existent or real (that is objectively real in some way or other). If something seems to be an entirely unfamiliar object appearing in our dreams, hallucinations, wildest imaginations or, in any other apparently perceptual mode of awareness, this unfamiliarity, outlandishness, or the out-of-the-world characteristic is only apparent, according to Nyaya, for proper and careful analysis will show that it is constructed out of only the familiar bits and pieces. In other words, the unfamiliar objects in a dream can be broken down to elements that have been already objects of our past acquaintance in some way or other. The so-called non-existent is therefore constructed by us out of the existents-existents that have been experienced by us already. In imagination, fantasies, and dreams it is our unconscious memory or unconscious reminiscence that is at work. If we

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do not ascribe separate existential status to the objects of memory, derivative of the objects of past experience, we need not worry about ontological economy in this theory. This seems to be an advantage over the sense-data theory, where a separate class of entities with dubious ontological status has somehow to be conceded. In imagination etc., in this theory, we draw unconsciously from our 'memory-bank'. However, the notion of the object of memory and past experience raises the problem of intentionality, or intentional inexistence as Brentano called it.

So far in our analysis we have taken the standard cases of perceptual illusion. Such cases as the 'rope-snake' or the 'shell-silver' situation are paradigm cases. In fact the Nyaya analysis in terms of similarity and memory-revival works well for such cases. But there are many other types of illusion which are difficult to explain in terms of similarity and unconscious reminiscing. For example, the shiny property is the point of similarity between the shell and a piece of silver, and that which may rightly revive my memory of silver. But it is not at all clear how we can speak in this manner of a similarity between the ascript (aropya) and the object to which it is ascribed (apropa-visaya) when we misperceive, for example, that the (white) conch-shell is yellow, under the influence of disease. We do not ascribe or superimpose a yellow thing upon the white conch-shell. Nor do we ascribe yellow colour to white colour, for white colour has not been the object of Visual awareness here at all. On the whole, we have to say that we ascribe yellow to the conch-shell. But then where is the supposed similarity between them? Anticipating such an objection, Vacaspati has given an answer. The percipient is aware of only the colour yellow belonging to the disease (we may compare it with coloured glass), but he does not recognize the object to which it belongs. He is also aware of the conch-shell whose white colour is hidden from his eye, as it were, owing to the disease (or the presence of the yellow glass). At the same time he is unaware that the yellow colour he sees is unconnected with the conch-shell he sees. However, he remembers a situation similar to this, in which he perceived a ripe bilva (or vilva) fruit as yellow; which presents him with the ingredient to misperceive and say 'this is yellow'. The ascript here is a relation, as Udayana emphasizes. It is a connectedness which picks out two unconnected objects, the conch-

shell and yellow colour to which the ascription is being made (cf. *aropa-visayau*). A similar analysis is proposed when I taste sugar as bitter. According to Nyaya direct realism, however, I cannot taste sugar directly as a thing. In fact only two faculties, that of vision and touch, are said to have the power to apprehend the material thing (body) directly. Hearing, smelling, and tasting can grasp only the relevant properties, not the things. Therefore, 'I hear a coach' (Berkeley's example, much discussed by Armstrong and Jackson from different points of view), 'I smell a jasmine', and 'I taste food' are all to be differently reformulated in Nyaya. When sugar tastes bitter, this is how it is supposed to happen, according to Vacaspati: I perceive sugar by tongue, but some ailment prevents me from tasting its sweetness (note also that tasteless sugar would be like 'colourless conch-shell'). On the other hand, I taste a bitter taste that belongs to *pitta* (i.e. the disease). This situation evokes the past experience of a bitter-tasting *nimba* fruit. Thereafter in the way described above we ascribe connectedness to the situation which in turn picks out the unconnected sugar and bitter taste. The ascript here is the connectedness, and the object to which it is ascribed is a pair, the lump of sugar and the unconnected bitter taste present in the disease.

A simple illusion is a misplacement or misconnection of the two unconnected entities--one is the ascript and the other is the object to which the ascription is made in the resulting judgement. There are two sides to the ascription: the ascript (*tiropya*) and the 'object of ascription' (*tiropa-visaya*), i.e. the object to which the former is ascribed. Nyaya emphasized that any entity belonging to either side of this type of ascription is real and existent and part of this world. The ascription itself is part of the imaginative construction (aided by past experience) or *vikalpa*, which is the general feature of any non-simple perception. This ascription or misconnection can be accounted for, Nyaya believes, by probing into material, i.e. physical and physiological, as well as some psychological factors such as memory, unique to each type of illusion. I say 'psychological' with tongue in cheek, for a psychological factor here should not be confused as being a reference to sense-impression or sense-data which are, some representationalists argue, mental entities. Psychological factors mean here any vestiges of past experience that may creatively contribute to any non-simple perception. Incidentally, Nyaya

direct realism does not necessarily lead to modern materialistic behaviourism in which all mental episodes or states must be identified with some physical behaviour or some neuro-physiological states. Hence ordinary mental occurrences are accepted as separate facts in Nyaya.

Similarity can be a material (or objective) feature. It is not always the perceived similarity, but the mere presence of similarity in the objects themselves that triggers off the perception sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly. A question is raised by Vacaspati: since it is possible to say that any object is similar to any other in some respect or other (for example, two very dissimilar things can also be said to be similar simply in that both are at least existent, sat), what kind or degree of similarity would trigger off a perceptual attribution? The answer is that there cannot be any restrictive rule (niyama) in this case, for it varies from person to person, object to object, situation to situation. Suppose an object has a cluster of properties, features, determined by my past experience: a, b, c, ... The presence of any one of these or any combination chosen from this set could trigger off my perceptual ascription aided or unaided by other factors. Sometimes my eager expectation to see my friend would be enough to trigger off a perceptual attribution to, or misidentification of, another person wearing, for example, the same sort of coat in a crowd. This 'anomaly' (i.e. lack of any restrictive rule) is in fact a characteristic of a mental occurrence.

Perceptual illusion can be of various types. It seems that the Nyaya explanatory model fits in very well with what we may call imaginative error. The standard examples are a 'shell-silver' situation and a 'rope snake' situation. The role of similarity and imaginative attribution is almost paradigmatic in such cases. The second type can be called objective or situational or conditional error. Here the whole situation seems to be manipulative. The examples are tasting bitterness in sugar, seeing yellow in a conch-shell, etc. These must be explained through a careful analysis of the individual situation. I have given above Vacaspati's analysis of the two examples. There are other examples where 'imaginative' attribution may be properly analysed following the lead of Vacaspati: the bent stick in water (mentioned by Udayana), mirror illusion (mentioned by Vardhamana), double moon, false motion of trees when one moves by a vehicle etc. (Dharmakīrti) There are

obvious difficulties if we use just one model of analysis for different types of error. We need not delve into the problem here. However, it may be presumed that with modern knowledge of physics, physiology, optics, etc. some sort of analysis of each situation would be possible (and this analysis may or may not coincide with the scientist's analysis) from the Nyaya point of view, for, we can set aside some item or items forming the set of ascripts and another set of items to which ascription is being made. Now, while the two are unconnected, perceptual attribution on the basis of some vestiges of past experience could connect (i.e. misconnect) them. This analysis of the actually unconnected ascript and subject in each misperception is the basis of the Nyaya 'misplacement' theory. Causal factors of each (wrong) attribution may be different. In hallucinations, and other psychotic conditions we can count an ardent desire or intensity of fear among their causal factors. The real object of the past experience (e.g. the real dagger for Macbeth) is the ascript ascribed to the actually unconnected (1) empty space (in front of the percipient) and (2) the present time. The combination of the latter two would be the subject (visayva) of ascription, i.e. the object to which ascription is being made. Sanskrit philosophers, it should be noted, instead of the Macbeth example (of which, alas, they were unaware), frequently refer to the hallucination of the beloved by the lovelorn lover during long separation (viraha).

It should be noted here that in spite of Vacaspati's bold attempt to apply a single model of analysis (that of ascription of a remembered object upon a perceived object, induced by similarity) to both types of illusion, other Naiyayikas would beg to differ. They divide illusions into those which run counter to another (succeeding) perception, e.g. the 'rope-snake' illusion, and those which run counter to other (non-perceptual) evidence, e.g. double moon (pratyakika tirasklira and yauktika tiraskiira). Some Naiyayikas would suggest a different model of analysis for the second type. For example, they would say that we need not take recourse to remembrance or similarity in these cases. This will be clear in the next section.

Check your Progress-1

1. Nyaya theory that is called 'misplacement' (anyathakhyati)

6.4 SENSE-DATUM VERSUS DIRECT REALISM

Udayana has emphasized that we mis-ascribe connectedness (= relation), that is, we 'misconnect' the unconnected, and the lack of awareness of their unconnectedness has been cited as an auxiliary factor. Here, however, Nyaya seems to concede the insight of the Prabhakara analysis where such lack of awareness is rightly emphasized. (For more on the Prabhakara, see below.) There are further problems with the Nyaya view of ascription. First, if we were to ascribe a relation to the two unconnected entities in the above manner then the structure of the illusory awareness would be 'the conch-shell and this yellow arc connected', and not 'the conch-shell is yellow'. Vardhamana explains in reply: it is the nature of any relation to try to pick out two available items as related, provided a relation between them is, if not actual, at least possible. Here similarity plays the role of a relation, for this yellow colour is a particular feature and this conch-shell is a thing, and therefore it presents a situation where a relation is possible (between the thing and the feature).

However, it raises the question: what is this relation that we are ascribing? Is it general relatedness? If so, then the awareness would no longer be an error, for two unconnected items can have some very general relation between them, for we can ingeniously formulate a chain of relation to show some connection in some way. (In fact, according to the Nyaya concept of 'relation', in general, anything can be related to anything else.) Do we ascribe the specific relation that is possible, in this case, between the thing and the feature, viz. inherence? We do not, for our illusion here persists even when we know that the conch-shell cannot be yellow. Vardhamana resolves this by saying that we ascribe here a unique relation between the two items, a relation that may not pick out any other ordered pair (in other words, a relation-particular).

Are we not then creating a new thing, a (non-existent) relation particular? The answer, I believe, would have to be 'yes', and Nyaya would probably say that thus is a minimal creation that we must attribute to the creative faculty of 'imagination' (vikalpa), which is certainly at play in perceptual illusion. I have already made this point while discussing the Buddhist theory of 'the revelation of the non-existent'. The main constituents of the object in illusion may be considered parts of this actual world and presented either by memory or by the occasion under which illusion occurs. But the particular connection that ties them up in illusion is only a possible, but not actual (and hence a 'non-existent' *asat*) entity.

It has already been noted that it is not always the perceived similarity that gives rise to illusion. It may be asked: When is similarity to be perceived in order for it to be a factor in generating illusion? Vardhamana gives an answer. We may ascribe either an identity or a characteristic. In other words, our illusory judgement may be either identificatory or predicative. If our judgement admits the form 'this = a piece of silver', that is, if we identify what lies before us with a piece of silver, then similarity between the two has to be perceived. But if we ascribe a characteristic, that is, if our judgement admits the form 'this has silverness', then the mere presence of similarity would be enough to trigger off misperception. The former, it may be noted, is a more complex judgement than the latter, and hence Vardhamana, in pointing this out, shows his own logical insight. To perceptually affirm of something that it is identical with a piece of silver we must be aware that the piece resembles a piece of silver in essential respects, but mere presence of some similarity may induce a perception of something as a piece of silver.

Some argue that it is possible to dismiss similarity as a relevant factor for each case of illusion. For what is needed is the presentation of the ascript in some way or other. It is not always that similarity reminds us of the ascript, for sometimes the ascripts may be perceptual present. For example, the physiological condition (disease, drunkenness, etc.) will make the percipient see pink rats without any intervention of the revival of memory due to similarity. Vardhamana reports that there are two views on this matter. One holds that when we identify through mistake the object before us with a piece of silver, then it is the perceived

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similarity that presents the piece of silver in the form of a disguised reminiscence. The other holds that when similarity is the only defect (do a) of the situation, i.e. the only relevant factor for the resulting misperception, then similarity may present the ascript from the 'memory bank'. But the second view further claims that in the case of other physiological conditions, such as disease, the presentation of the ascript, yellow for example, is perceptual (*pratyaksad eva*) and there is no need in our explanation to invoke the service of similarity.

In later Nyaya there is a tension between these two types of interpretation of illusion. In some cases of illusion (disease, tricky lighting, drunkenness) the misperception is felt so instantaneously and directly that recourse to the chain-device of similarity, remembrance, and ascription seems unnecessary. In such cases, the ascript is said to be perceptually presented, rather than through reminiscence. It is also wrong to say that when my jaundiced eye sees yellow I remember a past experience of yellow. The yellow is perceived first before we get to the stage of ascription, that is, the stage of associating yellow with the conch-shell resulting in a non-simple perception. This analysis apparently goes against the elaborate analysis of Vacaspati as explained earlier. According to Vacaspati, yellow is doubtless seen in such cases but we do not ascribe it to the conch-shell. We ascribe or concoct a connection which picks out two unconnected objects, conch-shell and yellow.

Sense-data philosophers, especially those who take sense-data to be part of the physical world, would not find much to dispute with the Nyaya analysis here. For example, G. E. Moore and C. D. Broad have argued that our visual datum is the front part of the opaque physical object. As long as what is seen is identified with some part of the physical and neuro-physiological world, I think Nyaya would not find it problematic. For clearly the existence of these items is not essentially dependent upon their being perceived. That my car looks purple under neon can be seen by a number of people. Neuro-physiological conditions may not be public in this way, but this need not present any problem. If I have jaundice my eye will see yellow where yours will not. But if you have jaundice you will see the same or similar yellow, i.e. the yellow of your disease. In other words, the yellow is as much shared by us as the

disease. It is reported that not one but several drunkards, not always at the same time, see pink rats on their white beds! Likewise, the round plate looks elliptical to me while I am sitting in this chair in the same way as it does to another observer when he sits here, provided nothing else changes. Nyaya would find all these physical and physiological data acceptable, provided two other assumptions do not go along with it: (i) these are the objects we must necessarily see in our immediate perception, and the physical world appears in its full glory when we see 'through' them, that is in our so-called mediate perception; (ii) there is little point in taking these objects to be actually there when nobody is perceiving them. Nyaya unequivocally rejects these two assumptions.

Some sense-data philosophers may argue in favour of the possibility of unsensed sense-data. At the extreme was Mill's view who defined substance as the 'permanent possibility of sensation'. If this means that Mill rejected the second assumption, this would be welcomed by Nyaya. But the point of Nyaya is that these data are actual, not possible, so that we do not need a perception to take place to show that they are possible. The sense-data philosophers, however, were more inclined to save phenomenalism from the alleged criticism that it does violence to common sense. But they would then have to concede that without any perceiver the sensible world would vanish into nothingness! Probably their point was that these possibilities exist independently of any perceiver to make them actual. Nere Nyaya would beg to differ. Naiyayikas argue that we do not necessarily see the physical world through such data, although we may do so on occasion. For we can see the physical world even directly. In the 'bent-stick' example (which Udayana mentions) a new physical bent stick is not created, but the property of 'bentness' belonging to the interaction of light and water (for Udayana, water waves) is transferred to the straight stick whose straightness is there hidden, much in the same way as yellow belonging to the yellow glass through which I am seeing is transferred to the white wall whose white then becomes hidden.

The Nyaya position has some similarity here with the 'multiple location' defence of naive or direct realism—a theory that H. H. Price has ascribed to Whitehead. According to this theory, a simple material object, such as a penny, is really a sort of infinitely various porcupine, which is not

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merely here in this room (as we commonly take it to be) but sticks out as it were in all directions and to all sorts of distances, "from" all of which it has its being and is qualified in various ways, whether present to any one's sense or not. However, this similarity with Nyaya need not be overemphasized. For Nyaya would not go so far as to take a penny to be a 'porcupine' unless there are also infinitely various percipients, at the same time, looking at the same penny from all directions and all sorts of distances. Since this is not what actually happens, Nyaya would not accept the suggestion of a penny being actually a 'porcupine'. Nyaya would, however, allow that some objective external particulars (features, things, properties or whatever) may be produced temporarily in the cases under consideration (i.e. in the second type of perceptual illusion). Further, in the production of such temporary (in fact momentary) particulars, the percipient certainly plays some part (he is included in the set of causal factors). When two persons looking at a penny see two different shapes due to their positions, etc., they help to create two different (objective and external) shapes which are then ascribed to the penny they actually see. These two created shapes do not belong to the penny, but are only attributed to it by different viewers. Hence there is no contradiction in saying that when the two percipients cease to perceive the penny in this way those 'objective' and 'external' particulars, those two shapes, also cease to exist. For if the sets of supporting causal factors are disturbed, the effects (those two shapes) are destroyed thereby. When nobody is looking at the penny, it shines in its own glory with its one and only shape! Hence, a penny cannot be a 'porcupine' in Nyaya.

What is the nature of these objective, external particulars which are also momentary and dependent upon the percipient's perceiving? Are they similar to the sense-data? If acceptance of sense-data means only acceptance of such temporary, external objects, there may not be any quarrel between Nyaya and the sense-data theorist in this matter. In fact the ontological status of these 'objective' particulars in Nyaya is very intriguing. It is claimed (in Nyaya) that an external objective reality can be created by a set of causal factors, of which a mental event can be a crucial member. The life (duration) of such external entity is short because the crucial mental event is also shortlived. In the Nyaya system, numbers such as two, three, or a thousand are created in this way as

objective external facts by the co-operation of some mental event. The crucial mental event that generates such numbers is called *apeksa-buddhi* (a 'count-orientated' cognitive episode). Such numbers die as fast as the corresponding cognitive episodes disappear. Similarly, another episode called 'sensing' may be regarded as a causal factor for generating the said objective, external particulars, the blue blur, etc. But these do not exist when no observer is present.

How do these particulars differ from the sense-data? First, they are not mental, but external objects, although they have been anomalously created by a mental episode as one of its causal factors. Most sense data philosophers take sense-data to be mental, but the *Naiyayika*'s particulars are not in the head of any person. Second, they are according to *Nyaya* not direct and immediate objects of perception, but only ascribed to the 'main' object of perception. He who sees an elliptical penny does not see the elliptical shape first, by virtue of which he sees the penny. He sees simply the penny as elliptical. Third, these particulars are not in any case part of the surface of the object of perception. They do not belong to the object but are only attributed to it. This shows that even those who would like to make sense-data part of the surface of the object perceived would not agree with the *Nyaya* view about these anomalous particulars.

D. W. Armstrong, with a view to supporting direct realism, has given an analysis of sensory illusion in terms of false belief or inclination to believe falsely that we are perceiving, that is, veridically perceiving, some physical object or state of affairs. To have a sense impression, according to him, is to believe, or be inclined to believe, that we are immediately perceiving something, some physical object or state of affairs. Most of what he says in the relevant chapter would seem to be acceptable to *Nyaya*. It is, however, difficult to see how by calling or identifying all perceptual illusion as mere false beliefs or even inclination to such beliefs, we can resolve the whole issue. According to this view, we do not actually perceive, although we may think we perceive, when we suffer from an illusion. It seems to me that Armstrong in this respect makes the same mistake as the *Prabhakara* who explains that in a perceptual illusion of silver we really do not perceive the silver (although we think we do). Although the *Prabhakara* analysis is entirely different, as we have seen above, there seems to be an agreement in this respect. In

their eagerness to save realism, both the Prabhakara and Armstrong seem to undermine the perceived character of our experience of silver in illusion. It becomes highly counter-intuitive if in order to account for or explain the phenomenon of perceptual illusion we simply say that there is no perceptual illusion for which explanation may be needed. Besides, Nyaya will say that in the case of perceptual illusion we have also an inward perception (an *anuvyavasaya*) that we have had an (external) perception. In other words, we not only reach a judgement of the form 'this is silver' but also in the next moment another inward judgement of the form 'I perceive that this is silver'. This, for Nyaya, seems to supply stronger experiential evidence in favour of the perceptual character of the experience. Such evidence cannot be lightly brushed aside. In other words, Nyaya would claim that when I visually see the double moon, I also inwardly perceive in the next moment that I see visually, and this needs an explanation. Our disposition, that is, belief or inclination to believe, may be the result of an experience, but certainly not simply a substitute for such experience. Vacaspati's charge of 'overkill' (cf. *ativyakhyana*) against the Prabhakara would apply equally well against Armstrong.

There is an agreement between Armstrong and the Prabhakara in another significant respect. The Prabhakara rightly emphasizes the factor he calls 'our lack of awareness of the distinctness of the two experiences, seeing and reminiscing'. If we are unaware of this distinction we will naturally be more inclined to confuse the two as one experience, perceiving, and in this way it would be possible to say that we believe (falsely) that we perceive when we do not actually perceive. The Prabhakara, however, would not say that it is our experience which mixes the two. Rather the claim is that our description of the experience, our speech-behaviour, mixes them inadvertently. The Prabhakara, however, is quite clear about the perceived part of the experience, for as sensory illusion is a non-simple awareness it contains the minimal perceptual part when we are confronted with the object and we see it; we see the piece of shell, though not as a piece of shell. Armstrong argues that he maintains, in his explanation, the ordinary usage of 'perceive', according to which, 'what is perceived must have physical existence'. This is also the problem before the Prabhakara as well as Nyaya. The Prabhakara insists that there is no

real illusion, for the perceived object, the 'thing' (dharmin), i.e. the shell, exists, much as the remembered piece of silver did when it was perceived. Nyaya also agrees with the Prabhakara in this respect. But Nyaya adds that the resulting event is not a confusion or conflation in our speech-behaviour of two different cases of awareness; rather it is one single case, which, though not veridical, is perceptual in character. In illusory perception, disconnected entities get connected falsely, but those disconnected entities are real entities. Thus there is more than one way to maintain the common-sense intuition about the ordinary usage or sense of the verb 'perceive' (or 'see'). Armstrong, however, is not simply a direct realist, since he also believes in the materialist theory of the mind. Neither the Nyaya nor the Prabhakara can be called materialist or monist in the same sense. At least the situation is not very clear here. Moreover, Armstrong's direct realism maintains that all our five sense-faculties perceive the external material thing directly, and not through any sense-datum. Nyaya, however, says that only two sense-faculties, the sense of vision and the sense of touch, grasp the external material object directly, not through its properties.

6.5 LET'S SUM UP

In illusory perception, disconnected entities get connected falsely, but those disconnected entities are real entities. Thus there is more than one way to maintain the common-sense intuition about the ordinary usage or sense of the verb 'perceive' (or 'see').

6.6 KEY WORDS

Anyathā-khyātivāda (misapprehension) (Nyāya) – the object perceived under illusion is real elsewhere, not here in front of the perceiver because of the mind connected with the object on account of memory, the error is due to wrong understanding of the presented and the represented, and occurs, as Vachaspati Mishra states - सदन्तरं सदन्तरत्मना गृह्यते - when "one reality is mistaken for another".

Asat-khyātivāda (apprehension of the non-existent) (*Cārvāka*) – what is being perceived (illusory) is really non-existent, the error consists in the apprehension of the unreal or in the perception of non-existent entities.

6.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain anyathakyati.

2. What is realism?

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6.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your Progress-1
 - It explains the likeness between two cases of snake perception, illusory and veridical, by referring to the similarity of properties, features, aspects, etc. between the two objects, one of which (a rope) I see, and the other of which (the snake) I misperceive.

UNIT 7 THE THEORIES ABOUT INVALID PERCEPTUAL COGNITIONS (KHYATIVADA): ATMAKHYATI, ANIRVACANIYAKHYATI, AKHYATI,

STRUCTURE

7.0 Objectives

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Seeing and Seeing-as

7.3 Two Buddhist Analyses of Illusion

7.4 The Advaita View of the Inexplicability of the Appearance

7.5 The Prabhakara View of No-illusion

7.6 Let Us Sum Up

7.7 Keywords

7.8 Questions for review

7.9 Suggested Readings

7.10 Answer to Check your Progress

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After studying this unit, you should be able to:

- Learn about the perceptual error
- Know Atma khyati
- know anivachaniya khyati
- understand the akhyati

7.1 INTRODUCTION

We find things about seeing puzzling because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.

7.2 SEEING AND SEEING-AS

Sensory (perceptual) illusion is said to be 'promiscuous' in Nyaya. Veridical perception is therefore characterized by Nyayasutra 1.1.4, as non-promiscuous (a-vyabhicarin). Promiscuity involves one's indiscriminate relation with at least two persons at the same time. Promiscuity of awareness here means that it deals with two 'objects' at the same time. Let us call awareness simple if it deals with only one object (unanalysed, but not necessarily unanalysable). An awareness then would be non-simple if it deals with more than one object. Our perceptual awareness is very seldom simple in the above sense, although in exceptional cases, and then only under some theoretical consideration, it can become simple. We can, however, analyse a non-simple awareness and abstract a simple one from it for our convenience. In a non-simple awareness, then, there will be at least two objects. We can call it a molecular non-simple awareness if these two objects are connected in a particular way. Usually the two play two different roles to form a unity: one is the 'chief' (mukhya) and the other is subordinate (gauna), one is being characterized while the other is the characteristic (dharma-dharmin), and one is the qualificand (visesya) while the other is the qualifier (prakrira). (An awareness of two seemingly unconnected objects, awareness of the conjunct, a and b, or the alternant, a or b, or the negation, not-a, would be non-simple under this description. In the case of the first two, however, we have a free choice of regarding any one of the constituents as the 'chief'. In 'not-a' usually an absence is the qualificand or 'chief' and it is qualified or distinguished by a.

The two objects, while playing different roles, can form a unity when they are connected. They would form a fake unity when they are not connected. Promiscuity of awareness does not mean simply that it deals with two objects, for then most awareness would be promiscuous. Rather the promiscuity consists in dealing with and uniting two objects in the above way when they are not so connected or united in the actual world. Seeing a tree as a tree is not promiscuous. Awareness of the table as a table (or as brown, if it is brown) is not promiscuous. For the two objects

here are the thing (tree) and the tree-character (or tree- universal or tree-ness, if we accept such entities). And they are connected. We do not here unite the character with something to which it does not belong. But seeing a rope as a snake is promiscuous. For the two objects are the thing (rope) and the snake-character. The snake character does not belong to the thing (rope) and therefore our seeing it as a snake is promiscuous in so far as it unites them into one complex.

I have remarked that perceptual awareness is seldom simple in the above sense. This point is sometimes made by such claims as 'All seeing is seeing as ...' If a person sees something at all, it must look to him like something, even if it only looks like 'somebody doing something'. I do not think there is any need to belabor the point although, as I have indicated, the universality or non-exceptionality of this position is dubious. There are some cases of seeing which are not cases of seeing-as. here may be a logical necessity to accept such exceptions. Seeing is mostly seeing-as ..., i.e. is seeing something as something and it is only with regard to such seeing-as that the possibility of promiscuity, i.e. possibility of illusion, can arise. The normal adult perceptual process is involved with various accretions due to past experience, collateral information, habitual associations, interpretations, and inference. All this makes a simple perceptual awareness a rare event that stands by itself. It is also well known that our perception could be promiscuous. It occasionally becomes promiscuous because of its involvement with all those things just mentioned. Epistemologists, therefore, would like to search for an occasion of simple perceptual awareness where chances of promiscuity are nil or logically impossible. If seeing is an occasion of 'simple' seeing in our sense of the term, and not of seeing-as ..., then it is impossible for it to be promiscuous, or to be an illusion. In the epistemologist's language, it is 'incorrigible'. Some philosophers think that if we can concentrate upon the pure sensory core, we have reached such an awareness in our perceptual process.

A distinction is usually made between seeing-things and seeing-that in modern philosophical writings on perception. But that distinction is not relevant for our purpose here. What is relevant for our purpose is to decide whether we are seeing a simple or a non-simple thing. Very few things we see are simple in the strictest sense. Similarly, we very rarely

direct our seeing only at a simple object in a conglomeration. Therefore, our seeing-things is 'non-simple' in the above sense. Some cases of seeing-things can be simple, as we have already conceded, but all so-called cases of seeing-that are non-simple for obvious reasons. It may be argued that I am blurring an important distinction between seeing-things and seeing-that. For example, F. Jackson has argued recently that while A in 'S sees A' is subject to substitutivity (of co-referential terms), it is not so in 'S sees that A is F'. In particular, Jackson's point is that:

(1) $(A = B)$ and S sees A. \Rightarrow S sees B' is valid, but (2) $(A = B)$ and S sees that A is F. \Rightarrow S sees that B is F' is not valid.

I do not find this to be quite convincing; for there is an unexplained ambiguity in the use of sees in the second case. Assuming that we are not talking in the first person I think we have to make the following point clear. In Jackson's example, the financier absconding to Brazil sees a pleasant-looking man, and if the pleasant-looking man is also a detective, then I can very well report that the financier sees the detective, even though he may be unaware of the fact that the man he sees is a detective. But if he sees that the pleasant-looking man is approaching him, it does not, according to Jackson, follow that he sees that the detective is approaching him. I think this is wrong unless we have switched from the non-epistemic seeing in the first case to the epistemic seeing in the second. Notice that the first implication (I) holds only because it is a case of non-epistemic seeing. Otherwise he cannot be said to be seeing the detective if he sees only a pleasant-looking man. In epistemic seeing, 'He sees a pleasant-looking man' would unpack as 'He sees that this is a pleasant-looking man, and would not imply 'He sees that this man is a detective'. There may be other philosophic reasons for introducing the notion of seeing-that but for our purpose such cases can be treated together with cases of non-simple seeing-things. In fact, it is to take non-simple seeing-things as equivalent to a sort of epistemic seeing.

Sensory illusion is a non-simple seeing, and a very odd one, because it is promiscuous. The question whether there can be sensory illusion which is also a simple awareness in our senses, is a question that can be reserved for later discussion. We use 'illusion' for cases where something is seen but looks to be other than it is or is 'taken' to be. Thus the rope is taken (i.e. mistaken) to be a snake and a white wall or a conch-shell

looks yellow to the jaundiced eye. Hallucinations and dreams are special cases. We may rule that they are also non-simple perceptions.

7.3 TWO BUDDHIST ANALYSES OF ILLUSION

When I see a shining piece of silver which is actually a piece of shell, how do I know that I am mistaken? At the next moment or at a later time, I may perceive the same piece to be a shell, which is non-silver. Therefore, there are two cases of seeing involved here. The first can be described as:

X looks F to S at t1

The second as:

X looks G to S at t2

It is assumed that F and G are mutually exclusive characteristics. The Sanskrit philosopher calls the second case the 'contradicting or correcting awareness (badhaka prayatna) in relation to the first case which is the case of illusion. The 'correcting' awareness falsifies the looks F. But the question arises: what is (or was) this 'looks F'? From the Buddhist circle, there are apparently two alternative answers. (To be sure, these two views are ascribed to the Buddhists by their non-Buddhist counterparts.) From the non-Buddhist circle, there are, at a conservative estimate, at least three different answers. I shall examine all of them here. The two Buddhist analyses of illusion may be attributed to two different views about the nature of awareness. According to one, our awareness has a 'form' (akara) intrinsic to itself, while the other maintains that our awareness is essentially 'formless'

The latter claims that our awareness in illusion false appears to be 'burdened' with an object-an object which is non-existent (asat). The former believes that our illusory awareness projects its own 'form' as an external object. My awareness of silver is falsified by my veridical awareness of the piece of shell. Obviously this does not mean that there as a piece of silver there which has now been destroyed or transformed into a shell. For our 'robust sense' of reality as well as of the nature of the material object would not allow such a conclusion. Therefore, the piece

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of silver that I saw or misperceived was nothing but part of my awareness. In other words, this was a mental entity, an object-form that my awareness grasped or made a part of itself. If this is conceded, then it is easy to explain how it has been 'destroyed' or 'falsified' by our next awareness. This amounts to saying that what appeared in such awareness was a 'form', a qualifying part of that very awareness and as long as the 'form' cannot exist when the awareness passes away, the silver-appearance, the mental entity, would not exist without that awareness. This is the position of the Buddhist generally belonging to the Yogacara-school or rather the school that upholds sakaravada.

The main part of this theory, which is technically called the revelation of the awareness itself' (atmakhyati), is that the silver-form or the silver like appearance that we are sensory aware of is not external to the awareness but internal (antara) to it. In this respect, the silver-form (comparable to the sensory datum) shares the character of such internal episodes as pain or pleasure. We have awareness of pain or pleasure, but this pain or pleasure that we 'feel' cannot be anything 'external' to the awareness itself which reveals it. We have pain-form or pleasure-form which, according to the Buddhist, is an integral part of the awareness itself. Similarly, the silver-form in a sensory illusion is an integral part of the awareness. An argument is formulated as follows: in our sensory illusion, there are three elements: (i) the silver- form that is picked out by the part 'silver' in the expression 'this (is) silver', (ii) what lies in front, and is picked out by the part 'this', and (iii) the awareness itself. Now the silver-form has a problematic character. It can presumably be connected with the two other elements of the complex: (ii) what lies in front and (iii) the awareness itself. However, while the illusory awareness ascribes it to what lies in front (the external object), the 'correcting' awareness refutes such an ascription. By elimination, therefore, the silver-form can right be connected with the third remaining dement, the awareness itself. Since there is no other element involved in the structure of the awareness, the silver-form cannot be attached to anything else. To put the matter simply: the silver-form in the awareness is not matched by anything in the objective situation with which we are concerned here. Hence it must belong to the subjective side, i.e. be only a part of the awareness itself. As there is no knower or self on the subjective side for the Buddhist,

there remains only awareness. If the silver-form is in this way attached to the awareness itself, the Buddhist will say that the silver-form is therefore a characteristic of the awareness, not of anything lying outside. Therefore, I have called it a 'mental' entity or a non-external existent. I presume that any sense-data philosopher who argues that a sense-datum is a mental entity (and there cannot be any unsensed sense-datum) would have to take a similar position. It might be said that the drunkard's perception of pink rats, Macbeth's vision of the dagger, and all other hallucinations could be explained in this way, the object of awareness being non-physical in all such cases. The sakara-vada of the Yogacara Buddhist is however a more radical theory than this, as we shall see.

Regarding the existence of mental objects as well as of mental events, there has been much discussion in what is considered a special branch of philosophy, namely the philosophy of mind. The arguments in favour of materialism, behaviourism, and physicalism, which eliminate (or 'parse away') mental objects or inner events such as pain or after-image in favour of the physical, are too well known to be repeated here. It may be tentatively assumed that the above Indian philosophers accept mental entities as real and intelligible and hence would regard the modern programme for eliminating all mentalist vocabulary as unnecessary. Hence from this point of view there will be little sympathy for the claim that all our talk of mental entities must be banished from any philosophical discourse. It is undeniable that mental objects like pain cannot exist without there being a person having them. But must all things that exist or are presumed to exist independently of the mind? It seems that the Sautrantika-Yoga-cara Buddhist goes to the other extreme and envisions a programme that could eliminate all physicalist vocabulary in favour of phenomenalist entities alone. Some would, however, prefer to interpret the Yogacara entities as purely 'mental'. If this seems to offend common sense, the physicalist should remember that his position too occasionally offends our presumably robust common sense. Mental events are undeniably facts as much as a car accident is a fact in the external world. There may or may not always be a recognizable and identifiable (under presumably some laboratory condition) physical change in the brain-cells concomitant with each mental event. We must admit that beyond a certain limit, the physicalist's

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programme becomes as much mysterious and conjectural as that of a mentalist or even a phenomenalist. In any case, some philosophers now accept the mentalist vocabulary for the sake of convenience, and because it would practically be impossible to do otherwise, if not for any other compelling reason. I will come back to this problem later. My own position is, however, that while there are some obvious internal episodes and mental entities, such as pain, pleasure, remembering, and confusing, it is not absolutely clear that the immediate objects of our sensory illusion should necessarily be non-existent or purely mental in the way some Buddhists claim. The main problem in the West has been the mysterious sway that Cartesian dualism held over centuries. In the classical Indian philosophy of mind, it may be noted, such a radical sort of dualism was never seriously maintained.

Whether or not we can grasp external objects in our awareness, there is undeniably a common feeling shared by all of us that there is an external world. Some (Madhyamika) Buddhists disagree with their Sautrantika-Yogacara counterparts in holding that our awareness does not really have any form (akara) that is intrinsic to it. The Naiyayikas and the Prabhakaras join hands with this section of the Buddhists in this regard. They can all be classified as those who regard awareness formless (nirakara-jnana-vadin). It is, however, maintained in this theory also that one awareness is distinguished from another by virtue of its object-form, i.e. that which appears in it as its object. Thus the awareness of blue will be distinct from the awareness of green because one is characterized by 'blue-grasping' while the other by 'green-grasping'. These 'blue-grasping' and 'green-grasping', which we have just called particular 'object-forms' are, however, not an intrinsic part of the awareness in this theory for awareness is essentially formless. The object-form is also called the 'apprehensible form (graha) because it is apprehended by the awareness and the awareness is called the 'apprehender' (grahaka).

That our sensory awareness is characterized by an apprehensible object-form is revealed by its linguistic description. To describe the awareness we say, 'it is an awareness of blue', or to express what is apprehended we say, 'it is blue'. This apprehensible object-form gives the formless awareness a recognizable shape as it were, so that we can distinguish one from the other. The major point here is that although the awareness is

basically formless, it has the peculiar capacity of revealing or manifesting an entirely non-existent or unreal object (asat- prakasana-fila; recall Vasubandhu in Vijnapti-karika 1: asad-arthava- bhasanat), and hence it is no wonder that our perceptual illusion reveals or manifests an object (that particular snake that I saw just a moment ago for example) that has no counterpart in reality. In fact this particular is not even identified with the illusion itself (in this theory), for the object's distinctness from the awareness that grasps it is almost experientially proven (recall also Udayana: na grahya-bhedam avadhuya dhiyo'sti -vrttih).

It should be emphasized, even at the risk of repetition, that each awareness arises only when it is characterized by some apprehensible form, but since awareness is, in this theory, essentially formless like the sky or space (colourless like the transparent crystal), it is only nominally characterized by its particular apprehensible form. The apprehensible form is not an essential part of our awareness. But what could be its objective status? If it is posited only as a 'mediator' between the external world and the internal episode of awareness then its objective status is dubious. Nyaya and Prabhakara would like to identify this apprehensible-form with the external reality or parts of such reality. The Sautrantikas who do not align themselves with the Yogacarins would probably have to say that the so-called apprehensible-form is a 'representation' (in some acceptable sense) of the external object. Those Buddhists who believe that awareness must have a form (an object-form), the Yogacarins, argue that the apprehensible-form is an 'internal' entity. It is mental for it is that part of awareness which is externalized or projected outside. But the Madhyamika Buddhists who would regard awareness as being essentially formless would argue that the apprehensible-form in erroneous perception, since it is neither mental nor material, neither external nor internal, is in fact an unreal or non-existent (a-sat) entity. The apprehensible object-form, the argument continues, can be held to be real provided it fulfils either of two conditions: (i) it is mirrored by the part of an external reality, or (ii) it is an integral part of the 'internal' reality, the awareness-episode itself. But since the apprehensible snake-form in the perceptual illusion of a snake fulfils neither of these conditions, it must be regarded as non-existent or unreal. It is also to be concluded therefore

that our awareness possesses the power to make a non-existent object appear in it.

The claim here is something like this. The nature of our awareness is such that when it arises as an episode from all its causal factors, it arises invariably apprehending some object-form that is different from it. The proponent of the above argument shows that the nature of an awareness cannot be such that its object-form is always, or is always caused by, an existent entity. The object-form may very well be a non-existent entity. We do have awareness of past and future things, where we cannot say that the object-forms are directly caused by those past or future things. Similarly, we have to deal with the episodes of awareness of non-existent, un-actual things. Because they are non-existent at the time when the awareness episode arises, they cannot be causally responsible for the relevant object-forms, the apprehensible-forms, in the awareness. In other words, in order to be the apprehensible object-form of awareness, it is not always necessary, though it may be sufficient, for an external object to 'create' such an object-form. For the object-form may be an unreal, a non-existent object, which the awareness apprehends or grasps as the apprehensible, as necessarily happens in dreams or hallucinations (*kesadi-darsana*). Therefore, the *asat* 'non-existent' object-form of the illusion, 'this is a piece of silver' is unreal for it meets neither test of reality: it is not a contribution from (a representation of) the external object and it is not created by the awareness itself. It is only apprehended or grasped by the awareness.

This, I think, is the position of those who hold the 'revelation of the non-existent' (*asat-khyati*) theory of sensory illusion. This is stated in non-Buddhist texts rather poorly and in an unconvincing manner. The object, i.e. the silver-form that is grasped in our sensory awareness is *asat*, unreal or non-existent. The 'correcting' awareness in which the piece appears as non-silver to the perceiver and he says 'this is not silver' exposes this fact, viz. non-existence of that silver-form that we grasped before. Commentators of the non-Buddhist tradition ascribe this view to the *Madhyamika* or *Sunyavada* school. However, this ascription need not be taken to be strictly correct.

The obvious difficulties of this view led to the other Buddhist view, which we have mentioned already. This is held by those who held the

Yogacara doctrine: The object-form is an integral part of the awareness itself, each awareness being different from another by virtue of this unique object-form which appears in it. The object-form does not come from outside. In fact when the object-form is projected outside or externalized, we are said to have an awareness of the external object. An awareness of blue is determined by the blue-form which is unique to that awareness. Therefore, the object-form intrinsically belonging to the awareness determines it as an awareness of that very object. In a true awareness the object-form becomes the 'evidence' (pramana) for the apprehension of the object. The same episode, awareness, in one role supplies the evidence, i.e. the object-form (as pramana), for the apprehension and in another role becomes the result (phala), i.e. what is established by that evidence, namely the apprehension of the object. This is not to be regarded as impossible. For example, the same oak tree in the aspect of being an oak acts as evidence (linga) for being regarded as a tree. Here the oak-aspect is the evidence for the tree-aspect, although the two in principle are inseparable. Just as we can say that 'this is a tree' because it is an oak, similarly it is possible to assert that there is apprehension of the object because the object-form belongs to it as an integral part. In this way these Buddhists would move towards some kind of phenomenalism and idealism, for they would claim that we do not need to refer to the external world in order to explain, understand, and distinguish our awareness-episodes. They would maintain that the familiar external world is nothing but these object-forms of true awareness (pramana) individually externalized. In sensory illusion etc., the object-form, i.e. the snake-form, belongs essentially to the awareness itself, for its externalization is repudiated by our 'correcting' awareness (awareness that corrects the previous error) which says 'this is not silver'. This counter-thrust against externalization would establish the internal or mental nature of the object-form that is grasped in sensory illusion.

It may be noted that the theory of the revelation of the non-existent' in illusion is not to be totally neglected. For even in the Nyaya realistic analysis of illusion, where the objects apprehended are broken into bits and pieces so that they can be identified with the bits and pieces of the actual world, there is one recalcitrant element that is not totally eliminable in this way! It is the connection (samsarga) that one bit has

with the other. This has to be finally a non-existent entity, an *asat* particular. Illusion thus uses its own cement to connect real bits and pieces into some fanciful whole. (See below.)

In this brief reconstruction of the views of the two Buddhist schools I have tried to simplify the rather complex arguments of the Buddhist, but the vocabulary that is common to the Buddhist discussion is not familiar today in philosophic parlance. Hence difficulties exist especially in following the thread of the argument as we jump from one step to another. In spite of these problems of exposition, I believe the rather specific nature of Buddhist phenomenalism is clear, though the arguments and philosophic motivation which led the Buddhist to these positions may still remain obscure. I shall now expound the three non-Buddhist theories of sensory illusion.

Check your Progress

2. Explain *Asatkyati*
-
-
-

7.4 THE ADVAITA VIEW OF THE INEXPLICABILITY OF THE APPEARANCE

The first well-known non-Buddhist view, which is in a way derivable also from the Buddhist position, is called the *anirvacaniyakhyati* which says that the object-form, the silver-form or the snake-form, in sensory illusion (expressible as 'this is silver' or 'this is a snake') must belong to a third realm of objects which is neither existent nor non-existent. This view resolves the problematic character of the object-form grasped in illusion by positing a third realm, which is sometimes called (wrongly, I think) in modern interpretations as the 'transcendental' realm. This view belongs to Advaita Vedanta. It is obvious that this position exploits the weak points of the two Buddhist views. First, the silver-form cannot real nor be non-existent or unreal for (i) it appeared in an apparently perceptual awareness and (ii) according to one meaning of 'sec' 'a sees X' implies 'X exists'. Something, it may be argued, which was so vivid and

certain in my 'direct' awareness cannot easily be ruled out as unreal. The 'revelation of the non-existent' (asat-khyai) view is rather weak on this point. For it does not explain why an unreal object is grasped at all by illusion. Second, the silver-form cannot really be internal or mental, for after all a vivid perceptual experience grasps it as an external object. Nor can the silver-form be regarded as existent or real, for the 'correcting' awareness falsifies that possibility. Nor can we rule that the silver-form is therefore both real and unreal, existent and non-existent, for that would be a contradiction. With such arguments, it is concluded that the nature of the silver-form appearing in illusion therefore cannot be made explicit (vacaniya) as existent or as non-existent, for it is neither. It is un-categorizable by the ordinary notion of the existent and the non-existent. This view is generalized in Advaita to support another philosophical doctrine. Samkara explains the status of this whole external, material world on this model of sensory illusion. Our ordinary veridical perception reveals diversities of the external but the scriptures say that there is the non-dual Brahman and Brahman-awareness will ultimately 'falsify' the diversity-awareness. Because of the presence of such falsifying awareness, therefore, the diversity of the external world would have the same un-categorizable status. It is, in the above sense, neither existent nor non-existent, neither real nor unreal. To put it another way, the world has an 'inexplicable' (or ineffable) existence (anirvacaniya or pratibhasika satta), for under examination (vicara) it yields to neither the characteristic or mark of the existent nor that of the non-existent. We need not concern ourselves too much with this metaphysical thesis which is an integral part or a necessary consequence of the scriptural (and perhaps experiential in the mystical sense) assertion about the Brahman-awareness. But this thesis need not be called (as it often is by some modern exponents) illusionism in the ordinary sense of illusion. Rather, the model of sensory illusion is used as an argument to show that the world of experience is neither categorizable as real or existent nor as unreal or non-existent. The world does not strictly conform to the way we intuitively understand these terms, real-unreal or 'existent-non-existent'.

One may recall here the Brentano thesis about the 'intentional inexistence' of the objects of all psychological verbs. One of the marks of

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intentional inexistence is this: from 'a F's X' (where F stands for any psychological verb) we cannot infer whether X exists or does not exist. Here the Advaitin is dealing with a specific type of psychological verb, cases of illusion, i.e. illusorily seeing X (the SNAKE). Now the argument is that this SNAKE can be said to be neither existent nor non-existent. Having established the status of the SNAKE in illusion in this way, the Advaitin proceeds to show that the status of the whole world appearing in our awareness is similar: indescribable either-as-existent-or-as-non-existent. In other words, the situation here is not comparable to what we ordinarily understand by the existents, e.g. the chair I am sitting upon, or the pen I am writing with, nor is it comparable with what we ordinarily understand by the non-existent or unreal, the rabbit's horn, the son of a barren woman, etc.

We may put this another way: our a priori notion of existence and non-existence falls short of the world we actually experience. Or the world we experience behaves strangely enough to enable us to say that it contradicts our a priori notions of real and unreal. The snake that I experienced in my sensory illusion had, with all its peculiarities and generalities, the unmistakable mark of being real and existent but now it has vanished, and a thing as real as a snake cannot do this. Therefore, how else could we classify that snake-form in our illusion except as neither real nor unreal? This theory in fact tends more towards realism than phenomenalism or idealism. For it accepts the external world more seriously as real and existent. It is only in the context of the ultimate Brahman awareness that the reality-status of this world becomes questionable.

Check your Progress

Explain Anirvacaniya Khyati

7.5 THE PRABHAKARA VIEW OF NO-ILLUSION

Now I shall discuss the views of the two avowedly realistic schools, the Prabhakara Mimamsaka and the Nyaya. The best way to introduce the Prabhakara is to say something about what is called the 'existential import' of the verb 'to see'. I believe the matter is concerned not simply with the English usage of the verb 'see', for the problem exists also in Sanskrit philosophy of perception. I may refer to how Sabara has formulated the principle of existential import in perception. To restate the Sabara principle: from 'S sees A' we can infer 'A exists', i.e. there must be something satisfying the description, or having the name, A, which S sees. Philosophers such as G. E. Moore and A. J. Ayer have tried to distinguish the different uses of this verb, in one case 'to see' is like 'to eat', which carries with it the existential implication of what is seen (or eaten), while in another case seeing does not have the said existential import, i.e. seeing something is consistent with the non-existence of what is seen.

There are, among other things, two distinct problems here I wish to discuss. First, people can say that they see things which they also believe (at the moment of seeing) to exist. A little boy can see Santa Claus or a ghost and he also believes that such a being exists and is there. Hence this is not really a counter-example to the use of 'see' governed by the 'existence' condition. A proper counter-example would be found in the percipient saying that he sees X with the full awareness that X is not present or does not exist. I concede that there are such examples. But I suggest that we could take it as a metaphorical extension of the use of the verb based upon similarity of situation (in both sorts of cases there are eyes open, broad daylight, I was not dreaming, I had an experience etc.). Second, with regard to after-image and other private data, dark patches, blurs, blotches, etc., it is perhaps still possible to claim that the 'existence' condition holds, unless our 'existence' condition further implies that the object be publicly observable. In fact it is reasonable to claim that if I see a blur, it exists for me, for the failure of other people to see it does not mean that I do not see it.

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Some modern re-presentationalists (e.g. F. Jackson) argue that if Macbeth saw a dagger (which other people failed to see) then there must have been a dagger-like shape for only Macbeth to see. Or, in other words, 'there may have been a mental image seen by Macbeth which he mistakenly took to be a dagger'. This means that although it is true, as if by definition, that nothing physical or material or public is seen when we are hallucinating, it does not follow from the same definition that something private or non-physical or mental cannot be seen when hallucination occurs. Even a Yogacara Buddhist would say that when someone is sensorily aware of the silver-form in sensory illusion, that silver-form he sees exists for him, though not as a publicly observable object. It exists as an integral part of that very awareness. The Prabhakara would raise a question at this point: if he sees the silver-form which exists, why should we call that awareness an illusion at all? The Prabhakara is however not a representationalist as we shall see presently. He is a direct realist, though he disagrees with Nyaya in his analysis of illusion. He takes the extreme position that if illusion means awareness of X when X is unreal or not there, then there cannot be any illusion in this given sense of the term, for all obvious cases of illusion can be explained away in a different manner. This position is called akhyati or satkhyati or vivekakhyati. Akhyati means 'no illusion'; sat-khyati means 'only the existent (real) appears in our awareness', and vivekakhyati means 'the distinction between past experience and present experience is "missed" (in illusion)'. All these three expressions (used as names here) in fact describe different aspects of a theory.

We have said earlier that a perceptual (sensory) illusion is a non-simple awareness, for it involves at least two elements. This, however, does not mean that the awareness is always judgemental in the sense that it is expressed as 'this is silver', nor does it mean that the percipient necessarily says 'I see that this is silver' to express his inner judgement. For all we know, the illusion may happen too quickly for the verbalization to arise. () But still it would be a non-simple awareness in our sense. For it would probably be admitted by all parties that even in my sensory illusion of a blue blur when there is only a white ellpanse (a wall), I am ready to allow a duality of what appears in the awareness

and what stimulated the sensory faculty (I say 'probably' because only some form of extreme phenomenalism, which will then move close to idealism and then to solipsism, may dispute this account). Sanskrit philosophers call the first pratibhasa, 'that which appears in awareness', and the second alambana, 'what supports the awareness by (causally?) stimulating etc.'.

It might be argued that given the above duality and the non-simple nature of the sensory perception, it is possible to think that such seeing could potentially deliver a judgement of the form 'this is F. I think this argument is valid but the crucial word is 'potentially', for the point is that it may or may not actually deliver the judgement required. Even so the sensory perception would be non-simple according to our definition, for it involves the duality mentioned above. It is possible for such a perception to be an illusion provided the appearance (pratibhasa) deviates (that is how the Sanskrit philosophers would like to put it, vyabharati) from the support-stimulant (alambana). In other words, if X looks some way to S and X is not that way at all, then S's perception is an illusion. If I am seeing, for whatever reason, a blue blur in the corner of the white expanse (wall) at the moment while the white wall, even in that corner, is not that way at all, then my seeing is illusory. The Prabhakara takes his cue here, and goes on to say that there is another alternative to our declaring this awareness to be illusory. The notion of alambana, the support-stimulant, from which the pratibhasa, 'appearance', is said to deviate, has been explicitly contrived in the above account of illusion as performing a causal function. But this may not be an essential constituent of the notion of alambana, 'the support', though in most cases that which is the support is also the stimulant and hence a causal factor. For example, a past object (or a future one) may be the support, i.e. the objective support (or alambana) of some present awareness. Therefore, it is possible to say that the 'objective support' and the appearance of a particular awareness not only can coincide (as opposed to deviate) and be the same, but they also always or necessarily 'coincide'. If they do so necessarily, then, the argument continues, there cannot arise any illusion in the given sense where the support (alambana.) must deviate from the appearance (pratibhasa). In other words, both Nyaya and Prabhakara would hold that in veridical perception what lends objective (causal)

support (alambana) to the awareness is also the object that appears in it, the 'object-form' and the (external) object being not separable at all. If a red patch causes the awareness of red, then the 'red-appearance' is nothing that could be distinguishable from the red patch itself. If the same can be maintained in the case of perceptual illusion, then we have to say that there cannot be any proper illusion. The above, rather strenuous, argument suggests a useful analysis of what we ordinarily take to be illusion. The Prabhakara says that each sensory illusion is non-simple not only because it is involved with at least two objects but also because it combines two distinct modes of awareness into one. One is the direct sensing while the other is a 'concealed' remembering. The judgement into which this 'illusion' can be developed has two distinct expressions, 'this' and 'silver' as in 'this (is) silver'. Here the 'this' part singles out the direct sensing, while the 'silver' part points to the 'concealed' remembering. 'Illusion' means that these distinct modes of awareness are confused as one. This confusion is due to our lack of knowledge of their distinctness. To be sure, we are confused not in our awareness but only in our behaviours, actions etc. (vyavahara). Because we cannot grasp the distinction between the two truly distinct cases of awareness, we tend to treat them as a unity (out of confusion) in our verbal report, actions, speech- behaviour etc. (vyavahara); we further act on the basis of this confusion or 'fusion'.

The 'this' part shows that what we grasp lies in front, but owing to some defect in the causal situation we cannot fully grasp it as a piece of shell. The similarity between a piece of silver and a shell being grasped in this way reminds the percipient of the previous experienced silver- character. Here again, owing to some defect in the causal situation, the remembering mode of awareness 'conceals' its own nature (pramustatatta) in the sense that it does not fully grasp that the silver-character we experience here is only a memory of such a character and is not actually present. In other words, in remembering F we are usually aware that we had directly experienced F once before. The present case is, however, not the usual kind of remembering, for we are only aware of F and the fact of its being previously experienced is concealed from the awareness. In this way in our speech-behaviour (vyavahara), a fusion of memory (remembering) and perception has taken place and as a result we have

what we call an illusion. In this analysis of illusion, it is maintained that what we see, i.e. the piece of shell, exists even though we do not see it as a piece of shell and what we actually remember, i.e. the silver-character, is not what we see, though in our confusion, we think or say that we see it. Saying and thinking are only different modes of vyavahara here. In fact there is a double fusion, according to this analysis. We are unaware of the distinction between objects-what is actually seen and what is actually remembered-and we are unaware, in addition, of the distinction between the two modes of awareness, seeing and remembering. Illusion is thus explained in terms of this double lack of awareness of distinction (cf. vivekagraha).

Each individual piece of awareness, under this theory, is correct or non-illusory in the sense that it is 'object-corresponding' (yathartha). In other words, here the 'appearance' (pratibhasika) does not deviate from the 'support' (alambana) in either case. In the perceptual component, the 'appearance' is expressed as this and the objective support is also what lies before the perceiver, while in the remembrance component, the objective support is the remembered silver. But what appears in the awareness is the unqualified silver. That is the silver of our past experience which is now only being remembered. But the remembered aspect of the past silver does not appear along with the appearance of silver in our present awareness. In other words, the awareness is the awareness of an indefinite piece of silver, not of that piece of silver (i.e. the silver I had seen before).

Sometimes, the Prabhakara argues, two distinct cases of perception are fused together to generate a so-called illusion, instead of a fusion between a seeing and a remembering. A jaundiced person, for example, perceives the conch-shell as yellow. Here the awareness of yellow is a sensory perception although this yellow is not of the object we distinguish in our visual field, i.e. the conch-shell. The yellow belongs to the disease that affects the eye. It is like seeing the white conch-shell through yellow glass where the yellow we see belongs to the glass. The yellow of the disease is sensed but that it belongs to the disease is not apprehended, just as the yellow of a very transparent glass plate may be grasped without our realizing that it is a quality of the glass plate. The awareness of the conch-shell is also perceptual. Because of the obvious

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defect in the perceptual factors, we grasp only the material body, the conch-shell as such without its particular colour. In this way, there is a perception of the qualifier only, the yellow, as well as another perception of the thing only, the conch-shell. The two cases of perception are distinct but we are unaware of their distinction. Similarly the two objects, the qualifier and the thing, are distinct, but there too we lack the knowledge of their unrelatedness. The result is a fusion in vyavahara, in which the conch-shell appears yellow to us. What is the function of the 'correcting' awareness in such cases? It simply supplies the missing knowledge of their distinction, of their unrelatedness. The so-called 'correcting' (badhka) awareness supplies only the gaps in the previous awareness and thereby sets the matter right! In this way, all cases of awareness, including illusion, would appear as 'object-corresponding' under this theory. Therefore, strictly speaking, no awareness can be incorrect or wrong.

We may ask why, in the case of a so-called perceptual illusion, we have a revival of memory which is really not a normal remembering? For in normal remembering we do grasp the object as being experienced before. Here this crucial component of a normal remembering is missing. How can we explain this abnormality? The Prabhakara suggests a way out. The Prabhakara, if we recall, believes that a cognitive event, when it is produced by a set of causal factors in normal circumstances, would be naturally a piece of knowledge (Chapter 5). If there is some fault or defect (do a) present among the causal factors, the result would be a 'defective' cognition, which we call illusion. This, according to the Prabhakara, is how we must explain the abnormality of the said remembering. Although we are actually remembering (i.e. have a memory-revival of) a snake previously experienced, we are not aware that it is a remembering. The defect among causal factors has produced a corresponding defect in the memory-revival itself with the result that we are confused in our speech-behaviour (vyavahara) or the resulting activity and so on. The previously experienced snake lends objective (causal) support to my remembering of it and it is also what is grasped by the same 'remembering'. Hence this remembering is not incorrect. In the same way we can show that the perceptual part is also not incorrect.

I have said that the Prabhakara is a realist. He tries to resolve the puzzlement of an idealist sceptic by meeting him headlong. An idealist or a sceptic may point to a well-known puzzlement. If objects exist independently of our being aware of them, and if it is in the nature of our awareness to reveal objects, then there should not arise any illusion. And if awareness by nature reveals objects that are not there to begin with, there cannot possibly arise any correct awareness, and there is no possibility of knowledge. The Prabhakara tries to opt for the first alternative and maintains that there are, in fact, no cases of illusion, but only of confusion. Remember the Vasubandhu argument: if in some cases of awareness (dreams, hallucinations) we are aware of objects that are not there, at least in the way they appear to us, then all cases could be so, for there is no neutral ground for us to distinguish between them. The Prabhakara turns the tables on this position and says that if some cases of awareness make us aware of objects that are there, and are there as they appear to us, then all cases of awareness must be so, for awareness and the factors giving rise to awareness, e.g. sense-faculty etc., cannot change their intrinsic nature of causing true awareness. These cases of so-called illusion are only apparent and can be explained away. In an awareness, be it a remembering, or seeing, or a sensing, sometimes due to some defective causal collocation we may not be aware of as much as we should be or could be, but we are never wrongly aware of something that is not there. There may be omission but no commission.

The Prabhakara does not accept sense-data in the same way as some modern re-presentationalists. The immediate object of perception may be the thing with properties, or simply the particular property without the thing (as in some cases of illusion explained above) or the thing itself without the property. In the last case we may be visually aware of the thing because it has a colour and shape but we need not always be aware of this colour or this shape, for we can simply be aware of the thing as such (although such awareness is caused by its having a colour). If the (white) wall is seen to be blue through a trick of light, then we see the blue, the particular property which, according to the Prabhakara, belongs to some external object, in this case to the light perhaps: the particular colour belongs not to the wall in front but to the lighting arrangement. Similarly we see the wall without seeing its colour while we are not

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aware that we are not seeing its colour. We are unaware that we are seeing two objects unrelated to each other, the wall and the particular blue. We are also unaware that there are two cases of seeing each distinct from the other. In this way, illusion is explained without resorting, in the usual sense, to the sense-datum blue (I assume that a sense-datum in the usual sense is a mental entity). If this blue is called a sense-datum here, it is unquestionably physical, according to the Prabhakara. Besides, by saying that direct grasp of the thing, the material body, is possible without the mediation of the grasping of its colour etc., the Prabhakara is opting for direct realism. Hallucinations and dreams are explained in terms of memory. When Macbeth sees the dagger, if he does, the Prabhakara would say that he is only remembering the previously experienced dagger without being aware that he is only so remembering. Further, he is also confusing the perceptual capacity or capability of his present situation (broad daylight, open eyes etc.) with his concealed remembering. He is unaware of the distinction between the two distinct cases. The dagger that appears in hallucination is therefore an internal object or a mental object in the sense that it is a remembered dagger and the initial experience was caused by a real dagger.

The Prabhakara's analysis of illusion seems unnecessarily complicated, although he is apparently motivated by his faith in realism and hence wishes to avoid positing a set of unwelcome entities called 'appearance' (pratibhasa), distinct from objects in the material world. He rightly emphasizes the role of memory in any non-simple perceptual awareness. As long as we allow that we cannot remember what we never experienced before in some form or other, the role of the objects in the material world (and this includes even properties, features, etc. of things) in generating even disguised memories is rightly underlined. But as Vacaspati has remarked the proposed analysis of illusion by the Prabhakara is unnecessarily driven to some ludicrous extremity (cf. *ativyakhyana*). In other words, the Prabhakara is guilty of 'overkill'. The strenuous effort to split what seems to be a unitary perceptual mode of awareness into two distinct occurrences of awareness, viz. remembering and seeing (where again we are unaware that we are remembering as well as unaware that we are not seeing), is, according to its Nyaya

critique, neither necessary nor defensible. It is not necessary, the Nyaya says, since there is a simpler way of explaining illusion. Nor is it defensible because such an explanation cannot account for the origin of human effort and action towards the object grasped in such illusory awareness. For example, even if I misperceive a snake, I immediately act in some way or other such as running away from it. My action is unquestionably prompted by my (false) awareness. Under the Prabhakara analysis, however, we would have to say that my action is prompted by my lack of awareness of the distinctness of the two different cases. Now suppose I pick out the object presented (to me) by my revived memory to make a false attribution to what lies before me but is entirely unrelated to it. I may, of course, make the attribution in either of two ways. I may do it unknowingly, or knowingly (as in a make-belief or fantasy). It is also true that I need not act the same way in each situation. People do not usually act on lack of knowledge but rather under some positive certitude or awareness. As Vacaspati emphasizes, 'A conscious being does not act out of lack of awareness, but out of awareness. Therefore I may lack the required knowledge of the unrelatedness of the two objects, but my positive action comes when I, unknowingly of course, 'mix them together', i.e. superimpose one upon the other.

The Prabhakara could reply that our failure to distinguish these two distinct cases of awareness would make them appear as one; this similarity with one unitary (perceptual) awareness would be enough to prompt us to act. In normal discourse we do say that the person ran away from that false snake because he did not know. The Prabhakara says that while the two different types of awareness remain distinct, confusion emerges (shows itself) when we express them in speech, for we express them as one: This is a snake. The Nyaya answer to this is not very convincing. Vacaspati says that if we can claim that it is possible to treat the two distinct cases of awareness as similar to one unitary awareness when their distinction is not grasped (and as a result our activity or speech-behaviour is made to conform to such a single unitary awareness), then we may as well claim that one unitary awareness could be treated as similar to two distinct instances of awareness when identity or the relatedness of its two components is not grasped. And then the speech-behaviour or even our action appropriate to those cases

of distinct awareness should also follow. The Prabhakara point is this. The tentative causal rule for action is that A and the like of A prompt similar action. Although illusion is not a unitary perceptual awareness the situation resembles the case of a unitary perceptual awareness as long as we fail to distinguish between the two distinct cases of awareness. Hence both episodes of awareness prompt us to act in a similar way. The point of Vacaspati's counter-argument is not very clear here. We may, facetiously, interpret the comment in a way that would go in favour of the Prabhakara. Suppose I see something lying on the ground, something that looks like a snake, and thus my memory of a snake is revived but for some unspecified reason I cannot identify or relate the two (for what lies before me is, unknown to me, a snake) and thereby cannot be aware that it is a snake. This situation would then be similar to my having two distinct cases of awareness, seeing and remembering. And hence the behaviour appropriate to such a situation (with two distinct cases of awareness) would follow. In other words, I would not run away from the place, since I know that my memory-snake cannot bite me. If this is the point of the Nyaya reply, the Prabhakara could very well say: in such a situation the person involved does not usually run away, although other observers may, for they know that there is a snake lying there!

7.6 LET'S SUM UP

Although illusion is not a unitary perceptual awareness the situation resembles the case of a unitary perceptual awareness as long as we fail to distinguish between the two distinct cases of awareness. Hence both episodes of awareness prompt us to act in a similar way.

7.7 KEY WORDS

- atmakhyati, (self-apprehension) (Yogacāra Buddhism) – it is the mental state projected outside as a mental image, the error occurs owing to the externalization of inner thoughts, by treating the internal object as external (extra-mental) and the error exists not in the object but in the subject.

- anirvachaniyakhyati, (apprehension of the indescribable) (Advaita) – the object is neither existent (सत्) nor non-existent (असत्) but indescribable (अनिर्वचनियम्), the illusory object is a product of ignorance (*avidyā*) about the substratum and the error is caused due to *Maya* which is also indescribable.

Akhyati (Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā) – the error is due to the failure to distinguish between perception and memory, it is due to the lack of right discrimination vis-à-vis memory.

7.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Explain atmakhyati
2. Write a note on anirvachaniya Khyati
3. What is akhyati.

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7.10 ANSWER TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. Answer to Check your Progress-1

- The two Buddhist analyses of illusion may be attributed to two different views about the nature of awareness.
- According to one, our awareness has a 'form' (akara) intrinsic to itself, while the other maintains that our awareness is essentially 'formless'
- The latter claims that our awareness in illusion false appears to be 'burdened' with an object-an object which is non-existent (asat). The former believes that our illusory awareness projects its own 'form' as an external object.

2 Answer to Check your Progress-1

- First, the silver-form cannot real nor be non-existent or unreal for
- (i) it appeared in an apparently perceptual awareness and
- (ii) according to one meaning of 'sec' 'a sees X' implies 'X exists'.
- the world has an 'inexplicable' (or ineffable) existence (anirvacaniya or pratibhasika satta), for under examination (vicara) it yields to neither the characteristic or mark of the existent nor that of the non-existent.